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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article explores some of the difficulties involved in design-
ing genuinely effective and broadly inclusive legal strategies for
eliminating women's sexual oppression. Part II.A begins the analysis
by using Gary LaFree's empirical studies of rape enforcement
practices to develop some observations about the kinds of legal
strategies most likely to foster women's sexual autonomy.' LaFree's
studies illustrate how the institutional structures and decision
making procedures of the criminal justice system create the
opportunity for rape processing practices to reproduce relations of
race and gender subordination. Each discretionary decision point in
the system creates a social space in which legal agents can deploy
racialized images of male and female sexuality. Because these images
are both racist and sexist, their circulation in the processing of rape
cases is a vehicle through which state power becomes embedded in
and subordinate to the cultural logic of white supremacy and male
supremacy.
LaFree's account of the criminal justice system also suggests
why feminist legal strategies that target the criminal justice appara-
tus have been and are likely to remain ineffective in eliminating rape.
It is precisely because some degree of discretion is inevitable at every
decision point in any case processing system that the legal struggle
for female sexual autonomy-for freedom from rape and sexual
coercion-must move beyond the struggle to reform the substantive
criminal laws and the legal procedures through which these laws are
enforced. Redefining the substantive elements of rape or reforming
evidentiary rules, for example, cannot eliminate the discretion
embedded at each decision point in the criminal justice system.
Because the culturally dominant images of race and sexual identity
inevitably influence the processing of rape cases through the discre-
tionary judgments of individual agents, these images and their social
production are themselves important targets for feminist legal inter-
vention and political struggle.
While LaFree's studies allow me to articulate the "rules of sex-
ual accessibility" that show the connection between rape processing
practices and the logics of white supremacy and male supremacy, the
ultimate question for women is still whether we can really expect to
1. See generally Gary D. LaFree, Rape and Criminal Justice The Social Construction of
Sexual Assault (Wadsworth, 1989).
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eliminate rape-and if so, how and under what circumstances. In
Part II.B, I approach these questions with the understanding that the
legal strategies feminists advocate are directly informed by the an-
swers we give to these questions, that these answers depend on how
we understand the meaning of rape, and that different women under-
stand rape differently, depending in part on differences in the way
women experience sexuality, class subordination, and racial privilege.
To explore these differences, I offer three categories for defining what
rape may mean to different women. These categories are "rape as
hate crime", "rape as sex", and "rape as power". These definitions of
rape suggest ways in which the practice of rape is reinforced by the
distribution of economic resources and racial privilege, as well as by
the culturally dominant images of femininity and masculinity. As a
result, some women are more sexually vulnerable than others, and
the struggle for sexual autonomy requires legal strategies that can
address these differences.
Put differently, although feminism has sometimes aspired to
be the solidarity women develop as we struggle to overcome our com-
mon oppressions, feminist theory remains as much a source of conflict
and misunderstanding between women as it is a source of solidarity
among women.2 Thus, while sexual oppression is a common experi-
ence for most women,3 feminist legal struggles have floundered
around two major problems that are presented most directly in the
lives of straight women of color. The first is heterosexual desire, a
problem engendered by the experience of female sexual desire for and
emotional dependence on men.4 The second problem is racial and
2. See Beatriz M. Pesquera and Denise A. Sugura, There is No Going Back Chicanas
and Feminism, in Norma Alarc6n, et al., eds., Chicana Critical Issues: Mujeres Activas En
Letras Y Cambio Social 95-115 (Third Woman Press, 1993); Gloria I. Joseph and Jill Lewis,
Common Differences: Conflicts in Black and White Feminist Perspectives 19-71
(Anchor/Doubleday, 1981); Chandra T. Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, eds., Third
World Women and the Politics of Feminism 1-80, 271-377 (Indiana U., 1991); Gloria I. Joseph,
The Incompatible Menage a Troi: Marxism, Feminism and Racism, in Lydia Sargeant, ed.,
Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism 91-
107 (South End, 1981); See generally Shabnam Grewal, et al., eds., Charting the Journey:
Writings by Black and Third World Women (Sheba Feminist, 1988).
3. See Catharine MacKinnon's hyperdefensive response to Angela Harris's critique in
Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, Or What is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 Yale
J. L. & Feminism 13, 15-17 (1991) (arguing that feminism ought to be about sexual oppression
because it is what is left in common once you bracket the differences between women). For a
more thoughtful articulation that grounds solidarity among women on the notion of "a gendered
life," see Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference it Makes, 2 Colum. J.
Gender & L. 1, 15-23 (1992).
4. Compare Catharine A. Macainnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses On Life And
Law 46-62 (Harvard U., 1987) (discussed in note 252 and accompanying text), and Robin L.
West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal
872 [Vol. 49:869
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ethnic solidarity.5 Indeed, many Black and Third World feminists
have been particularly critical of the priority given sexual oppression,
claiming that this prioritization reduces feminism to gender essential-
ism, a theoretical and political position limited to the specific concerns
of middle-class white women. 6
A genuinely inclusive feminism must join the struggle against
racism, cultural imperialism, and economic exploitation.7 In this
Article, however, I explore the problems of heterosexual desire and
racial/ethnic solidarity from a different perspective. More specifically,
I approach sexuality as a realm of social interaction where liberation
is, indeed, a feminist issue for women of color. My perspective em-
phasizes the differences that culture, class, and sexual orientation can
Theory, 3 Wis. Women's L. J. 81, 129 (1987) (describing female sexuality as "erotic submission"),
with, generally, Drucilla Cornell, Sexual Difference, the Feminine and Equivalency: A Critique
of MacKinnon's Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 100 Yale L. J. 2247 (1991), and Martha
R. Mahoney, Exit. Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation
Hearings, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1283 (1992).
5. See Kim Crenshaw's pained and painful struggle to position herself in relation to the
the prosecution of 2 Live Crew, Kimberi Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 1241, 1283 (1991) ("I
oppose the obscenity prosecution of 2 Live Crew, but not for the same reasons as those generally
offered in support of 2 Live Crew, and not without a sense of sharp internal division, of dissatis-
faction with the idea that the 'real issue' is race or gender, inertly juxtaposed"). See also
Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 359, 387-88
(1993) (expressing the concern that "the singleminded mission of enhancing individual women's
security by ensuring that offenders are punished conflicts with the antiracist interest in protect-
ing the Black community's freedom from excessive and biased state power").
6. More specifically, the argument has been that feminist struggles that focus exclusively
or even primarily on practices that target women for oppression and subordination because of
their sex and sexuality-practices like rape, sexual harassment, and pornography-neglect the
many practices through which women are oppressed by structures of race, religion, class, and
ethnicity and ignore the bonds that unite the men and women who share these oppressions.
This type of criticism is well illustrated by Cheryl Johnson-Odin's account of the United
Nations' Conference in Copenhagen in the mid-1980s. Cheryl Johnson-Odin, Common Themes,
Different Contexts: Third World Women and Feminism, in Mohanty, Russo, and Torres, eds.,
Third World Women at 314, 322 (cited in note 2). When First World feminists condemned the
practice of female genital mutilation, Third World feminists objected that "problems of nutri-
tion, infant mortality, illiteracy, health-care delivery, [and] skill training" were as important to
them as women as female circumcision. Id. Addressing these problems would, however, require
feminists to "take an antiimperialist position," and according to Johnson-Odin, "fm]any Third
World women fe[It] that their self-defined needs are not addressed as priority items in the in-
ternational feminist agenda, which does not address imperialism." Id.
7. See id. at 322. Johnson-Odin writes: "If the feminist movement does not address
itself also to issues of race, class and imperialism, it cannot be relevant to alleviating the
oppression of most of the women of the world. In addition to broadening the parameters of
feminism, there is the problem of setting a common agenda" Id. Some white feminists have
already made particularly thoughtful contributions to that effort. See, for example, Martha R.
Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5
Yale J. L. & Feminism 217 (1993).
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make in how women experience the struggle for and envision the ob-
jective of sexual autonomy. From this perspective, the questions
feminists need to ask and answer are these: What would it take to
secure every woman's right to heterosexual autonomy? How can
women experience and express heterosexual desire without fear of
rape, harassment, or other forms of coercion through which men at-
tempt to appropriate our sexuality for themselves?8
These questions focus on the experience and expression of fe-
male sexual desire because representations of women's sexual desire
and feminine identity, both as mothers and as sexual beings, often
operate to reproduce racial hierarchy. In addition, these representa-
tions legitimate public policies that reinforce women's economic de-
pendence on men and excuse interpersonal practices that deprive
women of the right to desire and the freedom to experience sexual in-
timacy.9 Indeed, in Part II.C, I argue that culturally dominant repre-
sentations of feminine and masculine sexual identities are directly
implicated in the practices and ideologies of rape because they en-
courage women and men to enact sexual identities that produce het-
8. The question does not specify heterosexual autonomy in order to minimize or ignore
the extent to which lesbian sexual autonomy is restricted by the practices through which men
enforce their version of heterosexuality. See, for example, Adrienne Rich, Compulsory
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell, and Sharon
Thompson, eds., Powers Of Desire: The Politics Of Sexuality 177, 177-205 (Monthly Review,
1985). Instead, I want to avoid a different form of essentialism, that is, the heterosexism which
presumes that reforming the practices and narratives through which heterosexuality is
constructed (my primary concern in this Article) would be enough to secure sexual autonomy for
all women. Heterosexuality does, however, pose particular problems for straight women of color
that need to be dealt with as such. Unlike lesbians (of any race), our desire and its ultimate
satisfaction depends upon achieving the conditions for sexual intimacy with men who often will
(maybe always and at least sometimes) try to dominate us. At the same time, the scripts men
enact in their sexual relations with women of color have narrative elements in which the drive
to dominate may have as much to do with their/our class, race, and culture, as it has to do with
their/our genders. See Part III.C on the sexual scripts organized by the virgin/whore dichotomy,
especially in Latin culture. See also Part V.A on the racial dimensions of pornographic
masculinity.
9. Black and Third World feminists have clearly and persuasively set forth the ways that
the subordination and sexual oppression of women of color have been organized around
degrading (mis)representations of our racialized sexual desire. See, for example, Jacquelyn
Dowd Hall, "The Mind that Burns in Each Body'" Women, Rape, and Racial Violence, in Snitow,
Stansell, and Thompson, eds., Powers of Desire 328, 331-33 (cited in note 8). Black women are
unrapable whores and Latinas are just as bad. See generally Oliva M. Espin, Cultural and
Historical Influences on Sexuality in Hispanic/Latin Women: Implications for Psychotherapy, in
Carole S. Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality 154 (Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 2d. ed. 1985). See also Abdul R. JanMohamed, Sexuality on/of the Racial Border:
Foucault, Wright and the Articulation of "Racialized Sexuality," in Donna C. Stanton, ed.,
Discourses of Sexuality: From Aristotle to AIDS 94, 112 (U. Michigan, 1995) ("[W]ithin the
discursive formation of racialized sexuality the process of racialization is always already a
process of sexualization, and the process of sexualization is also always already--or at least
functions as if it were-a process of racialization").
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erosexual animosity, reduce individual autonomy, and reproduce so-
cioeconomic inequalities. These identity positions, in turn, reduce the
chances that women and men will establish relationships that can
sustain a nonsubordinating sexual intimacy.10
If the ultimate goal is to secure women's sexual autonomy,
then part of the struggle is to change the way women and men think
about ourselves and each other. However, just as class, culture, and
sexual orientation affect how women experience the social meaning of
rape, they can also affect how women respond to different images of
feminine sexual identity. Understanding the feminist struggle for
sexual autonomy as part of a larger struggle to alter the culturally
dominant images of race and sexuality highlights women's potential
inter-cultural conflicts over the "feminist images" that emerge from
this struggle.,, Nevertheless, while women may not agree on which
images are "more liberating," a genuinely inclusive feminism will se-
riously consider these differences in the struggle over the production
of alternative images of motherhood and sexuality.
Part III.A begins the analysis by linking rape to the social con-
struction of women's sexual vulnerability. Both of these, in turn, are
connected to the images of women that circulate in the dominant cul-
ture of white, middle-class America. My initial focus is on the images
of "mother" recounted in the psychoanalytic discourses through which
both white feminists and the predominantly white, upper-middle-
class "men's movement" have attempted to explain interpersonal
practices, like rape, and cultural narratives, like pornographic mascu-
10. This account is developed by analyzing how different narratives of power call men and
women to enact their interpersonal relations as subject/subject or subject/object relations. See
Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of
Domination 7 (Pantheon, 1988).
11. For example, a woman may perceive the struggle to circulate feminist images of
motherhood or female sexuality as having very different implications for female autonomy de-
pending on her sexual preferences and the kinds of sexual experiences she has had, whether she
is single or married, whether her work makes her economically self-sufficient, whether she
wants her children to go to the college of their choice rather than work in the family business,
and whether she wants to leave an abusive partner or a boring marriage or simply wants her
husband to pay more attention to her. Different images of motherhood and sexuality may
facilitate some of these objectives and obstruct others, even as a woman's race, culture, and
sexual orientation will be directly implicated in the kinds of objectives she is likely to embrace.
Accordingly, the images of motherhood and sexuality that might further the objectives of
middle-class, white, American women, might threaten the objectives of Black or Latin women.
For an excellent criticism of the way the interests of poor mothers have been negatively
impacted by white liberal feminism, which deploys images of equality in the market and gender-
neutrality in family as the ultimate objectives of feminist struggles, see Martha A. Fineman,
The Neutered Mother, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 653, 660-62 (1992).
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linity. These images of "mother" are then compared in Part III.B to
the images that circulate in the subordinated discourses of Black and
Latin culture. This cross-cultural analysis of alternative images of
"mother" provides a critical perspective on the public policies and le-
gal doctrines that increase women's sexual vulnerability through the
regulation of motherhood. These policies and doctrines are implicitly,
and often explicitly, designed to pressure women into abdicating sex-
ual autonomy and maternal power to the will of a dominant male
partner. My point here is that liberating motherhood from the cul-
tural ideologies, public policies, and legal doctrines that promote the
male-dominated nuclear family is an important part of "what it will
take" to secure women's sexual autonomy.
Like the images of "mother," the virgin/whore dichotomy is
another culturally dominant narrative that informs the public policies
and legal doctrines that determine the "rules of sexual accessibility"
and restrict the parameters of women's sexual autonomy. Part III.C
examines how this dichotomy influences the substantive elements in
the legal definition of rape as well as the processing practices through
which rape laws are enforced. The discussion then examines the im-
pact this dichotomy has on the practices of heterosexuality. Here, I
focus primarily on Latin culture because it directly and definitively
links the practices of sexual dominance to the articulation of this di-
chotomy. My point is that rape will remain a pervasive phenomenon
so long as heterosexuality is experienced and practiced through the
virgin/whore dichotomy. I introduce Jungian psychoanalyst Nancy
Qualls-Corbett's work on the archetypal image of the "sacred prosti-
tute" as an alternative discursive regime that might help to shatter
the cultural power of this dichotomy. 12
While Part III grounds the social construction of women's sex-
ual vulnerability in the policies that regulate motherhood and female
sexuality, Part IV emphasizes the extent to which "machismo"
prevents both women and men from embracing alternative images
that could support the reforms necessary to secure women's sexual
autonomy. Even if mainstream culture embraces images of women as
"powerful mothers" and "desiring subjects," the circulation of these
images would not generate the changes necessary to reform the legal
incidents of motherhood or the rules of access to female sexuality
until the culture begins to circulate alternative images of men,
masculinity, and "male power."
12. See generally Nancy Qualls-Corbett, The Sacred Prostituta The Eternal Aspects of the
Feminine (Inner City Books, 1988).
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Part V links the feminist struggle against rape to an ideologi-
cal struggle over competing images of masculinity, in general, and
male power, in particular. Just as race, class, and culture affect
women's perceptions of feminine identity, these differences also influ-
ence the way we respond to alternative images of men. The notion,
for example, that male power is at the root of women's sexual oppres-
sion pervades white feminist theory. 13 This account of male power as
the root of women's oppression has made it easy to see the importance
of empowering women economically, culturally, and psychologically.
But it has also made it harder to understand how deeply women's
liberation is invested in the empowerment of the men with whom we
want to establish sexual relations, form families, raise children, and
develop interpersonal intimacy. By contrast, each of the two problems
presented by the experience of straight women of color offers a
perspective from which the root of women's sexual oppression is
located not so much in male power as in the mechanisms through
which men attempt to cope with, deny, and disguise their
powerlessness.14
Developing an analysis that connects the practices of sexual
dominance to male powerlessness has a number of advantages. First,
it provides a basis for a redemptive and transformative analysis of the
structures, practices, and cultural narratives through which women's
sexuality is oppressed. 15 The exclusive focus on male power suggests
13. Feminist theory has developed a sophisticated concept of male power, which ranges
from analyses of the interpersonal strategies through which individual men attempt to domi-
nate and control women, such as rape and sexual harassment, to the institutionalization of male
power. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 3 (cited in note 4) ("[The social relation between
the sexes is organized so that men may dominate and women must submit and this relation is
sexual-in fact, is sex"). See Heidi Hartmann, Capitalism, Patriarchy and Job Segregation by
Sex, in Zillah R. Eisenstein, ed., Capitalist Patriarchy And The Case For Socialist Feminism
206, 208 (Monthly Review, 1979) (stating that women's economic dependence on men is
reinforced by job segregation and wage discrimination); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 93 (1991).
14. At one level, my argument is obvious: we already know this. The evidence linking
male abusiveness to male insecurity, to socio-economic or psychological inadequacy, to male lack
is abundant, and reference to that evidence is pervasive in feminist theory. See, for example,
Susan Schechter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the Battered
Women's Movement 209-40 (South End, 1982); Peter Wade, Man the Hunter: Gender and
Violence in Music and Drinking in Colombia, in Penelope Harvey and Peter Gow, eds., Sex and
Violence: Issues in Representation and Experience 115, 126-34 (Routledge, 1994) (analyzing
domestic violence in Colombian culture as a product of male failure to negotiate successfully the
different value systems of competing masculinities); JanMohamed, Racialized Sexuality, in
Stanton, ed., Discourses of Sexuality at 94-116 (cited in note 9). Nevertheless, it is a connection
that has not been adequately thematized in feminist legal theory.
15. Thomas Ross, Despair and Redemption in the Feminist Nomos, 69 Ind. L. J. 101, 117
(1993) (discussing MacKinnon's work on pornography and sexual harassment: "Her expression
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that women's liberation from sexual oppression depends on finding
better ways to claim the kinds of power men wield. Women need ac-
cess to the jobs that produce economic resources and social status,
which men use to suppress the claims we make on them and to lever-
age the claims they make on us. 16 There is truth in this claim, but it
is only a partial truth in that women want more than the freedom to
confront men as empowered market actors. 17 To the extent women
want to develop deeply intimate sexual relationships with the men in
our lives, female disempowerment is only one part of the problem and
female empowerment only one part of the solution. For it is impossi-
ble to develop intimate relationships with weak, selfish, and insecure
men-the kind of men who need to dominate women.
Second, an analysis that focuses on the relationship between
women's oppression and male powerlessness invites feminists to take
a critical look at what is being represented and attacked as male
power.18 If male domination is not power, but powerlessness, then we
of the horrific nature of the present reality and the radically different world that must be cre-
ated seems to signify such a large void between here and there that she has put aside any real
redemptive possibilities").
16. Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 95, 96 (1993); Hartmann,
Job Segregation by Sex, in Eisenstein, ed., Capitalist Patriarchy at 208 (cited in note 13).
17. See Mahoney, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 1300 (cited in note 4).
18. For example, in a highly provocative passage, Catharine MacKinnon characterizes
male power as a concrete, real, and inescapable fact in women's lives. MacKinnon writes:
[B]ecause men have power over women, women come to epistemological issues situated
in a way that sheds a rather distinct light on the indeterminacy/determinacy question as
men have agonized over it.... How do we deal in the fact of Cartesian-updated as
existential-doubt? Women know the world is out there. Women know the world is out
there because it hits us in the face. Literally. We are raped, battered, pornographed,
defined by force, by a world that begins, at least, entirely outside us. No matter what we
think about it, how we try to think it out of existence or into a different shape for us to
inhabit, the world remains real. Try some time. It exists independent of our will. We
can tell that it is there, because no matter what we do, we can't get out of it. Male
power is for us-therefore is-this kind of fact.
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 57 (cited in note 4) (emphasis added).
This account of male power is highly problematic for a number of reasons. First, while it is
true that women cannot simply "imagine away" an abusive relationship or sexual assault,
MacKinnons account of male power ignores the fact that the content and exercise of agency is
guided more by what we think than by the reality we live. A fist in the face does not mean the
same thing to all women: one woman takes it, another woman leaves, and still another woman
hits back but stays. We cannot begin to understand, let alone to determine, the meaning of
these different responses unless we appreciate the fact that the reality that is outside the
interpretative resources through which individuals understand their behavior and relationships
is as much a product of the choices we can make as an external restriction upon the choices we
do make. Narratives of sexual identity are exactly the kind of interpretative structures that
explain why some women will interpret and respond to that fist as an intolerable 'last straw,"
others as an inescapable force they must submit to, and still others as provoking a fight they
may just as likely win or lose. Thus, while I agree that women cannot "imagine away" the
psycho-social practices of male sexual dominance, how women understand these practices
influences how we respond to them (that is, whether we just take it, exit, or fight back). How
878
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need a radically different account of what power is and what it means
for the relations through which we constitute ourselves as masculine
or feminine subjects. That account necessarily invokes a different set
of values and socio-political commitments than those expressed by the
practices of male domination. It struggles, instead, to articulate im-
ages of a masculinity that can not only withstand but also affirma-
tively embrace the equality and autonomy of female subjectivity.
Such images would offer the resources needed for sustaining the
practices of a deeply intimate heterosexuality.
Put differently, feminists-at least, straight feminists of
color-have a vested interest in articulating positive images of mascu-
line power that we can live with and love. Such images are com-
pletely missing in most feminist legal theory, and we need them des-
perately. Women's liberation depends ultimately and fundamentally,
not on the improbability that men's power over women's lives can ever
be eliminated, but rather on a feminist intervention to redefine male
power and develop the structures, narratives, and practices through
which we can produce men who do not feel compelled to dominate us.
Part V develops this account by attacking the narratives of
masculinity in male supremacist discourses as pornographic and
truncated distortions of the mature masculine. Drawing on the pro-
foundly provocative work of Robert Moore and Douglas Gillette, I ex-
plore what they call the archetypes of mature masculinity: "the King,
Warrior, Magician, and Lover."19 I read these images as alternative
narratives of masculine identity and examine the kinds of power they
invite men to exercise in order to assess the impact that increased
cultural circulation of these images might have on women's interests,
both as feminists and as heterosexual desiring subjects. I argue that
these four images of the Jungian Archetypal Self offer untapped
resources that women and men can incorporate to help further the
feminist struggle against misogynistic heterosexuality.
The goal in this analysis is to develop a critical account of the
ways in which different images of female and male sexual identity
we understand them, in turn, depends as much on what we think (rightly or wrongly) as on
what they are-even as what we think depends less on what they are than on the cultural
narratives we have internalized. The second problem with MacKinnon's formulation is that not
all men have equal power over all women. See Part V.A. The third problem is that equating
male supremacy and sexual dominance with male power ignores the positive elements of
masculine power. See Part V.B.
19. See generally Robert Moore and Douglas Gillette, King, Warrior, Magician, Lover:
Rediscovering the Archetypes of the Mature Masculine (Harper, 1990).
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represent the nature of power-that is, the different ways in which
maternal power, female sexuality, and male dominance are coded in
the narratives of commodified femininity and pornographic masculin-
ity.20 Eliminating rape and other forms of sexual oppression presup-
poses the successful deployment of effective counter-narratives that
will redefine the nature and meaning of power and shatter the delu-
sion that male power depends upon female powerlessness.
Finally, Part VI provides some concrete examples where the
incorporation of Latin images of maternal power, as well as Jungian
images of female sexuality and mature masculinity, into the dominant
culture might have a positive impact on the public policies and legal
doctrines through which women's sexual vulnerability is currently
constructed. This analysis focuses specifically on the way images of
maternal power and female sexuality are deployed in welfare reform
proposals and child custody determinations.
II. THE PROCESSING OF RAPE CASES AND THE SOCIAL
MEANING OF RAPE
A. Patterns of Rape Processing Decisions: Suspect/Victim Racial
Compositions and Gender Role Stereotypes
In Rape and Criminal Justice, Gary LaFree compiled empirical
data for rape cases processed in Indianapolis, Indiana, in 1970, 1973,
and 1975.21 This data and LaFree's analysis raise important ques-
tions for understanding the ways in which rape processing practices
reproduce the relations of white supremacy and male supremacy.
LaFree distinguishes rape cases according to the racial composition of
the suspect/victim combination, that is Black/Black, White/White, and
Black/White rapes.22 He then compares how these different sus-
pect/victim compositions were processed through the decision points
20. 'Pornographic masculinity" and "commodified femininity" are two ways of referring to
the same subjection of male and female sexuality to the imperatives of power, which, in this so-
ciety, are increasingly organized to facilitate the commodification of all social relations including
sex. See notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
21. LaFree, Rape And Criminal Justice at 59 (cited in note 1). Because the passage of
time and jurisdictional differences may affect rape processing practices, it may be problematic to
generalize about rape processing patterns in other juridictions. Nevertheless, my discussion fo-
cuses on the more general significance of LaFree's data and analysis.
22. White/Black rapes were not included in the chart because during the period under
study there were only 11 cases involving white offenders and Black women (1.2%, which was too
small to include in LaFree's multivariate analysis). Id. at 129.
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of the case processing system, from the initial decision to arrest and
prosecute through the imposition of a prison sentence.23 Not surpris-
ingly, the total number of cases at each decision point decreased as
the cases moved through the system. Some cases were disposed of
earlier than others, indicating the extent to which decisions made at
earlier points in the process determined the cases that would bear the
progressively increasing force of the criminal law.
Analyzing the points at which different cases were screened
out of the system in terms of the racial composition of the sus-
pect/victim combination indicates that race played a significant role in
the processing of rape cases. For example, LaFree's data shows that
most of the reported rapes involved Black suspects and Black victims.
The second largest category involved white suspects on white victims,
while Black on white rapes constituted the smallest group of reported
rapes. As these cases progressed through the system, however, the
percentage of cases involving Black suspects and white victims stead-
ily increased, the percentage of Black intraracial assaults steadily
decreased, and the percentage of white on white rapes remained rela-
tively constant.24
While LaFree's studies show that the racial composition of
suspect/victim combinations had a statistically significant impact on
the way rape cases progressed through the system, the more signifi-
cant finding in these studies raises important issues for straight
feminists of color. Specifically, these studies show that comparing the
dispositions of rape cases solely on the basis of the defendant's race
does not adequately account for the extent of racial bias in the proc-
essing of rape cases. Indeed, if Black men committed approximately
seventy percent of the reported rapes, then the fact that they received
the harshest sanction in seventy percent of the cases belies any
inference of discrimination.25 When the victim's race is factored into
23. See id. (indicating in Figure 6.1 the percentages of Black Suspect/White Victim (BW),
Black Intraracial (BB), and White Intraracial (WW) Incidents for Eight Processing Stages).
24. These results are even more problematic when we consider the racial implications of
the fact that although there were more Black/Black rapes than Black/White rapes, Black/White
rapes, which constituted only 23% of all reported rapes, constituted 45% of the rapes resulting
in state penitentiary incarceration and 50% of the cases resulting in maximum prison sentences
of six or more years. By contrast, Black/Black rapes, which constituted 45% of all reported
rapes, comprised only 26% of the rapes that resulted in state penitentiary incarceration and
only 17% of the cases that resulted in maximum prison sentences. Id. at 133.
25. LaFree's data indicates that Black men committed 67.7% of 870 reported rapes com-
pared to 32.3% committed by white men. The data also indicates that of the 30 cases in which
prison sentences of six or more years were imposed, Black men received 66.7% of the sentences,
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the analysis, however, these results suggest that the harsher
treatment of Black men convicted of interracial rape compensated for
the more lenient treatment of Black men convicted of intraracial rape.
This disparity produces the appearance of proportionality.26
With this reading of the data, important questions arise. Why,
for example, was a Black man who raped a Black woman less likely to
bear the maximum sentence than a white man who raped a white
woman? Why was a Black man who raped a white woman more likely
to receive the maximum sentence than a white man who did the
same? This reading also suggests why feminists may respond differ-
ently to evidence of racial bias in the processing of rape cases. The
implications of such evidence are, after all, ambiguous. If Black men
and white men are treated differently in the processing of rape cases,
does that mean that the Black and white men who rape white women
should "enjoy" the same relative impunity with which Black men rape
Black women? Or does it mean that the white men who rape white
women and Black men who rape Black women should bear the same
consequences as the Black men who rape white women? In other
words, while racial and ethnic solidarity may compel feminists of color
to condemn the fact that rape laws are discriminatorily applied when
racially subordinated men rape white women, as women we are still
left with rape. The fact that Black men are more vulnerable to prose-
cution for raping white women does not change the fact that men rape
women, and that they rape women of color with virtual impunity.
In a second part of his book, LaFree considers the impact of
women's nonconformity to stereotypical gender-roles on the process-
ing of rape cases. 2 7 Both official records and data compiled through
jury trial observations and interviews with jurors and court personnel
indicated that evidence of women's nonconformist behavior affected
the way their rape complaints were processed. Police records indi-
compared to 33.3% received by white men. Id. at 132. Without taking the victims' race into ac-
count, these results seem entirely proportional.
26. LaFree's data indicates that 44.7% of the total number of rapes reported against Black
suspects involved Black victims, while 23% involved white victims. The data also indicates that
in the cases where sentences of six or more years of penitentiary incarceration were imposed on
- Black men, 50% of the cases involved white victims, while only 16.7% involved Black victims.
Id. at 132. Thus, Black men received the harshest criminal sanction more often in cases where
they were convicted of raping white women.
27. Examples of nonconformist behavior include: "(1) hitchhiking, (2) drinking at the time
of the offense, (3) being at a tavern or bar without a male escort, (4) allegedly engaging in sex
outside of marriage, and (5) willingly entering the suspect's car, house, or apartment... [as well
as] assaults (1) by prior acquaintances, (2) occurring outside the victim's home, (3) perpetrated
by only one offender, (4) in which the victim did not physically resist, and (5) that were not re-
ported promptly by the victim." Id. at 72-73.
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cated that officers systematically failed to arrest in cases where they
observed nonconformist behavior on the part of the victim. 28 Data
gathered from jury trial observations and juror interviews indicated a
similar pattern.29 In cases where defendants alleged consent or de-
nied that intercourse had occurred "jurors... were clearly influenced
by testimony about victims' life-styles. Any evidence of drinking, drug
use, or sexual activity outside marriage led jurors to doubt defen-
dants' guilt, as did any prior acquaintance between victim and defen-
dant."30
LaFree explains the impact of both suspect/victim racial com-
binations and gender-role behaviors on rape processing decisions in
terms of the conflict and labeling theories of criminology.31 These
theories challenge the priority that criminology places on criminal
etiology, that is, the study of the causes of crime, crime rates and how
they change, and the characteristics of individuals and groups that
violate criminal laws. The crucial issue is no longer why people
commit crimes, but rather how legal agents determine that particular
conduct should be criminalized and that a particular crime has been
committed. Proceeding from the theoretical premise that law is
invoked and applied in order to maintain relations of dominance and
subordination across different social groups, these theories shift
attention from criminal etiology to the study of the social processes
and political conflicts through which law is created and enforced.
From this perspective, the results in LaFree's rape cases reveal
that state power reproduces hierarchical relations between different
social groups through the processing of rape cases. 32 In this society,
28. Id. at 76.
29. Non-conformist behavior in the jury trial study included: "(1) drinking, either in gen-
eral or at the time of the incident, (2) using drugs in general or at the time of the incident, (3)
engaging in sexual activity outside marriage, (4) having illegitimate children, and (5) having a
reputation as a 'partier,' a 'pleasure seeker,' or someone who stays out late at night." Id. at 201.
30. Id. at 226.
31. Labelling theory focuses on the way decisions are made in contexts involving factual
ambiguities and argues that "official processing decisions in criminal cases are based less on the
actual behavior of the accused than on the interpersonal context of the incident." See id. at 72.
This suggests that outcomes are more affected by extra-legal variables than by legal variables,
that is, by the officer's "situation sense" rather than an analytical determination that the
elements of a crime could be established by the evidence. Conflict theory focuses on the ways in
which the resolution of factual ambiguities reinscribes existing hierarchical relations between
social groups, such as whites and nonwhites, or males and females. Id. at 11-12, 34-52.
32. Id. at 8-11, 151 ("[L]egal protection, like other scarce resources, may be withheld from
some individuals on the basis of their race, age, economic status or gender. In addition, some
individuals forfeit legal protection because they live outside the legal or moral structure of soci-
ety.... [I]f women who violate traditional sex roles and are raped are unable to obtain justice
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the structure of intergroup relations is white over nonwhite
(particularly over Black) and male over female. Thus, the threat of
harsher enforcement against Black males accused of raping white
women constitutes a form of social control that reproduces what
Abdul JanMohamed calls "the racial-sexual border."33 Similarly, the
relative impunity with which men rape white women acting outside
traditional gender roles sends a clear message to white women that
the law will not protect them if they are attacked while exercising
prerogatives of autonomy outside of traditional gender roles. Finally,
the relative impunity with which men rape racially subordinated
women leads these women to understand that the law will not protect
them at all.
Put differently, this pattern of enforcement serves to reproduce
the logic of white supremacy and male supremacy by establishing
what I call "the rules of sexual accessibility." A translation of this
logic might be:
(a) All men must have sexual access to at least some women (male
supremacy). The social meaning of this pattern of enforcement might be
interpreted as follows: Black men are men. As men, they are entitled to
sexual access to Black women. Indeed, their assertion of that right will
be punished only in the most extreme cases. Thus, of the approximately
390 reported rapes Black men perpetrated on Black women, only 5
resulted in the maximum prison sentence.
(b) Some women are sexually accessible to only some men (white
supremacy). The pattern of enforcement made evident in LaFree's
studies also suggests that male supremacy is a social structure embedded
in the equally powerful logic of white supremacy. The fact of harsher
enforcement for Black/White rapes (of approximately 200 rapes, 15
resulted in the maximum sentence) enforces the color line, but it is the
comparative treatment of Black and white women victims that reveals its
hierarchy. The data shows that if Black men were punished severely for
raping white women, it is not because these women were women but
because they were white.34
through the legal system, then the law may be interpreted as an institutional arrangement for
reinforcing women's gender-role conformity").
33. See Janlohamed, Racialized Sexuality, in Stanton, ed., Discourses of Sexuality at 99
(cited in note 9).
34. Kim Crenshaw makes the point like this:
Where racial discrimination is framed by LaFree primarily in terms of a contest
between Black and white men over women, the racism experienced by Black women will
only be seen in terms of white male access to them.... [However,] Black women are
also discriminated against because intraracial rape of white women is treated more
seriously than intraracial rape of Black women.... In order to understand and treat
the victimization of Black women as a consequence of racism and sexism, it is necessary
to shift the analysis away from the differential access of men and more toward the
differential protection of women.
Crenshaw, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 1277-78 (cited in note 5).
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(c) All women must be sexually accessible to at least some men (male
supremacy). This element captures the socio-political meaning of
LaFree's data revealing prior social relations as statistically significant
nonconformist behavior. It is best illustrated by the marital rape
exception but is also apparent in the Model Penal Code, which makes
rape a second degree felony unless the action inflicts serious bodily injury
or the victim was not a "voluntary social companion of the actor upon the
occasion of the crime and had not previously permitted him sexual
liberties,"35 in which case it is a first degree felony. Women could easily
interpret these legal doctrines and empirical data to mean that no woman
above the legal age of consent has the right to be sexually inaccessible to
all men. 36  A woman is either accessible to her husband or her
nonconformist unmarried status makes her accessible to any man with
whom she has a social or sexual relationship.
(d) Some women are sexually accessible to all men (male supremacy
and white supremacy). The failure to prosecute and convict men
accused of raping women engaged in nonconformist behavior reinforces
relations of male supremacy, even as the general underenforcement of
rape laws in cases involving racially subordinated women reinforces
relations of white supremacy. These facts reflect the higher social value
placed on white women's right to bodily integrity.37
While these rules of sexual accessibility elucidate the
relationship between rape processing practices and the logics of white
supremacy and male supremacy, they do not adequately convey what
35. Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 213.1 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
(ALI, 1980)). Rape by a "voluntary social companion" is a less serious offense than rape by a
stranger because the woman's nonconsent to sexual intercourse in the context of a date is am-
biguous. Id. Interestingly, LaFree never breaks the cases down in terms of the marriage
relationship between the victim and rapist probably because the marital exemption meant that
those cases were never prosecuted even in the rare instances that complaints might have been
filed. LaFree does, however, note that prior sexual involvement between an alleged victim and
defendant is legally relevant under Indiana law, just as their prior acquaintance proved to be a
statistically significant variable in reducing the perceived credibility of the victim and the
seriousness of the incident. LaFree, Rape and Criminal Justice at 226 (cited in note 1). For
changes in the marital rape exemption laws, see, for example, Jaye Sitton, Comment, Old Wine
in New Bottles: The '7Marital" Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 261, 269-88 (1993).
36. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: The Meaning of Gender Equality in Criminal Law,
85 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 6-7 (1994) (arguing that "[tihe critique of statutory rape laws
should focus on challenging courts' persistent acceptance of some degree of violence against girls
as a means of sexual access... " This judicial posture explains why "prosecutors sometimes
must rely on statutory rape laws to obtain a conviction even where victims experience
violence").
37. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan. L.
Rev. 581, 590-605 (1990) (reviewing the relationship between dominant images of Black female
sexuality and the history of rape laws). The legal treatment of sexual assault against Black
women has "progressed" from an initial point where Black women were legally unrapable to the
current situation in which they are rapable, but rarely raped. Roberts, 85 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology at 4 (cited in note 36) (noting that "[c]ontemporary American juries and law
enforcement officials continue to discount the stories of Black victims of sexual assaule').
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rape means to women. Nor do they reflect the various ways different
women understand the social meaning of rape and its significance for
our lives. The next Section explores the implications of LaFree's work
from two perspectives. First, LaFree's analysis of the criminal justice
system provides a rational basis for redefining the terms of feminist
anti-rape legal interventions. More specifically, it suggests why
efforts to reform substantive rape laws may be less effective than
efforts to reform the structure of discretionary power in the criminal
justice system.
Second, even legal interventions grounded on LaFree's analysis
can flounder in achieving feminists' ultimate objective because this
endeavor still presupposes that the criminal justice apparatus should
be the principle target in the struggle against rape. Once we begin to
think about rape through the three categories I explore in the next
Section, we begin to understand how these legal strategies address
only the least controversial category of rape. By instead focusing on
all three categories of rape, feminists will be better equipped to rede-
fine their target and rechannel their reform efforts from the criminal
justice apparatus to the public policies that construct women's sexual
vulnerability and the culturally dominant images of women and men
upon which these policies are based.
B. Strategic Implications and the Social Meaning of Rape: Dilemmas
in the Practice of Feminist Legal Theory
LaFree's empirical studies illustrate how the enforcement of
rape laws expresses bias against racially subordinated men and
women, as well as against white women who do not conform to tradi-
tional gender roles. LaFree's work also has important implications
for feminist legal struggles aimed at eliminating rape. In LaFree's
analysis, the criminal justice system appears as a network of inter-
connected discretionary decision points, beginning with the victim's
initial decision to make a complaint and progressing through the deci-
sions to arrest, file a felony charge, prosecute or dismiss the charge,
convict or acquit the defendant, impose a prison sentence or proba-
tion, and so on. At each step, legal agents, including the victim, make
judgments about whether to move a case forward based on assump-
tions about the victim's credibility and other subjective assessments
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about what "really" happened and how seriously the allegation should
be treated.38
This recourse to stereotypical judgments occurs, in part, be-
cause a rape is often witnessed only by the individuals whose com-
peting accounts are at issue. LaFree explains that "[w]ithout eyewit-
nesses processing decisions may depend less on an assessment of
whether a rape has occurred than on a perception of whether the vic-
tim and the assailant are the kind of people who could have been in-
volved." 9 At the same time, because these stereotypes are often both
racist and sexist, the decisions they generate will produce rape pro-
cessing patterns that reinforce white supremacy and male supremacy.
This will continue so long as racist and sexist cultural narratives re-
main dominant in the interpretive judgments made by police officers,
prosecutors, jurors, and judges. Indeed, these results will be pro-
duced even in the face of a universal condemnation of rape.40
This account of the criminal justice system as a network of
discretionary decisions, which are based on subjective assessments of
ambiguous facts, suggests a number of things about the legal strug-
gles most likely to eliminate bias in the processing of rape cases.
First, feminists must target the social spaces where dominant cul-
tural narratives actually influence the decisions made at different
points in the case processing system. Feminist legal activists should
identify precisely the points at which a legal agent's decision becomes
discretionary, either by legally conferred authority or by the nature of
the decision, such as the de facto discretion involved in applying legal
standards to ambiguous factual situations.
While feminist initiatives to reform the elements of rape have
been controversial, the intrafeminist conflict over rape tends to be
38. LaFree explains: "Mhe difficult task in real cases is establishing whether these
crimes have actually occurred, whether the correct suspect has been identified, and whether
there are any aggravating or mitigating circumstances." LaFree, Rape and Criminal Justice at
27 (cited in note 1).
39. Id. at 28. LaFree supports this assertion with data from police and court records as
well as his analysis of a series of jury trials. In jury trials, LaFree notes that "jurors' doubts
about the conclusiveness of the evidence allow them to disregard the evidence and decide the
case on the basis more of their personal values than of the facts.... [i]n cases with weak evi-
dence, jurors turn to other factors, such as the defendant's physical appearance or the victim's
life-style, in reaching decisions." Id. at 203.
40. Thus LaFree notes: "[When the police talked about rape, they universally condemned
it and thought it should be punished swiftly and severely. However, further observations of po-
lice responses to actual cases indicated much more ambivalence. In effect, the officers were
unanimously opposed to rape and agreed that it was a serious offense, but in actual practice
they rarely encountered cases that fit their specific definitions of rape." Id. at 26.
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generated, not so much by the substantive definition of rape, but by
the way racial bias operates in the enforcement of rape laws.41
Indeed, legal strategies that seek to protect women by increasing po-
lice power and prosecutorial charging flexibility without establishing
procedures that ensure legal accountability for the abuse of power are
particularly problematic for women of color, whose racial and ethnic
identities often position us in opposition to the forces of white "law
and order" that appear all too ready to occupy minority communities
and bestialize minority men.42  Accordingly, feminists could consoli-
date our anti-rape reform efforts more effectively by focusing on the
structure of police and prosecutorial discretion and by prioritizing
reforms that make the exercise of official discretion (both formal and
de facto) more accountable to feminist and antiracist community
struggles, particularly our struggles to reconstruct the culturally
dominant narratives of race and sexuality.
For example, police and prosecutors currently exercise power
through legal doctrines that allow a broad range of discretion. These
legal actors make decisions about whether to arrest a suspect, file a
complaint, prosecute a case, and empanel a jury. These decisions are
based on a variety of factors that may have little to do with the likeli-
hood that the alleged rape actually happened.43 Legislative proposals
that effectively reduce the opportunity for police to "unfound" rape
complaints,44 or that prevent prosecutors from practicing selective
prosecution, 45 or that increase the victim's leverage to compel prosecu-
41. Thus, for example, Dorothy Roberts's ambivalence towards the establishment of new
categories of sexual assault reflects concerns that focus primarily on the racially biased manner
in which these new categories will be enforced. See Roberts, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. at 387-88
(cited in note 5).
42. See Crenshaw, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 1283 (cited in note 5); Roberts, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
at 387-88 (cited in note 5).
43. See, for example, Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 Tex. J. Women & L.
277 (1993) (discussing the various and conflicting institutional incentives that structure police
and prosecutorial processing decisions). See generally Norman Abrams, Internal Policy:
Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1971).
44. See Coombs, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. at 291-92 (cited in note 43) (discussing the reasons
police frequently invoke for unfounding rape cases). According to Coombs, "The implementation
of'unfounding' decisions may obscure the effect of rape myths. For example, if a police officer is
not convinced that an event was a rape, he will include facts indicating the 'undeserving'
character of the complainant in his report, but will exclude them if he expects a prosecution to
go forward." Id. at 292.
45. See, for example, City of Minneapolis v. Bushcette, 240 N.W.2d 500, 506 (Minn. 1976)
(applying a rational basis standard of review to reject a prostitute's equal protection challenge
against a city ordinance and its discriminatory enforcement); Commonwealth v. King, 372
N.E.2d 196, 205-07 (Mass. 1977) (applying intermediate scrutiny). See, for example, P.S. Kane,
Note, Why Have You Singled Me Out? The Use of Prosecutorial Discretion for Selective
Prosecution, 67 Tulane L. Rev. 2293, 2305-10 (1993).
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tion,46 may have a greater impact on the racist and sexist patterns of
rape processing than strategies aimed at redefining the substantive
elements of rape. These strategies hold more promise precisely be-
cause the pervasive circulation of culturally dominant narratives of
race and sexuality renders any incongruent factual situations am-
biguous. These ambiguities, in turn, create the social spaces in which
de facto discretion can reinscribe relations of male dominance and
racial subordination. 47
LaFree's work also suggests the importance of feminist legal
struggles aimed at challenging the narratives that are routinely de-
ployed in the rape processing system, such as struggles over the ad-
missibility of expert testimony to challenge the validity of culturally
dominant narratives that might otherwise trigger acquittals.4
Finally, the de facto discretion inherent in applying legal standards to
complex factual situations, particularly those that do not fit neatly
within the dominant narratives of race and sexuality, suggests some
of the difficulties involved in attempting to eliminate rape through
legal struggles directed at a criminal justice apparatus that women do
not control. Winifred Woodhull has observed that these struggles
force women
46. See, for example, Stuart P. Green, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A
Model Declaratory Judgment Statute, 97 Yale L. J. 488, 495-506 (1988). Such proposals should
take into account cases refusing to reach the merits of a victim's effort to compel prosecution on
the basis of a lack of standing, such as Linda R. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973), or on
the basis of separation of powers, such as Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller,
477 F.2d 375, 381 (2nd Cir. 1973).
47. Moreover, as Professor Coombs has noted, rape law reform proposals that seek to
eliminate the elements of force, consent, and mens rea from the substantive definitions of rape
are highly improbable and perhaps undesireable. Coombs, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. at 287-88 &
nn.36-37 (cited in note 43). "Thus, juries remain free to apply rape myths, and feminists must
work to eradicate them from our cultural understandings." Id. at 288.
48. See, for example, Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the
Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1013, 1026 (1991) (discussing
the use of expert testimony in counteracting the impact of pervasive rape myths on jury
determinations). For a lucid and comprehensive account of the myths routinely deployed in the
processing of rape cases, see generally Coombs, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. at 277 (cited in note 43).
For a passionate and compelling criticism of the use of rape-trauma syndrome expert testimony
to secure convictions at the expense of depoliticizing the pervasiveness of rape and replacing one
set of disempowering rape myths with another, see Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket. Rape
Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Labeling, and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1271, 1272-73 (1994).
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to call for more general repression in order to secure for themselves a modicum
of safety in public space.... Moreover, because the law, the courts and the
police are male dominated, women are obliged to call for male protection in the
face of male brutality.4 9
As long as rape processing practices are embedded in a net-
work of discretionary decisions, legal agents will enforce the cultur-
ally dominant narratives of race and sexuality. As long as these nar-
ratives are racist and sexist, appeals to the criminal justice system
will only reinscribe "[tihe disjuncture between the rape victim's
grounds for appealing to the legal system-including the violation of
her right to liberty and self-determination-and the court's re-
sponse."50 This disjuncture illustrates the tenuous nature of legal
strategies that expect to eliminate rape by reforming the criminal
justice apparatus.51
The results of LaFree's studies support this general observa-
tion and further suggest that the cultural narratives of race and
sexuality constitute a deployment of power different in kind from
other forms of power. The power deployed by the circulation of im-
ages is constitutive of, but not the same as, the relations of sub-
ordination constructed by the social arrangements, interpersonal
practices, and official decisions that invoke these images. This, in
turn, suggests why the legal struggle for female sexual autonomy-for
freedom from rape and sexual coercion-must develop strategies of
49. According to Woodhull, such appeals make it seem that the elimination of rape de-
pends on urging that:
(1) existing laws against rape be enforced and that the offenders, rather than the victims
be put on trial (with respect to one's sexual history, for example); (2) stricter laws be
enacted requiring harsher and more systematic punishment of sexual assault, with the
probable result that men from racial and ethnic minorities, especially blacks, will be
prosecuted and given severe sentences in numbers that exceed the proportion of rapes
committed by those groups, particularly when their victims are white; and (3) more
safety be assured in city streets and public buildings, which in effect means more police
and security guards.
Winifred Woodhull, Sexuality, Power and the Question of Rape, in Irene Diamond and Lee
Quinby, eds., Feminism & Foucault: Reflections on Resistance 167, 172-73 (Northeastern U.,
1988).
50. Id. at 172. "In the course of a typical rape trial it becomes clear that women are re-
garded as criminals... merely for presuming to circulate in public without men's protection, or
for daring to articulate what it means for them to be in control of their bodies, in this case, by
deciding where, when, with whom, and under what circumstances they will participate in a sex-
ual act." Id.
51. 'The fundamental challenge to the social relations of production and reproduction nec-
essary for the struggle against rape cannot ultimately come, then, from demands for rights in
legal battles, yet neither can these claims be renounced as long as women are forced to choose
between problematic protection and no protection at all." Id.
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transformation that move beyond reforming the criminal justice appa-
ratus.52
At the same time, while the rules of sexual accessibility I have
offered clarify the relationship between the patterns produced by rape
processing practices and the logic of white supremacy and male su-
premacy, they do not convey the many complex ways in which women
experience their own sexuality and the sexuality of men. Women
have different interpretations of sexual autonomy and the legal inter-
ventions most likely to promote it. To address these differences,
feminists need to develop conceptual frameworks that illuminate the
broader socioeconomic contexts and psycho-cultural systems that rein-
force the practice of rape.53 In the following discussion, I use three
distinct accounts of rape to organize an inquiry into the cultural nar-
ratives that support the public policies, interpersonal practices, and
socioeconomic structures that construct women's sexual vulnerability
and promote the practices of male sexual dominance. These three
accounts are "rape as hate crime," "rape as sex," and "rape as power".
(a) Rape as Hate Crime: This account projects the image of
the violent, half-crazed rapist hiding in the bushes. The rapist is a
deviant person acting out his anti-social hostility on any unlucky
woman unfortunate enough to happen across his path at the wrong
time, in the wrong place. Consensus is widespread. The response is
to "Get those guys. Lock them up and throw away the key." The rape
is coded as intentional and violent, a vicious assault designed both to
inflict serious physical injury and to degrade. Enormous amounts of
cultural resources are deployed to maintain this image as the domi-
nant account of what rape is. Nevertheless, this account obscures the
many other psycho-social contexts and manners in which women's
sexual autonomy is assaulted by men.54
52. Understanding legal struggles as struggles over image production highlights potential
intercultural conflicts between women over the substantive content of feminist images. The
struggle for "feminist images" suggests that alternative narratives are available and that circu-
lating these alternatives is a transformative political struggle. This is a position that most
feminists could probably agree to without in turn agreeing over which images are better or more
liberating. Part of the struggle is identifying the images that hurt different women, where the
images are deployed, and how it is that their deployment actually harms different women.
53. According to Abdul JanMohamed, "rape... defines a field in which formal identities,
thematic continuities, translations of concepts and polemical interchange may be deployed."
JanMohamed, Racialized Sexuality, in Stanton, ed., Discourses of Sexuality at 108 (cited in note
9).
54. See generally Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 Yale L. J. 1087 (1986) (discussing sexism in the
context of rape).
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(b) Rape as Sex: In this account, rape reflects the fact that
women's consent is simply not relevant to some, many, or most men's
sexual gratification. Rape is coded as a consequence of the way men
experience their sexual desire for women. Men want sex because it
feels good. Because they are ordinarily bigger and stronger than the
women they are with, they take it with more or less force and little'
awareness of the woman's lack of consent. In these accounts, rape is
not necessarily intentional, but the sex usually involves at least some
degree of coercion and physical force. This account underlies the
movement to redefine the mens rea of rape law by requiring a defen-
dant who asserts consent to meet an objective standard of reasonable
belief.5 5
(c) Rape as Power: In this account, rape is coded as a
conscious and deliberate use of physical strength and sex to enforce
male dominance. In its purest form, power rape is intentional but not
necessarily violent. For example, in the middle of an argument, a
husband says to his wife, "You may make more money than I do, but I
can make you want me anytime I want to," and then proceeds to prove
it. The rape is clearly intentional since the man's whole purpose is to
show the woman that he can have sex with her without her consent.
Her lack of consent is, for him, an important part of the event because
it is precisely her lack of consent that makes the intercourse an
assertion of dominance. The rape may be, but need not be, violent
since the purpose of the rape is neither to injure nor even to orgasm,
55. See, for example, Dolly F. Alexander, Comment, Twenty Years of Morgan: A Criticism
of the Subjectivist View of Mens Rea and Rape in Great Britain, 7 Pace Intl. L. Rev. 207, 233-34
(1995). Alexander delineates three "states of mind" that illustrate the way rape as sex gets
coded legally to meet the traditional requirement in rape cases that sexual intercourse involve a
guilty "state of mind," or mens rea: "First, the defendant realises that the woman may not be
consenting but hopes that she is. Second, the defendant realises that the woman may not be
consenting but is determined to have intercourse with her regardless. Third, the defendant is
so intent on having intercourse with the woman, that although it occurs to him that she may
not be consenting, he suppresses the thought, and deliberately closes his mind to the risk." Id.
at 233-34 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Alexander discusses three other "states of
mind" that help illustrate why the requirement of intent or recklessness in the mens rea
analysis inadequately addresses the psycho-sexual dynamic involved in rape as sex. Under this
standard of mens rea, sexual intercourse does not trigger criminal liability if "the defendant
does not advert to the issue of consent at all. This may occur if the defendanes mind is a total
blank," if it simply does not occur to the defendant that the woman might not be consenting, or
if "the defendant, having realised that the woman might not be consenting, wrongly and quite
unreasonably concludes that she is." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). In each
instance, the refusal to acknowledge criminal culpability treats the woman's consent as only
contingently related to, rather than as an essential element, of the sexual act. This is a position
that implicitly "views women as a means to an end, rather than a partner with equal interest in
the activity." Id. at 235-36. See also Lani Anne Remick, Comment, Read Her Lips: An
Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1103, 1138-51 (1993)
(arguing that courts should adopt an objective verbal standard in rape cases).
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but rather quite consciously to make the woman give in to him, to
show her that she is, after all, only a woman.
These three categories are arguably distinct and comprehen-
sive, even though any particular rape may involve any combination of
the categories. 56 The ways in which a particular rape intersects these
categories gives the rape its social and interpersonal significance. 57
For example, rape as power can, but does not always, intersect with
rape as hate crime. While hate crime rape will always involve the
assertion of male dominance, the assertion of male dominance
through rape is not necessarily a hate crime rape. In other words, the
will to dominate is not the same as the will to injure. A man can love
a woman and still want to dominate her, if necessary, through rape.
From this perspective, the difference between rape as power and rape
as hate crime is the difference between the will to dominate and the
desire to injure. Likewise, the difference between rape as power and
rape as sex may turn on a man's reason for using force, whether his
purpose is specifically to make the woman give in, or simply, to get
sex. In other words, the will to dominate is not the same as the desire
to "get laid."
As illustrated above, these categories implicitly organize the
meaning of rape according to the different ways women have inter-
preted the motives and interests that make men rape. While labeling
and conflict theories are better predictors of rape enforcement pat-
terns, the meaning of rape (for women) still turns on the way women
interpret the motives that drive it. Different motives imply different
things about the circumstances that increase our vulnerability to rape
56. This categorization implicitly rejects Macinnon's account of heterosexuality, which
reduces female sexual desire to self-annihilation and collapses male sexuality into the narra-
tives of pornographic masculinity. See MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 46-62 (cited in
note 4) (discussed in note 252 and accompanying text). By contrast, these three categories
suggest some of the complex ways in which women experience heterosexuality. Thus, in some
instances, women's experience of enforced subordination is indeed sexualized, but in others it is
not. Sex is, in some instances, but not always, experienced as rape. Rape, itself, is experienced
in different ways, often depending as much on the meaning women assign to the experience as
on the physical actions of the rape. In order to develop effective resistance and transformative
interventions, feminist theory must help women articulate the dynamics that produce these
different experiences.
57. For a moving account that explains rape through the various forms of spiritual injury
that it inflicts, see Adrien Katherine Wing and Sylke Merchin, Rape, Ethnicity, and Culture:
Spirit Injury from Bosnia to Black America, 25 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 29-38 (1993)
(describing rape as defilement, silence, sexuality, emasculation, trespass, and pollution).
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and hence about the nature of the measures necessary to cope with
and eliminate the threat of rape.5
From this perspective, the resources deployed to promote rape
as hate crime as the dominant cultural image of rape channel the so-
cio-political struggle over rape around a set of ideas and practices that
appear trivial, if not completely irrelevant, when contrasted to the
struggles organized around the images of rape as sex and rape as
power. Rape as hate crime suggests that women are relatively safe so
long as they avoid dark alleys and take other appropriate steps to
reduce their vulnerability to the depraved and deranged who are
stalking the streets, usually at night. This account of causes and
cures feeds certain struggles and suppresses others.
For example, the focus on hate rape generates objections that
men who rape do not specifically hate women. These men hate every-
one, but they target women because women are commonly perceived
as more vulnerable to attack than other men. Regardless of the steps
women take to avoid the depraved and deranged, women will continue
to live under the threat of hate rape so long as they are perceived as
58. If the ultimate question for women is whether we can really hope to eliminate rape,
feminists have responded to this question from a variety of perspectives. Susan Brownmiller
writes:
Man's structural capacity to rape and women's corresponding structural vulnerability
are as basic to the physiology of both our sexes as the primal act of sex itself. Had it not
been for this accident of biology, an accomodation requiring the locking together of two
separate parts, penis and vagina, there would be neither copulation, nor rape as we
know it.... We cannot work around the fact that in terms of human anatomy the
possibility of forcible intercourse incontrovertibly exists. This single factor may have
been sufficient to have caused the creation of a male ideology of rape.
Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape 4 (Bantam, 1975). As Winifred
Woodhull argues, however, this form of biological determinism reduces the complex social
processes that produce rape to the anatomical difference between the sexes:
So while sex is said to be "primal" and thus, implicitly, to precede power relations of any
kind, the structural features of male and female anatomy are nonetheless considered to
be marked by an equally "basic" asymmetry, which makes the male powerful and the
female powerless.... [The vagina comes to be coded-and experienced-as a place of
emptiness and vulnerability, the penis as a weapon, and intercourse as violation.
Woodhull, Sexuality, Power, in Diamond and Quinby, eds., Feminism & Foucoult at 171 (cited in
note 49). My own experience leads me to conclude that rape is better explained as an artifact of
men's efforts to enact the culturally dominant scripts of pornographic masculinity and the
frustrations this effort inevitably engenders, rather than stemming from any anatomical differ.
ence. After all, while some men may like to think of their penises as weapons, see generally
John Stoltenberg, Pornography and Freedom, in Michael S. Kimmel, ed., Men Confront
Pornography 70 (Meridian, 1991), this is not the only image that codes the penis. On the
contrary, the erect penis is also the Magician's wand, an organ of pleasure as much for women
as for men. See Michael Ventura, Notes on Three Erections, in Christopher S. Harding, ed.,
Wingspan: Inside the Men's Movement 43, 44 (St. Martin's, 1992); Joseph and Lewis, Common
Differences at 213-14 (cited in note 2) C'Betty: Listen, you all. I got to say this-the dick is good!
(laughter) The dick is good").
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vulnerable and weak, that is, as appropriate targets for rape.59 At the
same time, if women are perceived as more vulnerable targets, that
may be because women are more vulnerable because our social and
economic status makes us more vulnerable. The ability to avoid dark
alleys and "bad neighborhoods" turns, in many instances, on having
the money to own a car or take a taxi home to a "nice neighborhood."
Thus, the proffered solution presupposes access to the economic and
social resources that enable some, but not all, women to take appro-
priate steps to avoid attack. Even the most unbiased rape processing
59. This is the perspective from which movies like Thelma and Louise appear to be a step
in the right direction. Thelma and Louise was first screened in 1991. The public response to
the movie made it "the talk of the summer" and the subject of "white-hot debate." See Richard
Schickel, Gender Bender: A white hot debate rages over whether Thelma and Louise celebrates
liberated females, male bashers-or outlaws, Time 52 (June 24, 1991). See also Women Cheer,
Men Fret over Thelma and Louise, Phoenix Gazette C5 (July 10, 1991); John Robinson, The
Great Debate over Thelma and Louise: Is It Evil Man-Bashing or Liberating Fantasy? He Hates
It, Boston Globe 29 (June 14, 1991). Indeed, the movie so captured the public imagination that
during the Clarence Thomas hearings, Phyllis Schafly, president of the conservative Eagle
Forum, referred to Thomas's opponents as Thelma and Louise, stating that "[t]hey hate men
and anybody who stands in their way." John E. Young and Lynne Duke, Outside the Hearing, It
Was Cheers, Jeers; Thomas's Supporters Were the Most Vocal, Visible, Wash. Post A9 (Oct. 12,
1991). Why the uproar? The movie traces the interactions between two women and a series of
men. Over and again, the men fail to view the women as a potential threat with tragic
consequences both for the men (one dies, another is locked in a trunk, another's truck is blown
up) and for the women. For me, the most indicative moment is the confrontation between
Louise and a rapist. She points a gun to his head. She tells him, "Next time .... He replies, "I
should have gone ahead." She says, "What did you say?" He says, "Suck my dick" So Louise
shoots him, not because there was any danger of rape, but because he told her to suck his dick.
But why did he say that when she had a gun to his head? Because he simply could not or would
not see her as a threat to him.
This interaction is instructive because it illustrates how male perception of female power-
lessness prevents the interaction from producing higher self-knowledge. What is different about
Thelma and Louise is their willingness to make their point with violence. The message to male
viewers is simple. If you don't learn the easy way, you will learn the hard way. Most often,
women are unwilling or unable to press their points, and consequently, most men simply do not
learn. As Karl Mannheim has written: "In personal life, too, self-control and self-correction de-
velop only when in our originally blind vital forward drive we come upon an obstacle which
throws us back upon ourselves. In the course of this collision with other possible forms of exis-
tence, the peculiarity of our own mode of life becomes apparent to us." Karl Mannheim,
Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge 47 (Harcourt, Brace, 1936).
The commitment to self-knowledge and correction is crucial to maintaining a life-affirming and
dynamic relationship that is, in turn, necessary for sexual intimacy. In this struggle for self-
knowledge, the Other is the Obstacle through which the self is thrown back upon itself and
forced to confront the need for change. Change is at best difficult and often painful. Because it
is difficult and painful, change is often resisted and happens only if the Other is in fact, an
obstacle, in other words, if the Other has enough power to throw us back upon ourselves.
Women often do not have the power to throw men back upon themselves, and men often do not
have the ability to accept (if they even recognize) the fact that they have been thrown back by a
woman, with tragic consequences for men and women.
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system will not eliminate rape so long as women's socioeconomic posi-
tions make them vulnerable to sexual exploitation and assault.
The struggles organized around the image of rape as hate
crime are moderate points of contention compared to the struggles
generated by the rape as sex and rape as power accounts. Rape as
hate crime projects an image of socio-sexual relations in which
women's sexuality is relatively safe because rape is deviant and
unusual behavior. By contrast, rape as sex implies that
heterosexuality is itself a constant source of danger for women. Rape
is possible, perhaps even likely, in any encounter with any man.
Given the opportunity and the appropriate circumstances, any man
will rape, and many men do. While the image of rape as sex conveys
some of the ways women experience their sexuality as subordinated
by male sexual aggression, rape as power addresses the instances in
which we experience our subordination as sex. Put differently, rape
as sex refers to the ways men use physical strength or psycho-social
coercion to get sex, while rape as power refers to the ways men use
sex and sexuality to establish dominance.
Thinking about rape through these three categories furthers
the search for more effective and inclusive legal strategies to promote
women's sexual autonomy because these categories redirect our atten-
tion to the link between women's vulnerability and the public policies,
legal doctrines, and cultural practices that construct it. More specifi-
cally, the idea that emerges is that rape feeds upon women's sexual
vulnerability, a vulnerability that is, in part, a socially constructed
phenomenon. Put differently, if men rape because women's consent is
irrelevant to their sexual gratification, this is because of the ar-
rangements and cultural expectations that reduce women's power to
make their consent relevant. Similarly, if men rape in order to estab-
lish dominance, this also is because of the cultural imperatives that
reinforce the urge to dominate, particularly in men.
To eliminate rape, feminist legal activists need to identify the
social contexts in which public policies and legal doctrines increase
women's sexual vulnerability. For example, the policies behind wel-
fare eligibility rules seek to keep poor mothers dependent on male
wage-earners and penalize them for their sexuality.0 Meanwhile doc-
60. See notes 312-35 and accompanying text (discussing Sylvia A. Law's work, Women,
Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1249 (1983) (analyzing the
ways in which welfare eligibility and work requirements encourage female dependence on a
male wage-earner, while simultaneously undermining and penalizing female independence);
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Unrealized Power of Mother, 5 Colum. J. Gender & L. 141, 142-46
(1995) (discussing the Personal Responsibility Act as an assault on maternal independence);
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trines like "the best interests of the child" are used in custody
proceedings to penalize expressions of maternal sexuality that do not
produce a stable, male-headed nuclear family.61 Legal reforms aimed
at transforming policies and doctrines that construct women's sexual
vulnerability may be a more effective strategy for eliminating rape
than legal struggles to redefine the crime of rape or reform the
criminal justice system.
C. Beyond Law: Narratives and Counter-Narratives in the
Reconstruction of Heterosexuality
In the preceding Section, I illustrated how thinking of rape
through the categories of rape as hate crime, rape as sex, and rape as
power relocates the struggle for women's sexual autonomy within a
broader struggle to transform the legal doctrines and public policies
that construct women's sexual vulnerability. In this Section, I intro-
duce the argument that drives the analysis in the next three Parts of
this Article. Specifically, my point is to show that the struggle for
women's sexual autonomy is linked ultimately to an even broader
struggle over the production and dissemination of popular culture,
with particular emphasis on images of sexual identity and the way
images of femininity and masculinity encourage us to organize our
interpersonal relations.6 2
Larry Cats Backer, Welfare Reform at the Limit: The Futility of "Ending Welfare as We Know
It," 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 339, 340-41 (1995) (noting ideological similarities in the
"competing" welfare proposals contained in the Republicans' Personal Responsibility Act and
President Clinton's Work and Responsibility Act)). See generally Martha A. Fineman, The
Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 114-18 (Routledge,
1995) (indicating that the imagery surrounding welfare includes moral and normative
judgments founded upon stereotypical perceptions of females).
61. See notes 336-54 and accompanying text. See generally Part VI. See also Fineman,
The Neutered Mother at 118-23 (cited in note 60); Barbara Stark, Divorce Law, Feminism, and
Psychoanalysis: it Dreams Begin Responsibilities, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1483, 1520-26 (1991)
(discussing post-divorce consequences of custody arrangements).
62. It is only recently that social science has begun to understand both the extent to which
individuals actively construct, rather than passively receive, their sexual identities as well as
the extent to which this process of self-construction is embedded in a pre-given context, which
may or may not circulate competing narratives of sexual identity. See, for example, Henrietta
Moore, The Problem of Explaining Violence in the Social Sciences, in Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex
and Violence at 142 (cited in note 14). According to Moore,
[a]nthropology... has begun to move away from a simplistic model of a single gender
system into which individuals must be socialized, towards a more complex under-
standing of the way in which individuals come to take up gendered subject positions
through engagement with multiple discourses on gender. This move has enabled
researchers to focus on the process of failure, resistance, and change in the acquisition of
gender identity as well as instances of compliance, acceptance and investment.
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The popular representation of women's feminine identity as
mothers and as sexual beings significantly reinforces the ways women
are controlled and subordinated. Just as the racialized images of
women's sexual desire reinforce racial hierarchy and excuse male
sexual dominance,63 images of female sexuality also rationalize the
disciplinary regimens imposed upon women workers in the Third
World.64 These images also incite the self-disciplinary regimens
through which First World women become "fashion slaves,"65 all at the
expense of genuine sexual autonomy. In these discursive regimes, be-
ing a woman requires Third World women to produce goods for First
World capitalists under constant surveillance, through which labor
discipline is enforced for the sake of sexual morality. Meanwhile,
First World women (of all races) are encouraged to invest large sums
of money to enact a sexual identity that requires them to sacrifice the
economic and educational aspirations that could secure their
autonomy or reduce their dependence on men.66
Id.
63. See Dowd Hall, The Mind that Burns in Each Body, in Snitow, Stansell, and
Thompson, eds., Powers of Desire at 328 (cited in note 8); Espin, Sexuality in Hispanic/Latin
Women, in Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger at 154 (cited in note 9); JanMohamed, Racialized
Sexuality, in Stanton, ed., Discourses of Sexuality (cited in note 9).
64. Thus, Chandra Mohanty writes about Third World women working in multinational
factories. These women live in otherwise "traditional" societies, where factory work makes
them vulnerable to categorization as "loose," "immoral," or "unsupervised." In these factories,
"[d]iscipline was exercised not only through work relations but also through surveillance and
the cooperation of village elders in managing the maidens and their morality. Assailed by
public doubts over their virtue, village-based factory women internalized these disparate
disciplinary schemes, engaging in self- and other-monitoring on the shopfloor, in kainpung
society and within the wider society." Chandra Mohanty, Cartographies of Struggle, in
Mohanty, Russo, and Torres, eds., Third World Women at 29-30 (cited in note 2) (quoting Aihwa
Ong, Spirits of Resistance and Capitalist Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia 220 (S.U.N.Y.,
1987)). Put differently, these women accept this disciplinary surveillance and impose it on each
other in order to assuage their own doubts about their own sexual morality, which are driven by
their internalization of traditional constructions of morality.
65. See Sandra Lee Bartky, Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal
Power, in Diamond and Quinby, eds., Feminism & Foucault at 61, 64 (cited in note 49)
(examining the self-disciplinary practices through which women "produce a body which in ges-
ture and appearance is recognizably feminine"). Bartky writes: "The woman who checks her
makeup half a dozen times a day to see if her foundation has caked or her mascara has run, who
worries that the wind or the rain may spoil her hairdo, who looks frequently to see if her stock-
ings have bagged at the ankle or who, feeling fat, monitors everything she eats, has become, just
as surely as the inmate of the Panopticon, a self-policing subject, a self committed to a relentless
self-surveillance. This self-surveillance is a form of obedience to patriarchy." Id. at 81.
66. Joseph and Lewis make the point in the following manner:
For there to be mass consumption, the corporate interests which control and own the
means of production need not only to make their products known, but to create needs
which seduce us into buying things as if they are essential.... Yet, as the ads direct
our vision toward objects to buy, they also, in the images they use, enmesh us in a whole
system of power distribution, suggesting desirable patterns of dominance and oppression
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Focusing feminist legal struggles on transforming the images
of sexuality in popular culture is also important because sexuality and
sexual autonomy are important elements of human fulfillment.67 Just
as culturally dominant images of female and male sexuality organize
relations of racial hierarchy and economic exploitation, these relations
also construct a reality of subordination that makes heterosexual in-
timacy an elusive, 68 and perhaps unimaginable dream for many
women.19
Thus, while the effort to disseminate alternative narratives of
sexual identity would inevitability generate extensive interventions in
the production of popular culture, 70 these interventions are a crucial
component in the struggle against rape and other forms of sexual co-
ercion. Rape certainly feeds on women's socially constructed vulner-
ability, but it also draws momentum from the heterosexual animosity
created by the interpersonal dynamics through which individuals con-
which are most immediately and significantly present in the gender roles that the
advertisements blatantly and subtly suggest.
Joseph and Lewis, Common Differences at 167 (cited in note 2).
67. In psychoanalytic theory, sexuality is opposed both to the death wish (Thanatos) and
to aggression. Both the death wish and aggression can be understood as the suppres-
sion/repression of Eros. See Benjamin, The Bonds of Love at 66-67 (cited in note 10); Qualls-
Corbett, The Sacred Prostitute at 11-19 (cited in note 12).
68. See Joseph and Lewis, Common Differences at 215 (cited in note 2).
[M]any Black women were fearful of losing their man if they did not please him
sexually, so they did not disclose dissatisfaction. Black women understand that the
Black male has had little opportunity for economic advancement. They have therefore
provided ego gratification to the male in the area of sexual relations. In attempting not
to further damage the male ego, women sacrificed their feelings. In the long run, this
created more problems for both partners.
Id. This quote would, however, be completely out of context without noting the very next sen-
tences: "What must not be overlooked ... is the fact that Black women as well as Black men
truly enjoy sex and view orgasm as the ultimate in pleasure. This is a positive factor and should
be used as a positive reinforcer for relationships." Id. See note 262 and accompanying text.
69. Compare Joseph and Lewis, Common Differences at 260-61 (cited in note 2):
The feminist struggle is committed to understanding the history and processes of male
dominance and women's oppression-so, until that dominance and oppression end, the
relishing of "free" sexuality with men (given that feminist understanding) is highly prob-
lematic. As one heterosexual feminist wrote: "I have noticed that when I feel most
militantly feminist I am hardly at all interested in sex."
Id.
70. These struggles are made all the more problematic because producing the images of
pornographic masculinity and commodified femininity is a capitalist "growth industry." Boris
Frankel, On the State of the State: Marxist Theories of the State After Leninism, in Anthony
Giddens and David Held, eds., Classes, Power And Conflict 257, 260 n.5 (U. Calif., 1982) ("[Ihe
media is no mere ideological apparatus, but rather a massive billion dollar capitalist production
unit"). The struggle for control over the production of popular culture is, therefore, as much a
struggle against the social and political forces that are committed to the increasing commodifi-
cation of social reality as a struggle against inherited ideologies of race and sexual identity.
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stitute themselves and their relationships in conformity with the nar-
ratives of commodified femininity and pornographic masculinity that
currently dominate white, American popular culture.71
Both women and men spend enormous energy and resources
trying to act out the culturally dominant scripts of masculinity and
femininity. Women give up jobs, stay in bad marriages, accept dispro-
portionate responsibility for childcare and domestic work, fake or-
gasms, and generally defer to male selfishness, all of which makes
them more vulnerable to assaults upon their sexual autonomy. Men
overwork, ignore their children, consume pornography, commit
adultery, abuse their wives and children, and also fake orgasms. 2
The contradictions between our experiences of sexual intimacy
(or lack of intimacy) and the images of sexuality in culturally
dominant narratives, in turn, illustrate the double binds that com-
modified femininity and pornographic masculinity create for individ-
ual women and men. If we try to enact these forms of sexual identity
and fail, then we bear the psychological burden of not being "real"
women and men. If we succeed to any degree, we thereby inscribe our
lives in a network of self-disciplinary practices that strip women of
our autonomy and men of their spiritual vitality and emotional en-
71. See generally note 20. For an account of "commodified femininity," see Parts III.A.
and III.C. For an account of "pornographic masculinity," see Part V.A. When individual men
and women expend energy and resources to enact these sexual identities, they are no more
liberated than the Third World women in multinational factories who are subjected to
disciplinary restrictions enforced by constant surveillance. As Sandra Lee Bartky's essay
illustrates, the First World consumer is also subject to power that restricts her freedom and
self-affirmation. This disciplinary power is "dispersed and anonymous; there are no individuals
formally empowered to wield it; it is, as we have seen, invested in everyone and in no one in
particular.... For all that, its invasion of the body is well-nigh total: the female body enters a
machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it." Bartky, Foucault,
Femininity, in Diamond and Quinby, eds., Feminism & Foucault at 80 (cited in note 49) (quoting
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish 138 (Vintage, Alan Sheridan, trans., 1979)). Of course,
the fact that power is pervasive does not mean that male and female sexual identity is
culturally uncontested. On the contrary, this Article explores alternative narratives of
femininity and masculinity, in part, to illustrate that there is no single femininity/masculinity,
but a plurality, which individual men and women must negotiate and which creates the
opportunity for the exercise of judgment and agency in the process of self-construction. See
generally Moore, Explaining Violence, in Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex and Violence at 138-55
(cited in note 14).
72. See Ventura, Notes on Three Erections, in Harding, ed., Wingspan at 49 (cited in note
58) ('There is ample evidence in face after face that, as there are women who have never come,
so there are men who have often ejaculated but never come. And they likely don't know
it.... These men live in a terrifying and baffling sexual numbness in which they try the right
moves and say the right things but every climax is, literally, an anticlimax.... Men can't fake
the ejaculation of sperm, of course, but we can fake muscle spasms, hip jerks, and moans as well
as any woman can").
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gagement-all in the service of what John Kavanaugh would call the
Commodity Form.73
The risk of linking rape to the internalization of impoverished
cultural narratives of sexual identity is that it seems to minimize how
differential access to economic resources and social status increases
women's vulnerability to rape, as well as men's desire to rape.
Nevertheless, these narratives are the main resources through which
individuals interpret their interactions. If the goal is to eliminate
rape, then part of the struggle is to change the way men and women
think about themselves and each other. This is true precisely because
the way we think has a significant impact on what we are likely to
accomplish or refuse to accept.7 4 Cultural narratives of sexual iden-
tity are also important targets for reasons already suggested: they
are pervasive in the discourses through which public policy is formu-
lated and the institutions where legal agents apply the laws that
make women more or less vulnerable to rape, harassment, and other
assaults on our sexual autonomy.
In the following Parts of this Article, I begin to articulate al-
ternative images of femininity and masculinity by drawing on the
narratives of sexual identity and interpersonal relation found in
73. The preeminent values of the Commodity Form are producing, marketing, and con-
suming. These values are the ethical lens through which we are conditioned to see our worth
and importance. John Kavanaugh makes the point well:
Friendship, intimacy, love, pride, happiness and joy are actually the objects we buy and
consume.... And since none of these deepest human hopes can be fulfilled in any
product, the mere consumption of them is never enough; "more" of the product, or a
"new improved" product, is the only relief offered to our human longings.
John F. Kavanaugh, Following Christ in a Consumer Society (Still) 34 (Orbis, 1991).
Kavanaugh further observes:
With human sexuality objectified, voyeurized, and technologized, there is little place for
the full relationship of one human being to another. Sexuality as an expression of the
self, as a saying of the self, as an embodiment of interiority, is lost because the self is
lost in the dictatorship of commodity consciousness, in the world perceived through the
filters of the Commodity Form.
Id. at 51-52.
74. Indeed, a fundamental part of my argument is that the way women exercise agency is
influenced as much by the narratives of sexual, racial, and class identities that we internal-
ize-that give us our sense of our "proper place"-as it is by the practices and relations through
which power is deployed against us. Women, of course, confront deployments of power that
suppress our self-determination (violently, sometimes even fatally), but that power, though
pervasive, is not all-encompassing, and some women have more resources for resistance than
others. Whether we will find the gaps in power that create the opportunity for autonomy
depends on how hard we keep looking for them, which is in turn influenced by the degree to
which we internalize narratives of identity that encourage effective agency. Whether we will
allow our struggles for self-determination to be derailed by images of feminine identity (which
suggest we are lesser women precisely because we struggle) in turn depends, not insignificantly,
on the images we are offered.
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cross-cultural studies of Black and Latin culture and embedded in the
Archetypal Images that various Jungian analysts have sought to dis-
seminate.75  These sources enable a critical re-reading of the ways
that relations of power and powerlessness are represented in the
dominant cultural images of pornographic masculinity and commodi-
fled femininity. Read as alternative narratives of sexual identity and
interpersonal relation, the Jungian images of the Archetypal Self offer
untapped resources that can further feminist struggles against the
continued deployment, enactment, and enforcement of misogynistic
heterosexuality.
III. IMAGES OF WOMEN: THE POLITICAL PATHOLOGIES OF ENACTING A
FEMININE IDENTITY
Feminists have long recognized that the dominant images of
women represent us as mother, virgin, or whore.76 Indeed, many
feminists have linked violence against women to the ways in which
these images circulate in cultural narratives and the psychic struc-
tures of individual men and women. Some feminists argue that the
male impulse to dominate women stems from the lost security of the
mother.77 Others argue that the sexual exploitation of women is or-
ganized around the virgin/whore dichotomy. This dichotomy suggests
that men act properly as long as they target the whore and respect
the virgin.78 Rather than focus on the differences between these im-
75. See generally Qualls-Corbett, The Sacred Prostitute (cited in note 12); Moore and
Gillette, King, Warrior, Magician, Lover (cited in note 19).
76. While the exact meaning and particular expressions of these images reflect cross-
cultural and historical specificities, these three images of woman are pervasive as a paradigm of
female gendered identities. Some of their modes of appearance in Latin cultural imagery are
illustrated in Erlinda Gonzales-Berry, Unveiling Athena: Women in the Chicano Novel, in
Alarc6n, et al., eds., Chicana Critical Issues at 33-44 (cited in note 2), and Norma Alarc6n, Ana
Castillo, and Cherrie Moraga, eds., The Sexuality of Latinas 147 (Third Woman Press, 1993).
For an account of the ways these images are applied to Black women, see Dorothy E. Roberts,
Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 1, 11-12
(discussing the images of the sexually promiscuous Jezebel and the nurturing and subservient
Mammy).
77. Indeed, Dorothy Dinnerstein has argued that men will not stop trying to dominate
women until they are reared by men. Dorothy Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur:
Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise 54 (Harper & Row, 1976). See also Nancy Chodorow,
The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender 106-07 (U. Cal.,
1976); Cornell, 100 Yale L. J. at 2269 (cited in note 4) (discussing a Lacanian perspective on the
intersection of infant individuation and gender formation, Cornell writes that "the primordial
moment of separation is experienced by the infant both as a loss of unity and the gaining of an
identity").
78. Women of color and poor women (of any race) may be particularly vulnerable to sexual
exploitation to the extent their color and their class automatically make them whores. See, for
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ages, it is important to note that their common characteristic is a
complete failure to convey any sense of the passion that sustains an
intimate sexual relationship between persons who are mutually
admired and desired. The mother and the virgin are completely
asexual,79 while the whore is an appropriate target for sexual
exploitation and the wife for sexual appropriation.80
In this Part, I explore the images of mother that circulate in
the psychoanalytic discourses of both white feminists and the
predominantly white, upper-middle-class men's movement. I then
investigate how these images are used to explain the interpersonal
practices (like rape) and the cultural narratives of sexual identity
(like pornographic masculinity and commodified femininity) that
repress women's sexual autonomy, and compare them to the images of
mother that circulate in Black and Latin culture.8 ' There are two
points to this comparison.
First, the images of mother in Black and Latin culture are not
only very different from the images of mother in white American cul-
ture. They are also very different from the images of motherhood that
circulate in white discourses about Black and Latin mothers. 82 In
example, Wing and Merchin, 25 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. at 25-29 (cited in note 57) (discussing
the impact slavery has had upon American society's view of the rape of Black Americans).
79. Although some feminists have rejected the image of asexual motherhood, a pervasive
theme in white feminist discourse is the incompatibility of motherhood and sexuality. See, for
example, Nancy Chodorow and Susan Contratto's discussion of Shulamith Firestone's The
Dialectic of Sex and Nancy Friday's My Mother/My Self. Nancy Chodorow and Susan
Contratto, The Fantasy of the Perfect Mother, in Barrie Thorne and Marilyn Yalum, eds.,
Rethinking the Family: Some Feminist Questions 54-71 (Longman, 1982). More importantly,
none of the feminist images that identify motherhood with sexuality focus unambiguously on
the heterosexual sexuality of a mother's continued desire for an adult male partner. The
mother's sexuality is recognized only in affirming the sexual pleasure in mothering and the
connection between the physical pleasures of mother/infant relating and lesbian sexuality. Id.
Contrast the images of motherhood and female sexual desire in Latin Culture, discussed in
Parts III.B. and III.C.
80. The image of the "wife" is somewhat problematic in this tri-model. In some instances,
the "wife" merges into the asexual image of the wife/mother and, at other times, into the image
of the whore, a woman who is available for sexual appropriation. In Latin culture, "the wife" is
the "mujer principal" with all that implies. See Part III.B.
81. In referring to "Latin culture," I refer interchangeably to materials that focus, in some
instances, on Bolivian practices and, in others, on Chicano, Cuban, Peruvian, and Puerto Rican
practices. I do this not because I am unaware of the significant diversity in these different
manifestations of Latin culture, but precisely because the elements that make us similar to each
other make us different from white Americans.
82. See, for example, Roberts, 1 Am. U. J. Gender & L. at 4 (cited in note 76). Professor
Roberts powerfully captures some of the ways white racism distorts the meaning of motherhood
for racially subordinated women, even as patriarchal narratives distort the meaning of the ways
women experience and attempt to meet the burdens of motherhood in a racist and sexist society.
For example, Roberts notes, "[ain unwed Black teenager, for example, may experience mother-
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many of these accounts, the Black and Latin mother's culturally rec-
ognized power to direct her children and run her home is translated
through the lens of white racism and patriarchal misogyny into the
image of the castrating matriarch, 83 thereby reinscribing the delusion
that male power depends on female powerlessness. 84 By contrast,
Black and Latin culture offer images of motherhood that challenge the
idea that men are men only if they control and subordinate women.
The interpersonal practices found in the matrifocal extended family of
hood as a rare source of self-affirmation, while society deems her motherhood to be illegitimate
and deviant. She may experience caring for her child as a determined struggle against harsh
circumstances, while society sees in her mothering the pathological perpetuation of poverty."
Id.
83. See, for example, Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, A Geneology of Dependency:
Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 Signs 309, 327 (1994); Espin, Sexuality in
Hispanic/Latin Women, in Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger at 154 (cited in note 9). This
devaluation of matrifocal extended families is based upon the same ethnocentrism that Stanley
Kurtz exposed through his critique of white, Western, psycho-analytic models and the practice
of applying these models to other cultures. See, for example, Stanley N. Kurtz, All the Mothers
are One: Hindu India and the Cultural Reshaping of Psychoanalysis (Colum. U., 1992).
Nevertheless, this racist devaluation has led some women of color to repudiate the images of
maternal strength and female power. See, for example, Michele Wallace, Black Macho & The
Myth of Superwoman 107 (Dial, 1990). Wallace describes the stereotypical black woman:
[A] woman of inordinate strength, with an ability for tolerating an unusual amount of
misery and heavy distasteful work. This woman does not have the fears, weaknesses,
and insecurities as other women, but believes herself to be and is, in fact, stronger
emotionally than most men. Less of a woman in that she is less "feminine" and helpless,
she is really more of a woman in that she is the embodiment of Mother Earth, the
quintessential mother with infinite sexual, life-giving, and nurturing reserves.
Id.
While this image of the Black woman is certainly stereotypical, it is also a caricature of the
emotional and personal strength that many women of color raised in matrifocal kinship
structures aspire to enact. See, for example, Lillian Comas-Diaz, Mainland Puerto Rican
Women: A Sociocultural Approach, 16 J. Community Psych. 21, 23-24 (1988) (positioning Latin
motherhood between the competing discourses of "inarianismo," the aspirational emulation of
the Virgin Mary, which encourages mothers to enact positions of endurance and self-sacrifice,
and the discourses of "hembrismo," which call them to enact positions of strength, survival, and
active engagement in community struggles). See also Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist
Thought: Knowledge and Consciousness & The Politics of Empowerment 115-37 (Unwin
Hyman, 1991) (describing the practices of community mothering and the experience of maternal
power in Black culture).
I am not so ready to abandon the images of maternal power, nor the practices and kinship
structures that sustain them. I prefer instead to re-code and disseminate these narratives as
more life-affirming and empowering images of feminine sexual identity than the images embed.
ded in the narratives of white motherhood. I do this particularly given the unique survival re-
sources matrifocal kinship arrangements have offered many Latin women and might offer the
increasing number of white single mothers. See Part III.B.
84. Clearly, the devaluation of female power is a constitutive first principle in the logic of
patriarchy: "The devaluation of woman represents a necessary stage in the history of humanity,
for it is not upon her positive value but upon man's weakness that her prestige is founded. In
woman are incarnated the disturbing mysteries of nature, and man escapes her hold when he
frees himself from nature." Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex 75 (Knopf, 1953). By this
logic, it is precisely through man's dual escape from and subjugation of nature (i.e., women),
that he purportedly gains freedom and mastery.
RAPE, RACE, AND REPRESENTATION
Black and Latin culture offer women a wide variety of psycho-social
resources that are simply ignored in the various discourses that por-
tray these families as failed versions of the white, male-headed nu-
clear family.
The second reason for this comparison is to provide an initial
point of reference for interrogating the family model underlying the
psychoanalytic theories deployed in the discourses of white feminism
and the white men's movement. White feminists have articulated a
powerful theoretical framework for understanding the interpersonal
practices and cultural narratives through which men repress female
sexual autonomy as a reaction against the psychological impact of
being "mothered" as infants exclusively by women.85
The theory is that men want control of women's sexuality, to
deny our subjectivity, and to repress our autonomy either because
they want to recreate "the oneness" the infant experiences with his
mother, or because they want to resist "the oneness" that threatens to
subsume and infantilize them. Men can escape that sense of
oneness-the loss of boundaries that sexual intimacy can
trigger--only by making the male experience of female sexuality into
a subject/object relation. Mediated through the subject/object
framework, a man can re-experience oneness through sexual intimacy
without experiencing the fear and pain triggered by separation: the
woman is his; her will is subject to his; he will not lose her because
she must do what he wants, not what she wants. At the same time,
coding the relation through the subject/object framework allows the
man to remain a distinct autonomous subject to her object. He must
maintain his individuality and autonomy. Consequently, sexual
intimacy depends on her loss of individuality and autonomy. She
must give herself to him, but he cannot give himself to her. Thus she
is part of him, but he is not part of her. The origin of this dynamic is
85. See Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur at 54 (cited in note 77); Chodorow,
The Reproduction of Mothering at 180-90 (cited in note 77). Chodorow summarizes her theory
like this:
Masculinity becomes an issue as a direct result of a boy's experience of himself in his
family-as a result of his being parented by a woman. For children of both genders,
mothers represent regression and lack of autonomy. A boy associates these issues with
his gender identification as well. Dependence on his mother, attachment to her, and
identification with her represent that which is not masculine; a boy must reject
dependence and deny attachment and identification. Masculine gender role training
becomes much more rigid than feminine. A boy represses those qualities he takes to be
feminine inside himself, and rejects and devalues women and whatever he considers to
be feminine in the social world.
Id. at 181.
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then traced back to the male child's experience of individuation from
the mother/infant bond.8 6
While white feminists have used these psychoanalytic narra-
tives of sexual dominance, along with their images of mother and
mothering, to encourage social changes that promote their vision of
increased female autonomy,8 7 antifeminists and racists have used
these same psychoanalytic narratives to attack women's autonomy by
deploying negative images of maternal power. These attacks are cal-
culated to pressure women into abdicating any significant power as
mothers and to abandon any claimed right to direct our own lives or
our children's. 8 At the same time, these images of mother are used to
exonerate male abuse and sexual violence, blaming the practices of
pornographic masculinity on maternal dominance.8 9
Comparing the images of mother and maternal power that
circulate in Black and Latin culture is one way to combat both
dynamics by revealing the class, racial, and cultural contingencies of
the family model underlying the misogynist anti-mother discourses of
86. Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur at 59-75 (cited in note 77); Benjamin,
The Bonds of Love at 11.50 (cited in note 10).
87. For example, feminists have fought vigorously for changes in employment and parent-
ing practices that can increase paternal involvement with, and facilitate maternal separation
from, their infant-children. For a compelling criticism of this strategy, see Fineman, The
Neutered Mother at 33-66 (cited in note 60). For an argument that expressly invokes
Chodorow's psychoanalytic theories in support of child custody arrangements that promote
paternal custody, see Stark, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1508-14, 1520-26 (cited in note 61) (discussed
in Part VI).
88. For evidence of the extent and form of these attacks, see Fineman, The Neutered
Mother at 101-42 (cited in note 60). In this book, Fineman proposes alternative ways to
conceptualize relationships of dependence. Id. at 161-64, 231-36. Fineman argues that
caregiving relationships (such as mother/child) rather than sexual relationships (such as
husband/wife) should be the center of the conceptual frameworks we use to determine legal
rights and construct legal institutions. Id. at 233. The idea is that if mothers are weak and
dependent, it is the network of social/political and economic systems that make them so.
Fineman's proposals presuppose that strong and independent mothers are a good thing, a social
objective well worth the radical social, political, and economic reconstruction it would entail. Id.
at 232. I fully agree. Indeed, from this perspective, my goal is to point out the triple binds of
the "castrated mother" and explore the significance of the fact that white culture (unlike Black
and Latin culture) has no culturally prevalent positive images of strong mothers: maternal
power is something individual women are routinely encouraged (by cultural narratives and
public policy) to abdicate to a male head of family. The lack of positive images of maternal
power only adds to the uphill battle Professor Fineman's proposals will surely confront.
89. See Part III.A. The use of these images of mother and mothering by white feminists
and their antifeminist counterparts alike may be particularly threatening to many Latin
women. Unlike white feminists, Latin women may often see no benefit to increased male par-
ticipation in the home and parenting. This may be because it is extremely unlikely that Latin
men will ever "do diapers" in any meaningfully helpful way, so long as images of Latin mascu-
linity are so pervasive in the subculture, see notes 139-50 and accompanying text. Or it may be
because these women do not have the same kind of class/race based opportunities that would
make freedom from home obligations worth the lost authority and investment the performance
of these obligations confer.
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white feminism and the white men's movement.90 By creating a
rhetorical framework that attacks mothers as much for their power as
for their powerlessness, these anti-mother discourses reinforce the
anti-feminist, racist forces that attack public policies designed to help
women as mothers. These attacks emphasize the fact that these
policies subsidize maternal independence from a dominant male
figure who is needed to counterbalance the Overwhelmingly Feminine
environment created by maternal power and to provide the stability
and security which most women cannot provide (except at public
expense).9'
Part VI will show how this rhetorical structure is expressed in
two legal contexts that bear directly on the way motherhood is experi-
enced by many women: welfare eligibility rules and child custody de-
terminations after divorce. These policies, in turn, construct a social
reality in which motherhood often means poverty, economic hardship,
governmental intervention, and dependence upon individual men. All
of this increases women's sexual vulnerability and completely ignores
the empowering aspects of matrifocal family arrangements, thereby
obstructing their cultural articulation and contributing to their fur-
ther demise.92
90. For example, women raised in families where their mother had no life outside the
home, and their power in the home was subordinate to an otherwise absent husband, may feel
liberated by images of motherhood that promote increased paternal involvement in parenting,
particularly if they aspire to any activity that would be facilitated by shifting domestic re-
sponsibilities to a father figure (for example, a professional career). Women raised in families
where their mothers did have a life outside the home or significant authority over matters in
the home may view these images of motherhood differently. Race, class, and culture will make
a difference to the family structures women experience-the former being typical primarily of
white suburban motherhood.
91. Women of color are repeatedly assaulted through the double binds of this rhetorical
structure. For example, Twila Perry notes a similar rhetorical structure operating in argu-
ments made by white liberal feminists who advocate the placement of Black children in white
households on the theory that Black mothers are often too weak (economically disadvantaged)
or too strong (emasculating matriarchs) to warrant making intraracial placements a policy
priority. Twila Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and
Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 33, 95 n.273 (1994) (quoting Dorothy E.
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality and the Right to
Privacy, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1437 (1991)). Similarly, Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon have
noted the double bind created by the "culture of poverty" attacks on Black "matriarchal"
families. In this anti-welfare discourse, public assistance was attacked through the
representations of Black AFDC claimants as "pathologically independent with respect to men
and pathologically dependent with respect to government." Fraser and Gordon, 19 Signs at 327
(cited in note 83).
92. In a fascinating reshaping of psychoanalytic theory to account for cultural differences
in the child rearing practices of Hindu society, Stanley Kurtz offers some conceptual resources
(most specifically a re-focus on "the group") for understanding and re-valuing matrifocality in
Black and Latin families and combatting the misogyny in psychoanalytic discourses of the
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In Part II.B, I turn to the virgin/whore dichotomy in order to
explore its relationship to the practice and ideology of rape,
particularly in Latin culture. I then re-read the psycho-social
meaning of this dichotomy through the missing image that Jungian
psychoanalyst Nancy Qualls-Corbett has called the "sacred
prostitute." I use this image to examine the cultural implications of
the fact that feminine sexual identity in its culturally prevalent forms
is one-dimensional and devoid of any spiritual or sexual depth. The
result is a commodified feminity that feeds the discourses of female
provocation and responsibility for male sexual assault.9 3
In each instance, my goal is to circulate alternative narratives
of feminine identity. These narratives of powerful mothers and sa-
cred prostitutes should be widely disseminated in antiracist and
feminist struggles aimed at helping individuals construct more em-
powered sexual identities. These alternative narratives may also help
us to reform public policies and transform the stereotypes through
which legal agents define substantive law94 and enforce its prescrip-
tions in individual cases.95
"Overwhelming Feminine." See generally Kurtz, All the Mothers are One (cited in note 83)
(discussed in notes 152-63 and accompanying text).
93. The dominant white culture's lack of positive and respectful images of female sexual
desire, in general, and maternal sexual desire, in particular, is profoundly disempowering for
straight women of color. AFDC recipients have been routinely penalized for their formation of
sexual relationships, see Law, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1258-59, 1325 (cited in note 60); Fraser and
Gordon, 19 Signs at 330 (cited in note 83), even as attacks on such public assistance programs
are conducted largely through the strategic deployment of images of maternal sexuality as socio-
pathological, see Roberts, 5 Colum. J. Gender & L. at 146 (cited in note 60). Within the
discourses of asexual motherhood, straight mothers are vulnerable to attack either because
their sexual desire for men is deemed inconsistent with their status as mothers or because their
motherhood is inconsistent with their sexuality as women. Moreover, the cultural paradigm
that splits the images of mother and whore does not protect such women from being both
mothers and whores, partly because of white racism. See generally bell hooks, Ain't I a Woman.
Black Women and Feminism (South End, 1981). This image of women as both mothers and
whores is also partly a result of the practices and discourses through which men have expressed
their resentment towards female sexual autonomy. See generally Ann Fergerson, On
Conceiving Motherhood and Sexuality, in Joyce Trebilcot, ed., Mothering: Essays in Feminist
Theory 174 (Rowman & Allenheld, 1983) (explaining that the status of motherhood has declined
in part because "[white w]omen's increasing economic independence from men and increased
sexual permissiveness.., has weakened men's ability to impose sexual double standards on
women").
94. See Part VI (discussing the images of sexual identity and race deployed in the wars on
welfare and custody battles).
95. See generally notes 27-40 and accompanying text (discussing the rape processing
patterns produced by the discretionary decisions individual legal agents routinely make based
on culturally dominant narratives of race and sexuality). More specifically, consider how
Patricia Bowman's credibility in the William Kennedy Smith rape trial was diminished, rather
than bolstered, by her status as a mother. As one media commentator said of her: "She didn't
really explain why, as so devoted a mom, she was out on the town until almost dawn and didn't
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A. Images of the White Mother: Powerless and Overpowering
In the discourses of white feminism and of the white men's
movement, the white mother frequently appears as the passive, self-
less, subordinate mother, a well-meaning woman who is nevertheless
too weak to give her children the direction and security they need to
develop self-confident and other-affirming identities. Alternatively,
the white mother appears as the overbearing, invasive, devouring
mother, who inflicts the primordial wound of humiliation on her boy-
hero and her girl-princess. 96 White women write, for example, of the
"fear of becoming [their] mothers," of the way "the tradition of the
mothers... produces the consciously articulated struggle of the
daughters, albeit in conflict, anger and pain,"97 of their "rage at the
sex-role socialization, sexual repression and loss of self-boundaries
that their connection with their mothers has produced in them,"98 of
the daughter's "resistance to love and tenderness, and her horror at
sexuality," which emerge from her earliest realizations that "the
inevitable path via love and sex to motherhood involves loss of pride
[and] loss of control."99 According to Gloria Joseph and Jill Lewis:
There is a first-level anger at the mother for seemingly not having struggled
enough, not having demanded and refused more. This anger is painfully
linked, in the absence of consciously articulated messages about oppression of
call home once to check on the kid." Coombs, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. at 300 (cited in note 43)
(quoting columnist Mike Royko).
96. See generally Chodorow and Contratto, The Fantasy of the Perfect Mother, in Thorne
and Yalom, eds., Rethinking the Family at 54 (cited in note 79) (noting a recurrent pattern in
feminist analysis blaming mothers and motherhood for any number of social, psychological, and
political ills). It is important to emphasize that my point is not so much to attribute these
different images of mother to all white/Black/Latin sons and daughters or to suggest that white
mothers are in fact "weak" or "invasive," or that Latin/Black mothers are in fact "strong" and
"affirming." As Martha Mahoney has pointed out, battered white women are often represented
as "pathologically weak" when they may in fact have made heroic efforts to escape a bad
situation-only to be overwhelmed by power. Mahoney, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 4-18, 61-63 (cited in
note 13). Conversely, Latin mothers are often represented as "long suffering" and oppressed.
See David T. Abalos, Latinos in the United States: The Sacred and the Political 66-67 (U. Notre
Dame, 1986); Comas-Diaz, 16 J. Community Psych. at 23 (cited in note 83); Alarc6n, et al., eds.,
Chicana Critical Issues at 173 (cited in note 2). Instead, my purpose is to examine the scripts of
motherhood that are deployed in the discourses of different social groups. The fact that white
culture has no positive images of strong mothers (maternal stength is coded as "overwhelming"
and "emasculating") has psychoanalytic/social significance for the formation of the
subject/subject relations and the implementation of public policies necessary to secure female
sexual autonomy. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note who draws upon what images and for
what purposes.
97. Joseph and Lewis, Common Differences at 143 (cited in note 2).
98. Id. at 139.
99. Id. (quoting Agnes Smedley, Daughter of Earth 139 (Feminist Press, 1987)).
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women, with the daughter's realization that her imagining of her mother as
someone who was limitless clashes with a reality of someone who seems to
have "chosen" limits.100
If some white women feel betrayed by their mothers' weakness,
white men (at least those who speak through the men's movement)
hate them for their power.'0' Douglas Gillette, for example, explains
male fear of intimacy as an artifact of the coping mechanisms through
which men try to protect themselves from what he calls "The
Overwhelming Feminine." 0 2 In his account, male violence and emo-
tional withdrawal are simply variations of the different strategies
men "adopted as boys for coping with what feels to them like the in-
vasive and overwhelming powerful feminine."' 03 These men were
raised in a hostile feminine environment, in which their mothers
acted out their "own fears of mistreatment or abandonment by the
masculine, and even more primordially, by [their] own mother," by
attacking their sons. 10 4  These attacks might take different forms,
ranging from "subtle attempts to undermine her son's masculine pride
and exuberance to rageful displays of jealousy when he begins to
date."105
The white mother's power appears, in this account, as a dan-
gerous threat to her son's masculinity and his prospects for develop-
ing positive heterosexual relations. Gillette continues:
In their present relationships, many men often find their inadequately drawn
boundaries overrun by their women. Their boundaries are inadequately drawn
because their mothers did, in fact, invade them and seek to merge with them
100. Id. at 141.
101. The men's movement, like the feminist mother-bashers, has a wealth of material to
draw on. See Chodorow and Contratto, The Fantasy of the Perfect Mother, in Thorne and
Yalom, eds., Rethinking the Family at 54-75 (cited in note 79). The authors note that "[b]laming
the motherL] ... a major theme in feminist writings, has a long social history." Id. at 60-61.
This history includes "19th century cultural ideology about motherhood" and "post-Freudian
psychological theory," as well as "David Levy's Maternal Overprotection, the Momism of Philip
Wylie and Erik Erikson, literature on the schizophrenogenic mother, Joseph Rheingold's
analysis of maternal aggression as the primary pathogenic influence on the child, Philip Slater's
discussion of the oedipally titillating, overwhelming mother, and Christopher Lasch's account of
the mother 'impos[ing] her madness on everyone else.'" Id.
102. See Douglas Gillette, Men and Intimacy, in Harding, ed., Wingspan at 52-59 (cited in
note 58).
103. Id. at 55.
104 Id. at 53.
105. Id.
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and to submerge the boy's ego and Self, thus rendering the boy's task of con-
structing legitimate psychological boundaries extremely problematic. 106
According to Peter Middleton, this emphasis on the mother's
power over her young son provides the perspective from which:
Masculinity ... can be viewed as a defensive construction developed over the
early years out of a need to emphasize difference, a separateness from the
mother. In the extreme this is manifested by machismo behavior with its em-
phasis on competitiveness, strength, aggressiveness, contempt for women and
emotional shallowness, all serving to keep the male secure in his separate
identity. 10 7
Middleton recognizes, however, that feminists have been skeptical of
the enthusiasm with which the men's movement has embraced
Chodorow's theory of identity formation as separation from the
mother.0 8 Not only does this embrace smell of "the ideological use of
psychoanalytic theory to pressurize women back into motherhood, by
blaming mothers for creating the psychic structures of masculinity;"'10 9
it also slides easily into male self-pity and self-exoneration. "[T]his
kind of argument can then provide a kind of Achilles heel explanation
106. Gillette does not lay all the blame for male emotional dysfunctions on the white
mother. "An additional factor in the generation of boundary issues is that their fathers were not
present enough to show their sons how to consolidate their masculine identities or to empower
them to exercise the legitimate masculine (and human) prerogatives of Self-affirmation and
defense of psychological territory and integrity." Id. at 55.
107. Peter Middleton, The Inward Gaze: Masculinity & Subjectivity in Modern Culture 128
(Routledge, 1992) (quoting Andrew Metcalf and Martin Humphreys, eds., The Sexuality of Man
24 (Pluto, 1985)).
108. Id. See generally Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (cited in note 77). See
also Dinnerstein, The Mermaid and the Minotaur at 54 (cited in note 77). Accordink to
Benjamin, both Chodorow and Dinnerstein conclude from their analyses of female mothering
that: "if both men and women raised children, both would become associated with primary
oneness. Presumably, then, the child could not resolve the ambivalence toward the earliest
parent by splitting the two parents. This would mean that males would no longer have to break
that bond in order to identify with their own sex, and thus they would not have to repudiate and
denigrate the maternal. They would retain the value of nurturance and empathy." Benjamin,
The Bonds of Love at 217 (cited in note 10). Benjamin rejects this claim, arguing that:
The reorganization of parenting in individual families cannot wholly eliminate the
effects of binary opposition-though it can mute the splitting that underlies it, weaken
the conviction that it is a function of gender, and sequester it in fantasy. The core
feature of the gender system-promoting masculinity as separation from and femininity
as continuity with the primary bond-is maintained even when mother and father
participate equally in that bond.... [Thus] it is equally important to grasp the deep
structure of gender as a binary opposition which is common to psychic and cultural
representations.
Id. at 218.
109. Middleton, The Inward Gaze at 128 (cited in note 107).
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for the adult man's behavior, in which it seems as if it were the
mother to blame somehow for messing up the making of her heroic
son."1lO
It may be that men suffer from "terrible isolation and loneli-
ness," and it may be that they find it "difficult to respond to the needs
and wants of others.., because [they] can so easily discount their
own emotional needs and wants." Nevertheless many feminists have
felt "that the emphasis on emotional expression and development"
associated with the men's movement and its most articulate spokes-
men, "was sidestepping important issues, and was potentially self-
indulgent and self-exonerating." '  Rather than excusing men's sexual
oppression of women, the emotional emptiness and isolation that en-
sue from the lies men live simply appear as the product of the prac-
tices through which men maintain their dominance. Lying, emotional
withdrawal, and sexual dominance may be experienced internally as
strategic self-preservation, perhaps even from some "Overwhelming
Feminine," but they operate externally as mechanisms of control.112
When men withdraw emotionally, they constitute themselves
as moving targets. There is nothing to engage, therefore there is no
one for women to lay any claims on. While women certainly make il-
legitimate claims upon men, there are many legitimate claims women
might make on them: claims for assistance that require self-sacrifice;
claims for encouragement and recognition that require a man to re-
linquish his position at the center of the universe and make room for
the woman, and for her projects, dreams, and aspirations; and claims
110. Id. at 124.
111. Id. at 126 (discussing feminist critiques of the use of emotion in men's movement lit-
erature, especially Victor Seidler's work). 'len do suffer, but this suffering cannot justify their
treatment of others." Id. at 125.
112. My own experience is that lies and withdrawal are the strategies preferred by so-
called "feminist men," the ones who consciously disclaim any interest in the prerogatives of
male supremacy. These men are in fact much harder to deal with interpersonally than some
men who openly claim these prerogatives. The latter can sometimes be confronted and in some
contexts educated into loving and respectful mutuality, that is, when they are (though mis-
guided) basically honest with themselves and genuinely care for the women they believe they
can and ought to dominate. The former can rarely be confronted because they project their
passive-aggressive assaults through the smoke and mirrors of their lies. See generally Gerald
Schoenewolf, Sexual Animosity Between Men and Women 48-49 (Jason Aronson, 1989).
Schoenewolf calls these men "passive narcissists" and explains:
Passive narcissists appear to be submissive to the women they marry, and sometimes
they even proclaim themselves to be "new men" or feminists. On an unconscious level,
however, they are acting out sexual animosity by withholding their feelings .... [Tihe
passive has contempt for women, but he may or may not be conscious of it and will never
admit it. He manifests a gentle, intellectual, or spiritual persona: He is a "good
boy'.... He seems to be the perfect man, always deferring to the woman; yet he
seldom gives them what they really want-his genuine feelings.
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for nurturance and understanding that require a man occasionally
even to swallow his pride without losing his dignity or self-
assurance.
113
Lies, violence, and emotional withdrawal mean that some men
are never constructively engaged in distinguishing between legitimate
and illegitimate claims women make upon them. All claims inconsis-
tent with a man's own objectives and desires are perceived and coded
as a threat to his masculinity. In this way, these men constitute
themselves as victims of an overpowering, castrating force, even as
they thereby abdicate any responsibility to assist, nurture, or respond
to the legitimate claims of women.1 14 This construction of the claims
113. I want to emphasize that this Article is not a proposal to ground female sexual libera-
tion on the psychological and spiritual actualization of individual men. I focus on the dynamics
in interpersonal relations, not so much because I believe "the personal is politicar' (which I do),
but because it is in these interpersonal interactions that the political is personalized. The prac-
tices through which we construct our individual lives and relationships are "political" precisely
because they are so very "scripted" by the dominant narratives our culture produces.
Individuals are, in part, what we try to become. What we try to become may not be determined
by the dominant cultural narratives that presume to show us what we ought to be. But, for bet-
ter or worse, these narratives do raise the costs of enacting alternative identities or "lifestyles."
This is either because they "drown out" other narratives that circulate in subordinate subcul-
tures or because of the way these narratives organize the circulation of power in our interper-
sonal relations and social institutions. See, for example, JanMohamed, Racialized Sexuality, in
Stanton, ed., Discourses of Sexuality at 97-103 (cited in note 9) (illustrating that power is not
something individuals have, but something they exercise from different positions, these
positions being constituted in part by institutions and in part by the cultural narratives that
other people are enacting); Bartky, Foucault, Femininity, in Diamond and Quinby, eds.,
Feminism & Foucault at 61-81 (cited in note 49) (illustrating the relationship between cultural
images of commodified femininity and the social practices these images call us to enact).
114. John Stoltenberg provides an analysis in which he cals this posture "the ethic of male
sexual identity," where men blame women for frustrating objectives they should never have had
in the first place. John Stoltenberg, Refusing to Be a Manw Essays on Sex and Justice 19
(Breitenbush, 1989). Stoltenberg calls this "reversal of moral accountability... 'the rapist-
ethics mindfuck,'" in which men impute " 'oppressiveness' to anyone who refuses to give in,
ignoring the word 'no,' disregarding completely the reality of anyone who is not fawning and
flattering and full of awe for our masculine prerogative." Id. at 19, 24. A particularly blatant
example of this moral reversal is when a man blames a woman for "making [him]" rape her.
Stoltenberg recounts the words of one rape victim:
There he was, a man who had the physical power to lock me up and rape me, without
any real threat of societal punishment, telling me that I was oppressive because I was a
woman! Then he started telling me he could understand how men sometimes go out and
rape women .... He looked at me and said, "Don't make me hurt you," as though I was,
by not giving in to him, forcing him to rape me. That is how he justified the whole
thing. He kept saying that women were forcing him to rape them by not being there
when he needed them.
Id. at 19. For an innovative and compelling critique of the ways men have attempted to ma-
nipulate access to the victim position in order to preserve the prerogatives of sexual dominance,
see Martha T. McCluskey, Fear of Feminism: Media Stories of Feminist Victims and Victims of
Feminism on College Campuses, in Martha A. Fineman and Martha T. McCluskey, eds.,
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made upon him allows a man to hide from himself (and anyone who
believes his lies) the fundamental selfishness in his relations to the
women in his life, a selfishness expressed sexually through dominance
or impotence. 115
From this perspective, lying, withdrawal, and violence are all
different faces of the Stoltenberg "mind-fuck,116 tactics through which
these men appropriate women's sexuality even as they avoid any per-
sonal responsibility to respond to women's needs and desires. The
image of the Overwhelming Feminine allows them to blame their self-
ishness on their mothers, if not on their women. 117 In short, the prob-
lem with the Overwhelming Feminine theory of male emotional with-
drawal, deception, and sexual exploitation is that the reason men can-
not renounce these practices may have less to do with their mothers
and more to do with their own determination to distort and suppress
any interaction that might require them to take risks or make sacri-
fices for women.
At the same time, these images of mothers as both weak and
overwhelming are played against the narratives of "the good
mother,"118 that is, of the white, middle-class mother, the sweet, well-
meaning, loving woman who importantly is attached to and depend-
ent upon a male sexual partner (preferably her husband).119 These
narratives of the good (but dependent) mother code the struggle for
economic autonomy, independence, and self-realization of any woman
Feminism, Media and Law (Oxford U., forthcoming, 1996) (analyzing the rhetorical deployments
of the victim position in the debates over university sexual harassment policies).
115. See Parts III.C and V.A.
116. Stoltenberg, Refusing to Be a Man at 24 (cited in note 114).
117. See generally Chodorow and Contratto, The Fantasy of the Perfect Mother, in Thorne
and Yalom, eds., Rethinking the Family (cited in note 79).
118. Ironically, but not insignificantly, the white mother who works is made just as vulner-
able to attack through the discourse of "maternal deprivation," as the white mother who stays
home with her children is vulnerable to the discourse of "maternal omnipotence." As Chodorow
and Contratto explain, both narratives are based on an ideology of motherhood produced by
infantile fantasies that simultaneously idealize mothers as the source of "all good and evil," even
as they blame mothers for their inevitable failures to realize these ideals. Id. at 65. These
narratives, in turn, are reflected in legal debates over women's rights to have and direct their
children. See, for example, Marlee Kline, Race, Racism and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 Harv.
Women's L. J. 115, 128-34 (1989) (discussing Susan Boyd's analysis of the ways images of
motherhood have been used to deprive employed women of the right to custody of their
children). For an excellent review and criticism of recent assaults on women deployed through
the discourse of the "good mother," see Benjamin, The Bonds Of Love at 198-218 (cited in note
10) (criticizing the hypocrisy through which the new wave "defenders of the private sphere"
attack feminism for encouraging "hyper-individualism" in women even as they defend the indi-
vidualist ethos for men: "[Women's] role is to produce autonomous individuals (boys), who can
balance their public and private lives, not to be such individuals").
119. See Fineman, The Neutered Mother at 161-66, 231-36 (cited in note 60) (analyzing this
image).
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who refuses motherhood or any mother who insists on maintaining "a
full life for herself outside the home" as selfish neglect of her children.
By contrast, the white, middle-class father is absolved of any similar
obligations. 120
The material impact on women's lives when they acquiesce in
this double standard and allow their choices to be driven by the psy-
cho-social pressures of "the good mother" narratives is, at least in the
discourses of white feminism, economic subordination, increased
dependence, and greater vulnerability to their male partners.121 The
image of "the good mother"-attached to and dependent upon a
dominant male figure-also plays into the anti-welfare rhetoric that
keeps poor mothers poor and thereby increases their sexual
vulnerability to individual men. 22  Cumulatively, these narratives
help construct a society in which women's sexual vulnerability is
continually reproduced by the interpersonal practices, legal
institutions, and public policies through which our sexuality is
repeatedly assaulted and suppressed.
B. Mothers in Matrifocal Perspective: Powerful and Oppressed
This Section explores the images of mother in Black and Latin
culture. These images reflect common elements that are directly at-
tributable to the fact that, in both cultures, motherhood is experi-
enced as the central element in a matrifocal network of extended fa-
milial relations. Drawing on the key elements of Stanley Kurtz's bril-
liant re-reading of psychoanalytic theory as applied to Hindu child-
rearing practices, 23 I argue that matrifocal extended families have
more potential for constructing a subject-to-subject heterosexuality
than the male-headed nuclear families that are so popular in white,
120. M. Rivka Polatnick, Why Men Don't Rear Children, in Trebilcot, ed., Mothering at 27
(cited in note 93) (quoting Sandra and Daryl Bern: "No matter how much he loved his children,
no one would expect him to sacrifice his career in order to stay home with them on a full-time
basis-even if he had an independent source of income. No one would charge him with
selfishness or lack of parental feeling if he sought professional care for his children during the
day").
121. Id. at 28. Polatnick explains that, "[flor a period, at least, parenthood means
that.., whatever vocational or professional skills she may possess may become
atrophied .... During this period of retirement the woman becomes isolated and almost totally
socially, economically and emotionally dependent upon her husband.... She loses her position,
cannot keep up with developments in her field, does not build up seniority." Id.
122. See Fineman, The Neutered Mother at 114-18 (cited in note 60).
123. See generally Kurtz, All the Mothers are One (cited in note 83) (discussed in notes 153-
63 and accompanying text).
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American patriarchy. These images of motherhood-of maternal
power and agency-offer more empowering identities for women, even
as the daily experience of extended family interdependence provides
the building blocks for developing unappropriating sexual relation-
ships. Motherhood does not have to involve the elimination of
effective agency, nor is it necessary for sexual intimacy to include the
abdication of sexual autonomy. Motherhood is currently experienced
this way because of the legal doctrines, public policies, and cultural
narratives through which women's maternal identity and sexual
autonomy are socially constructed.12 4
In a fascinating study of "matrifocality" in Indonesia, Africa,
and Black America, Nancy Tanner uses cross-cultural analysis to
criticize the biased understanding of matrifocality in Black American
culture. 125 Daniel Patrick Moynihan invoked this biased under-
standing in a 1965 federal government report entitled The Negro
Family: The Case for National Action. The report used highly incon-
clusive census material to posit the "breakdown of the Negro family"
and attributed this breakdown, along with low school performance
and higher arrest and welfare rates among nonwhites, to the preva-
lence of matriarchy in Black families. 26
Tanner notes the ethnocentrism and sexism embedded in this
report, stating that it "a priori assumes that there is no distinctive
Black American kinship system, and that whatever there is, is an
imperfect and disorganized variant of the white middle-class family
system."127 By way of contrast, Tanner notes the central role Black
124. See Part VI (criticizing the images of mother and female sexuality embedded in
American welfare policy and divorce law).
125. Nancy Tanner, Matrifocality in Indonesia and Africa and Among Black Americans, in
Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere, eds., Woman, Culture & Society 129, 150-51
(Stanford U., 1993).
126. See also Fraser and Gordon, 19 Signs 327 (cited in note 83); Theresa L. Amott, Black
Women and AFDC: Making Entitlement Out of Necessity, in Linda Gordon, ed., Women, the
State and Welfare 280, 290 (U. Wisc., 1990). Amott discusses a report published by the Reagan
Administration attacking AFDC for being an "enabler-a program which enables women to live
without a husband or a job." Id. This argument assumes that welfare "was the cause of poverty
and family breakup rather than the effect since welfare set up ... incentives for people to have
children, to avoid marriage, and to stay out of the labor force." Id. The argument not only
ignores the racial and gendered structure of economic opportunity, it also presupposes that the
male-headed nuclear family is socially, psychologically, and economically more viable than
matrifocal extended family networks. Compare notes 152-63 and accompanying text.
127. Tanner, Matrifocality, in Rosaldo and Lamphere, eds., Women, Culture at 152 (cited in
note 125). This account was revisited in the work of William Julius Wilson, The Truly
Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy 20-21 (U. Chicago, 1987).
Compare Kimberl Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331 (1988) (criticizing Wilson's
assumptions).
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women play in Black families, a role described in Joyce Ladner's
study of young Black women:
The strongest conception of womanhood that exists among all preadult females
is that of how the woman has to take a strong role in the family.... All of
these girls had been exposed to women who played central roles in their
households.... The symbol of the resourceful woman becomes an influential
model in their lives.... In sum, women were expected to be strong, and par-
ents socialized their daughters with this intention.
128
According to Tanner, Ladner's work illustrates the positive
cultural factors underlying the central position of Black women in the
Black American family. There is a clear expectation that a woman
should be a strong, resourceful mother with a structurally central
position. This image of female agency and maternal centrality is,
according to Tanner, a basic and positive feature of the Black
American kinship system, in which there are extended and flexible
kinship networks. Male and female children are equally socialized to
be active, resourceful, and assertive, and women's family roles have a
special importance. Through these relationships, women offer each
other solidarity, childcare, and other assistance, often sharing
common residences and resources.
While white racism translates the resourcefulness and agency
evidenced by "[s]tatistics showing the participation of Black women in
the labor force and their educational attainments"129 into further evi-
dence of the breakdown of the Black family, Tanner responds:
[Tio assume that Black women will cease having strong self-images, will cease
regarding themselves and being regarded as in some sense the backbone of the
family, and will retire from their jobs and their participation in religious and
political activities if and when Black men no longer face economic and political
discrimination, is to ignore the positive cultural factors supporting the various
roles of Black women. 130
From this perspective, Moynihan's attack on Black matriarchy
is little more than an ethnocentric "scholarly legitimization of a popu-
lar (and of course racist) stereotype of the Black man as somehow less
a man because the Black woman is a strong and resourceful
128. Tanner, Matrifocality, in Rosaldo and Lamphere, eds., Woman, Culture at 151 (cited in
note 125) (quoting Joyce A. Ladner, Tomorrow's Tomorrow: The Black Woman 131-32, 135
(Doubleday, 1971)).
129 Id. at 152.
130. Id. at 154.
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woman."131 Nevertheless, this counterpositioning of female power and
male powerlessness deflects attention from the racist practices
through which racially subordinated men are denied economic and
educational opportunities and are subjected to discriminatory disci-
pline by state officials such as police officers and public school offi-
cials. This perspective deploys sexist stereotypes that attempt to
make male power depend on female powerlessness, rather than
acknowledging the extent to which racial equality depends upon
increased economic and educational opportunities for both men and
women.
In Latin culture, the image of the mother shares similar char-
acteristics and resonates power: cualquiera es padre, pero madre solo
hay una.132 For example, in a fascinating account of the narratives of
masculinity and femininity that circulate in Colombia and the
Caribbean, Peter Wade writes:
The most central concept of femininity... sees women as a stable force. In the
Pacific region, for example, the mother is symbolized as the guayacin de es-
quina, a house corner post made from a very hard and durable tropical wood
which supports the whole structure of the house.
133
Penelope Harvey strikes a similar theme in her ethnographic
study of sex and violence in the Southern Peruvian Andes:
Images of motherhood are strong, positive and pervasive and present women
as those who are most able to form close bonds with their children and take re-
131. Id. at 152. Tanner is quick to rebut this assumption as sexist and unsubstantiated:
'Matrifocality can and does exist with the socialization of men and women with strong achieve-
ment motivation and entrepreneurial orientation .... The cross-cultural materials examined
here give no indication of any causal link between matrifocality and low status or achievement
for men." Id. Similarly, in Latin culture, the matrifocal structure of family life facilitates men
in enacting the scripts of parrandero, see note 140, a practice through which men maintain the
relations that will secure economic assistance for themselves and their families in times of need.
See Wade, Man the Hunter, in Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex and Violence at 126 (cited in note 14)
('[A] man's economic situation is linked to parranda because by socializing in this way he makes
crucial contacts for economic favours, aid, loans, information, and so on").
132. Literally translated, this saying reads: "Anybody can be a father, but there is only one
mother." Both clauses, however, resonate multiple meanings. The saying conveys the idea that
the relationship between a father and child is much more attenuated than the relationship be-
tween a mother and child by referring implicitly to the ease with which men "father" children.
The male ejaculation is implicitly portrayed as a minimal investment and hence inherently
promiscuous as compared to the female pregnancy. At the same time, the two clauses juxtapose
the paternal and maternal roles. The first clause portrays the paternal role as a minimal in-
volvement that any man can fulfill in relation to any child, in contrast to the maternal role,
which the second clause portrays as a fundamental commitment to the child's well being that
only a mother would assume.
133. Wade, Man the Hunter, in Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex and Violence at 118 (cited in
note 14).
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sponsibility for them and the immediate environment in which they are raised.
A woman shows her love for a man by having his children and bringing them
up. It is motherhood that confers adult status and motherhood that places
women firmly in a world of sexual differentiation and complementary
agency.
34
To be sure, patriarchal relations are embedded in these mater-
nal images of agency and power. They invite women to assume, as
mothers, the substantial burdens and personal sacrifices involved in
providing such stability.135 The image of mother as a stable force cre-
ates a space that diffuses the negative consequences of the man's lack
of parental responsibility. Paternal irresponsibility, if not affirma-
tively condoned by the image of maternal stability and responsibility,
is nevertheless rendered less threatening in cases where the mother
as a stable force is an available image. Indeed, the conservative hys-
teria over white feminism, with its emphasis on increasing women's
freedom from domestic responsibilities, is a reaction that presupposes
that men cannot, will not, or should not assume any significant re-
sponsibility for making the home a stable, nurturing environment for
children.16
134. Penelope Harvey, Domestic Violence in the Peruvian Andes, in Harvey and Gow, eds.,
Sex and Violence 73-74 (cited in note 14).
135. As Wade explains:
The central feminine position of stability and support is viewed positively by both men
and women, but there are significant differences. For women, it is a position the
negotiation of which necessarily involves commitment and sacrifice, and which may
have aspects which are forced onto her by her male partners' impermanence and the
weakness of her own position within the labour market. The positive value that
attaches to it is therefore closely connected to a sense of personal sacrifice for, and
investment in, her family .... Men, in contrast, may approach this feminine position
from a different angle, viewing it for what it does for them as men. They may assert
that they owe everything to their mothers who bore and raised them, rather than their
father who was a more shadowy figure. Capitalizing on positive images of women as
stable and domestic, men try to present a picture of women as people over whom they
have control, and who will submit to men's demands.
Wade, Man the Hunter, in Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex and Violence at 119-20 (cited in note 14).
136. See, for example, Benjamin, The Bonds of Love at 198-206 (cited in note 10). Latin
culture resists the increased educational and occupational opportunities women enjoy as a
result of the white feminist movement as "Americanization," but not so much out of fear that
children will suffer if women do not sacrifice themselves to ensure stability in the home. Like
the Black women Patricia Hill Collins describes in Black Feminist Thought (cited in note 83),
Latin women routinely work for wages or in family businesses, leaving their children securely in
the care of the women's own mothers or grandmothers. Instead, "Americanization" is resisted
because careerism and ambition in women is viewed as a play for the other sphere, a move that
is as threatening to women's claim to predominant authority within the home as it is to effective
male agency outside the home. Careerism in women is also viewed as a position that commits
women to an individualistic independence that impedes and therefore threatens the
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The Latin image of maternal strength and reliability sup-
presses the practices through which women enact an alternative iden-
tity of the woman as individual: the Western, capitalist, economic
free agent.137 The positive value associated with this Latin image of
mother comes at the expense of individual independence or, more pre-
cisely, at the expense of individual freedom from the obligation to re-
spond to the needs of children, husbands, and other dependents.
Nevertheless, the difference between the Latin images of mother and
the dominant images of the white mother are explained by the fact
that lack of individual freedom (even from gendered obligations) is not
the same as lack of power, autonomy, or agency. As Penelope Harvey
writes of Latin culture in the Peruvian Andes,
As mothers, women are responsible for the running of the home, and to be wor-
thy of respect a woman must show herself to be hard-working in this regard.
Men are not expected to display aptitude or interest in the day-to-day mainte-
nance tasks such as serving food or cooking. This ability in women is thus
seen as something worthy of respect.... A lively clever woman will represent
the interests of her household behind the scenes in informal networks and in
the subtle manipulation of the man over whom she has some influence. An
ideal woman is quick-witted (viva), hard-working (trabajadora), tender
(carifiosa) and attractive (simpbtica)-a quality which combines physical and
moral attributes. There is no ideal of passive receptive femininity. A bad
woman is one who is not effective because she is lazy (floja), stupid (sonsa), or
uses her abilities for anti-social purposes (mala).138
Given these narratives, Latin children do not experience the
Latin mother's lack of freedom from gendered obligations the same
way the white mother appears coded in white feminist and psycho-
analytic theory. Put differently, the mother's lack of agency and sub-
jectivity independent from the superior authority of an otherwise ab-
sent father is a decidedly white, Anglo image.13 9 Indeed, many Latin
relationships of interdependence through which family members make claims upon and make
themselves available to reciprocate the assistance of other family members.
137. For an excellent discussion of this image and the impact of its deployment in legal
rhetoric on the interests of women involved in abusive home and/or work relations, see
Mahoney, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 1283 (cited in note 4). Martha Fineman has also examined the
negative impact of this image on the interests of poor women. See Fineman, The Neutered
Mother at 115-17 (cited in note 60); Fineman, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. at 660-62 (cited in note 11).
138. Harvey, Domestic Violence, in Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex and Violence at 74 (cited in
note 14).
139. In her particularly insightful analysis, Penelope Harvey explains the ambiguities of
power and violence in Latin culture:
During my stay in the village I had many conversations with women about their
marital relationships. I was struck by the fact that their toleration of actions, which I
found horrifying, was not based in a sense of shame or passivity; they talked with pride
about how they fought back and were perfectly willing to complain to others about their
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daughters and sons grow up believing their mothers will have the fi-
nal way, if not the final word. For example, appealing for paternal
intervention in the disciplinary regimens established in the home
(matters such as bedtimes, television hours, curfews, and dating) is
often deemed futile and likely to backfire. Latin mothers commonly
expect to set the rules for their children and expect these rules to be
obeyed by their children and enforced by their husbands. Many Latin
fathers readily embrace the role of background enforcer and rarely
intervene of their own initiative because proactive interventions may
invite claims for continued involvement and because the narratives of
Latin masculinity make intervention in such matters problematic.
The practices through which Latin men enact masculine iden-
tities substantially reduce their standing to intervene or countermand
the will of Latin mothers in the home. Peter Wade discusses the im-
ages of masculinity that circulate in Colombia and the Caribbean,
images of el mujeriego, el hombre parrandero, and el buen padre, buen
marido, which call men to fulfill competing lifestyles that are in
significant tension. 140 Constructing a powerful or strong masculinity
depends largely on achieving a balance among the different value
systems embedded in these different masculinities. "The point is, of
course, that the two realms are intimately interdependent, since a
man's success as party-goer and womanizer is partly dependent on
him keeping his mujer principal happy, or failing that, submissive in
the domestic realm."141
Thus, in the songs Wade analyzes, the message is that the
strong and vital man gets to have it all because, despite his philander-
ing, he can keep his woman happy. For Wade, keeping her happy
means satisfying her sexually and providing economic support for her
treatment. The difference between their attitude and mine was that they appeared to
accept this confrontational aspect of their relationships as one of the unpleasant
consequences of falling in love and forming a stable partnership. Furthermore .... I
often witnessed them retaliating and giving as good as they got in domestic fights.
Id. at 66.
140. See Wade, Man the Hunter, in Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex and Violence at 117 (cited in
note 14). El tnujeriego is the womanizer, a man "engaged in the sexual conquest of women even
when based in a relatively stable conjugal union." Id. El hombre parrandero is "the fun-loving
drinker and dancer who is always ready to party with his male friends and stay up all night,
drinking rum, listening and dancing to music, telling jokes and stories." Id. El buen padre,
buen marido is the good husband, the good father, the man who takes care of his family, edu-
cates his children, and keeps his wife "happy" Id.
141. Id. at 123. Thus "a man whose children are known to be going hungry because he
spends too much money on parrandas and other women is liable to lose prestige (although per-
haps not as much as if he did not go out with his friends)." Id. at 130.
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and their children. Thus "the sex he has with his mujer principal is
in fact a duty he owes her, rather than an expression of his sexual
dominance."'' 2  An additional reading is that keeping her happy
means deferring to and enforcing her authority in the home. From
this perspective, male deference and respect for female authority in
the home is, in Latin culture, the quid pro quo for male freedom from
the home, a freedom both men and women have some interest in pre-
serving.14 3
Many Latin mothers are further empowered by relations of
female solidarity. Like the images of Black mothers, and unlike the
images of white, middle-class mothers, Latin mothers enjoy the sup-
port of other women, thereby increasing their authority and the felt
legitimacy of the power they exercise in the home. As Oliva Espin ex-
plains:
142. Id. at 122. Penelope Harvey notes a similar theme in Peruvian culture: 'Married
women are assumed to experience sexual desire and their husbands should ideally control that
desire through satisfying the woman's needs. Indeed, men frequently joke about the strain that
women put them under in this respect, constantly demanding their sexual services." Harvey,
Domestic Violence, in Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex and Violence at 75 (cited in note 14). But see
Part III.C (discussing the virgin/whore dichotomy in Latin culture). Latin culture "resolves" the
apparent difficulties generated by these conflicting representations of female sexual desire: A
woman's sexual desire is expressed outside the rhetorical structure of the virgin/whore dichot-
omy only if and when it is inscribed within the structure of married motherhood. Motherhood
marks a woman's sexual maturity, manifesting the expression of a woman's sexual desire for
her husband, but a woman only acquires the right to such desire through marriage. At the
same time, the virgin/whore dichotomy remains a rhetorical resource readily available to dis-
cipline expressions of female sexual desire that threaten a husband's security in his exclusive
access to his wife. Harvey, Domestic Violence, in Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex and Violence at 75
(cited in note 14) ("The most distinctive aspect of male attitudes towards sexuality is their ex-
aggerated concern with female infidelity. Indeed, female infidelity appears to be far more
threatening to men than male infidelity is to women").
143. Here is another example of the relationship between male powerlessness and male
abuse. Just as male respect for female authority is a tactic used in successfully negotiating the
competing imperatives of being a man in Latin culture, male abuse appears as the tactic of a
weak masculinity, i.e., the man who cannot successfully negotiate these different claims. His
wife objects to his mujeres, his parrandas. She resists. She is not happy. Because he cannot
keep her happy, he must keep her submissive, and he does this with violence. Wade, Man the
Hunter, in Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex and Violence at 131 (cited in note 14). Wade's account is
valuable because it highlights the fact that male violence is not simply an artifact of the ways in
which masculinity is defined in opposition to the feminine, see, for example, Stoltenberg,
Refusing to be a Man at 31-34 (cited in note 114), but also a product of the conflict among
different narratives of masculinity. Both men and women are disadvantaged when cultural
narratives privilege masculinity at the expense of and in opposition to femininity. See, for
example, id.; Benjamin, The Bonds of Love at 183-98 (cited in note 10). But men and women are
also both disadvantaged when the narratives of pornographic masculinity (consumption, abuse,
emotional withdrawal, and narcissism) and commodified femininity gain predominance over
more life-affirming narratives.
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Latin women experience a unique combination of power and powerlessness
which is characteristic of the culture. The idea that personal problems are
best discussed with women is very much part of the Hispanic culture....
There is a widespread belief among Latin women of all social classes that most
men are undependable and are not to be trusted. [And yet], many of these
women will put up with a man's abuse because having a man around is an im-
portant source of a woman's sense of self-worth. Middle-aged and elderly
Hispanic women retain important roles in their families even after their sons
and daughters are married. Grandmothers are ever present and highly vocal
in family affairs. Older women have much more status and power than their
white American counterparts, who at this age may be suffering from depres-
sion due to what has been called the "empty-nest syndrome"' 144
The important point is that these cultural differences create a
context in which Latin children tend to view maternal power quite
differently from the images projected in the psychoanalytic accounts
of white motherhood. 145 In sharp contrast to the fear some white men
express of being absorbed and infantilized by maternal pampering,146
144. Espin, Sexuality in Hispanic/Latin Women, in Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger at 155
(cited in note 9).
145. Black daughters' accounts of their mothers suggest similar themes. See Joseph and
Lewis, Common Differences at 96-103 (cited in note 2). When asked what they most respected
about their mothers, the daughters responded: "She works a job she hates so I can have this
fine education." Id. at 96. "Ambition, perseverance and the refusal to take shit from anyone
(with the exception of my father)." Id. "I respect my mother's ability and strength as a woman.
(My mother reared eight children without the ample support she should have gotten from my
father and only a strong woman can do such.)" Id. at 97. "Her courage to continue working with
the bullshit that society gave her. The bullshit my father gave her. Her courage to raise all
seven of her children. Just for her being herself." Id. "Her ability to manage money and
making ends meet on her low wages." Id. "Her knowledge and strength of character." Id.
Clearly, the other side of admiration is fear: "When my mother gave me a certain look, fear
would run all through me in seconds." Id. at 98. More than one daughter said that she feared
her mother's "quick temper," her "terrible temper," her 'eating my behind," her "physical
strength, which seemed overwhelming," her "using the strap." Id. at 98-99. One daughter
summed it up like this: "If she says that what she says goes in her house, I know I better
respect her wishes." Id. at 99. Nevertheless, these expressions of fear coexist with expressions
of deep appreciation, graditude, love, and admiration for the very same mothers they feared
because: "How much she really loved us and did for us when we were children. She was always
around when we needed her," because she was "trustworthy, hardworking and thrifty," because
of "[h]er determination in bringing us up," because she "was able to be relatively optimistic in
the face of shoveling through tons of bullshit; she could laugh; she was very open in her pride of
me," because she was "very open and we can express opinions about everything. She is
dependable and shows a lot of concern for her entire family." Id. at 98-99. Indeed, it may be
that "her wishes" were respected not so much out of fear but because of what she gave, "Her
sense of humor, perseverance, determination. Her belief in the conviction that you never say
you 'can't' do something. You try first. Her outspokenness, her ability to make friends
wherever she goes (without even trying)." Id. at 98-99.
146. Douglas Gillette argues that this reaction is the consequence of being raised in "a
hostile feminine environment" See Gillette, Men and Intimacy, in Harding, ed., Wingspan at 53
(cited in note 58). See also notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
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Latin boys, like their fathers, are routinely catered to in the home, in
part, because Latin images of masculinity make male domestic labor a
cultural taboo 147 and, in part, because no Latin mother wants to raise
her son to be a wimp. 48
Cross-cultural analyses of matrifocal kinship relations suggest
that strong and positive mother/child bonds are staple features of
matrifocal family structures and are formed in relation to both daugh-
ters and sons. 49 In Latin culture, this bond is formed through the cul-
turally pervasive practices of celebrating children, indulging their
childhood, and protecting their innocence. It is commonplace for
Latin children to express deep love and respect for the mothers who
raised them. As adults, Latin sons continue to "respect and revere
their mothers, even when they may not show much respect for their
wives or other women. As adolescents they may have protected their
mothers from their fathers' abuse or indifference. As adults they ac-
cord their mothers a respect that no other woman deserves, thus fol-
lowing their fathers' steps."'' 5
Latin daughters are raised to identify with their mothers.
Moreover, while daughters are encouraged and indeed compelled to
serve their fathers and brothers, the psycho-social meaning of that
service is ambiguously situated at the intersection of two competing
discourses. As entitlements of male supremacy, these services rein-
force male superiority, but, as evidence of male dependence on female
capabilities, the domestic services Latin women provide men are in-
vested with an element of female superiority not conveyed in any ac-
counts of the white family. As a result, the Latin woman often in-
dulges, but she does not expect to depend upon the male whom she is
raised to believe is emotionally and psychologically undependable.15'
147. See, for example, Margaret Randall, Women in Cuba: Twenty Years Later 18-20, 149-
51 (Smyrna, 1981).
148. Espin, Sexuality in Hispanic/Latin Women, in Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger at 157
(cited in note 9). Indeed, it is often "[tihe mother herself [that] teaches her sons to be dominant
and independent in relations with other women." Id.
149. See, for example, Tanner, Matrifocality, in Rosaldo and Lamphere, eds., Woman,
Culture at 136-37 (cited in note 125). According to Tanner, the "mother-child bond is strong and
persistent.... The relationship with the mother... lasts throughout the individual's life....
The mother is seen as a bulwark of strength and love to whom one can always turn." Id.
(quoting Hildred Geertz). "Mothers may divorce and remarry several times; children remain
with their mothers." Id. at 137.
150. Espin, Sexuality and Hispanic/Latin Women, in Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger at
157 (cited in note 9).
151. See, for example, Comas-Diaz, 16 J. Community Psych. at 21 (cited in note 83).
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In a fascinating re-reading of Hindu child-rearing practices, s15 2
Stanley Kurtz offers a conceptual framework for re-examining and re-
valuing the psycho-cultural impact of numerous practices pervasive in
Latin culture. While there are significant differences between Hindu
and Latin (as well as among Latin) cultures, Latin children in tradi-
tional extended families (not disrupted by revolutions, assimilation, or
other social upheavals) are raised more like Hindu children than
white, American children precisely because they are raised into their
families, rather than into the individualistic independence of white
children in American culture.15s Put differently, like similar Hindu
practices, Latin child-rearing practices are connected to the cultural
emphasis on the family and the child's membership in that group.
In white, Western psychoanalytic theory, the familial interde-
pendence these practices produce are coded as pathological and re-
gressive. As adults, Latin sons and daughters routinely make signifi-
cant personal sacrifices in order to promote the interests or meet the
needs of their parents or other family members. These sacrifices,
when interpreted through the lens of American individualism, are
often deemed evidence of failed individuation or excessive familial
entanglement in the individual's life. One cannot properly under-
stand or evaluate these practices, however, without taking account of
the culturally specific normative commitments that define the objec-
tives of maturation and the meaning of family in Latin culture.154 As
Kurtz notes:
152. See generally Kurtz, All the Mothers are One (cited in note 83). There are no
comparative psychoanalytical studies of Latin child-rearing practices that are even remotely
comparable in quality and depth. Consequently, my discussion is guided in large part by the
extent to which Kurtz's analysis of Hindu child-rearing practices illuminates the practices and
normative positions I have experienced, expressed, and observed in my own and other Latin
families. While comparative psychoanalytic anthropology would do well to expand and apply
Kurtz's approach to the study of Latin culture, my purpose is a more limited effort to present a
perspective from which the cultural specificity and biases of the psychoanalytic theories of
motherhood deployed in white feminism and the white men's movement can be more clearly
observed. See Part III.A.
153. See, for example, Comas-Diaz, 16 J. Community Psych. at 26 (cited in note 83)
(discussing DeGranda's account of identity crises triggered by "the confrontation of the tradi-
tional Puerto Rican values [of] the extended family, interdependence, cooperation, and personal-
ism (the value of personal relationships over impersonal ones) with opposing American values
such as the nuclear family, individualism, and competition").
154. For example, as Stanley Kurtz explains, the emphasis on familial interdependence in
Hindu culture promotes different subject/subject relations: the Hindu we-self. Kurtz, All the
Mothers are One at 263 (cited in note 83) (noting how the Indian notion of "we-self' alters the
meaning of women's career commitments. These careers "are undertaken for the sake of the




However compelling the psychoanalytic account of development, it will be im-
possible for us to retain it as a universal model without consigning most of the
world to a state of relative pathology.... [O]ther cultures [most notably Black,
but also Latin] appear to be failing their children on any number of counts
from the perspective of psychoanalysis. 155
Kurtz discusses three types of practices that illustrate how
children are raised to experience themselves as members of an inter-
dependent extended family. These practices illustrate the ways in
which other family members assert their claims of relationship even
as the natural parents minimize their special ties to the child and the
normative positions these practices reflect. The first practice is a
game Hindu (and Latin) adults often play with children. The child is
given a gift and immediately asked to return it to the giver. Both the
giving and the requested return are routinely accompanied by an as-
sertion of the kinship relationship that connects the child to the adult.
If the child returns the gift, he is praised for his self-sacrifice and
generosity. If the child refuses to return it, he is praised for his clev-
erness. His refusal to return the gift is interpreted as an appropriate
assertion of his right to receive and retain the benefits conferred by
his family. In either case, the interaction is coded to further consoli-
date the child's sense of belonging to an interdependent group. For
even as the child is expected to renounce his individual desires at the
request of other family members, he is also entitled to insist on a re-
ciprocal flow of benefits and assistance from other members of the
family.156
A different but related Hindu practice, also pervasive in Latin
culture, is the practice of indulging children to a degree deemed
"pathological" by white, American standards, which emphasize indi-
viduation and independence rather than familial interdependence and
solidarity. Kurtz notes that Hindu mothers almost never refuse their
children's repeated requests. As Kurtz explains, however, rather than
reinforcing the child's narcissistic self-centeredness, this form of ma-
ternal indulgence is one of the ways children learn their place in the
family. The child gets what he wants, but only after making repeated
requests. Granting the child's requests teaches the child that his
155. Id. at 252. For a compelling analysis of how this ethnocentrism translates into racist
adoption policies, see Perry, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change at 33 (cited in note 91). For a
critical (and relatively "Americanized") perspective on familial interdependence in Latin culture,
see David Abalos, Latinos in the United States at 62-80 (cited in note 96).
156. Kurtz, All the Mothers are One at 79-82 (cited in note 83). As Kurtz notes, from this
position "a child's greatest weapon against his parents is a refusal to take, for such a refusal
indicates an exit from the basic understanding of mutual entitlement that holds the group to-
gether." Id. at 80.
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needs will be satisfied in the family and that, consequently, member-
ship in the family is valuable to him. At the same time, the mother's
resistance to the child's requests and the child's need to repeatedly
assert them teaches the child that there are some wants he should
sacrifice for the sake of others in the family.
The third set of practices construct and reinforce the practices
of "multiple mothering," that is, the practices through which other
women in the family assert a right to participate in the care and
guidance of the children in the extended family. 57 Through these
practices, the child's natural mother complies with other family mem-
bers' expectations that she will restrain affectional displays toward
her own child, particularly in the presence of the child's grandmoth-
ers. 58 These rules of restraint reinforce the idea that the child be-
longs to the family, not just to his natural mother. Thus compliance
with these rules is a way of consolidating group bonds by relinquish-
ing what would be deemed a selfish preference of the natural mother
for her own child.' 59
What Kurtz's analysis illuminates is an alternative framework
for understanding how child-rearing practices designed to consolidate
extended families impact the child's identity formation and affectional
positions. Unlike the child's individuation in the male-headed nuclear
family, Kurtz's analysis emphasizes the
task of drawing the child out of the initial tie to the mother and into
participation in a form of social life in which the group [the family] is the
normative center. One might call this general pattern of development
separation-integration in contrast to our own developmental norm of
separation-individuation.' 60
157. "Si es tu hijo, es mi nieto!.. . sobrino/. . . ahijado.P' ("He may be your son, but he's my
grandson!... nephew! ... godchild!") are all common refrains familiar to many Latin mothers
in which the claims of interest and of right of the child's othermothers, to use Patricia Hill
Collins's wonderful expression, are embedded. Collins, Black Feminist Thought at 129-32 (cited
in note 83). According to Kurtz, "[t~he presence of alternate caretakers in many cultures acts in
complex and varied ways to break the initial attachment to the mother and to move the child
along a path to maturity whose outcome is neither individual independence in the Western
sense nor a simple continuation of symbiosis and dependence." Kurtz, All the Mothers are One
at 259 (cited in note 83).
158. Kurtz, All the Mothers are One at 260 (cited in note 83) ("[W]hile a Tamil woman may
freely show affection for the children of her siblings and in-laws within the joint family, her
strong anpu (love) for her own children must remain unseen-particularly when her in-laws are
nearby").
159. Id. at 104.
160. Id. at 261.
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These child-rearing practices, which focus on the child's inte-
gration into the family rather than his individuation from the mother,
promote affectional positions that are different from the
"individualized, empathetic attention that makes up much of what
[Americans] call love."161 Love is coded as compliance with the obliga-
tions to and sacrifices for one's family; it is sharply distinguished from
the preferential desire expressed in sexual relationships and the af-
fection expressed in friendships with nonfamily members.
In short, Kurtz's analysis of Hindu child-rearing provides a
framework for understanding the limitations of the mainstream psy-
choanalytic theories deployed in feminist and anti-feminist rhetoric.
These theories impose a culturally specific model of development that
defines maturation as individuation. They also presuppose the
normative commitments of individualism, in which preferential one-
to-one relationships take priority over the bonds of solidarity that
consolidate a group. These presuppositions make it difficult to
appreciate the positive elements of alternative family structures and
child-rearing practices that emphasize the individual's membership in
extended family networks.
Indeed, my point is that Kurtz's work offers two perspectives
from which the most distinctive features of matrifocal family ar-
rangements-that is, the value placed upon maternal authority and
extended family interdependence-make the matrifocal extended
family a more fruitful starting point for the formation of subject-to-
subject heterosexuality than the male-headed nuclear family. This is,
initially, because the experience of being raised by strong maternal
figures in an extended family offers a perspective from which the
child's identity formation does not depend upon individuation from a
devalued feminine so much as integration into a broader group in
which the feminine is still present and powerful. The second
perspective focuses on the strategies that encourage the child to
relinquish his self-centeredness in order to participate more fully in
the relations of reciprocal assistance and renunciation that sustain
the family.
Read against the narratives of mainstream psychoanalytic
theory, the child-rearing practices used to promote individual self-re-
nunciation and group integration in Latin extended families offer bet-
ter building blocks for nonappropriating heterosexual relationships in
American society. The ever-present possibility of replacing familial
interdependence with an individualistic marked-mediated
161. Id. at 260.
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independence creates a space in which extended family relationships
can be experienced as an affirmative choice. These freely chosen
practices of self-renunciation and multiple interdependence may, in
turn, help the individual recode erotic love in nonpossessory terms. 62
The more immediate point, however, is that re-valuing the ma-
trifocal extended family is a crucial step in displacing the cultural
enshrinement of the nuclear male-headed sexual family in public poli-
cies.' 63 This displacement is crucial to reforming policies, like welfare
eligibility rules, which make it increasingly difficult for single moth-
ers to maintain their families as viable economic units, or legal doc-
trines, like "the best interests of the child," which are used, in child
custody proceedings, to punish women for their nonmarital sexual
relationships. These policies and legal doctrines reflect a general
pattern in which state power enforces a general preference for the
male-headed nuclear family and disciplines women who cannot or will
not conform to this preferred family arrangement. These policies also
promote women's continued dependence on individual men and
thereby increase women's sexual vulnerability.
C. Images of Female Sexuality: In and Beyond
the Virgin/Whore Dichotomy
The virgin/whore dichotomy is a culturally dominant narrative
that is repeatedly asserted in the formulation of legal rules that
govern the processing of rape cases. The dichotomy also operates in a
de facto fashion in rape processing practices. For example, rape-
shield statutes that exclude evidence of a rape victim's prior sexual
conduct are designed to prevent juries from using such evidence to
conclude that the victim consented to the sexual assault.64 This pro-
hibited inference is based on the notion that women who engage in
consensual, nonmarital sex are either generally promiscuous, and
162. As Kurtz notes: "[]n the Western notion of love, as incorporated by psychoanalysis,
we have a relationship in which the individual remains the normative center. We feel loved
when we feel loved for ourselves-for what is individual or particular in us.... []t follows that
true love must be a love of one for one, for to be loved for one's unique self means to be loved in
preference to another." Id. at 254-55. But "[i]f the truest love were not the love of one for one,
then the loss of a given love would cause little pain nor would it even be necessary to come to
trust in the reliability of the beloved. On reflection, then, the notion of one-to-one love, so vital
to psychoanalysis, seems to reflect the larger presence of the individualism characteristic of
Western cultures." Id.
163. See, for example, Fineman, The Neutered Mother (cited in note 60) (discussed in Part
VI).
164. Coombs, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. at 283 n.19 (cited in note 43).
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hence more likely to have consented in the case at issue, or they are
deemed generally disreputable, and hence more likely to fabricate
rape accusations. These notions are easily interpreted as a further
specification of the virgin/whore dichotomy. At the same time, con-
tinued controversy over the appropriate scope of rape-shield stat-
utes 165 suggests that legal reforms designed to eliminate racist and
sexist images of female sexuality from the criminal justice system will
only be partially successful. Full success requires altering the
substantive content of these images, for example by achieving broader
participation of women and minorities in the production of popular
culture. It also requires reforms to change the relations of
dependence through which many women's sexual vulnerability is
most immediately constructed.
Read as narratives of heterosexuality, the virgin/whore polari-
ties are images of female sexual identity that encourage men and
women to enact a variety of familiar scripts. In Latin culture, these
narratives are even more pervasive and the dichotomy more rigid
than in white, Anglo culture. This is true largely because of the pro-
found influence of Catholicism, which emphasizes the importance of
virginity for all unmarried women. 166 The narratives organized
around this dichotomy support social practices that destroy female
heterosexual autonomy and threaten women who dare express non-
marital sexual desire. 6 7
165. See Sakthi Murthy, Comment, Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations: Limits on
Using a Rape Victim's Sexual History to Show the Defendant's Mistaken Belief in Consent, 79
Cal. L. Rev. 541, 542 (1991) (commenting on a case holding that evidence of a victim's
promiscuity was not barred by a rape-shield statute if it was offered to support the defendant's
assertion that he reasonably but mistakenly believed that the victim consented to sex); Recent
Cases, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 951, 974 n.38 (1993).
166. Espin, Sexuality and Hispanic/Latin Women, in Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger at
151 (cited in note 9); Alarc6n, Castillo, and Moraga, eds., The Sexuality of Latinas at 147 (cited
in note 76). See also Kathryn Gravdal, Ravishing Maidens: Writing Rape in Medieval French
Literature and Law 22 (U. Pa., 1991). Gravdal writes:
The Church fathers are well known for calling women to a virginal life. Most
patristic thinkers propounded the idea that woman is the objective correlative both of
the sexual body and of human sinfulness. A woman could be saved from her inferior
female nature only by renouncing sexuality and becoming like a man, through virginity.
A woman accedes to sanctity by prizing her chastity so highly that she dies for it.
Sexual assault is one of the preferred methods of promotion to female martyrdom in
early Christian hagiography.
Id.
167. Espin, Sexuality in Hispanic/Latin Women, in Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger at 151
(cited in note 9). "[B]y upholding the standard of virginity as the proof of a woman's
honorability, the church, and later the culture in general, further lowered the status of women
who cannot or will not maintain virginity. This also fostered the perspective that once an
unmarried woman is not a virgin, she is automatically promiscuous." Id.
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An example of the operation of the dichotomy is the pervasive
male practice of preying on women, particularly virgins. 68 Getting to
them before anyone else does purportedly makes men more macho, a
practice which is then invoked to legitimate and explain the necessity
for imposing strict restrictions on young women's freedom. 169 Indeed,
these narratives simultaneously reflect and reproduce a cultural
environment where any nonmarital sex is coded as the vehicle
through which women are degraded (and degrade themselves), even
in the eyes of their lovers. 171
The mutual incompatibility of a sexual identity structure that
codes masculinity as the aggressive pursuit of sex and femininity as
an equally active rejection of sex feeds the culture of rape and sexual
domination. Because women must always say no, even when they
really want to say yes, men must take the initiative and overcome the
no that really means yes.'1 ' Indeed, Latin popular culture routinely
codes rape as the means of last resort in a man's desperate and frus-
trated attempts to express true love.'72
168. See Olivia Harris, Condor and Bull: The Ambiguities of Masculinity in Northern
Potosi, in Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex and Violence at 40-65 (cited in note 14).
169. See Espin, Sexuality and Hispanic/Latin Women, in Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger
at 157 (cited in note 9). For a definition of machismo and an analysis linking it to the
experience of masculine inadequacy generated by economic and social subordination, see
Comas-Diaz, 16 J. Community Psych. at 22-23 (cited in note 83).
170. Espin, Sexuality and Hispanic/Latin Women, in Vance, ed., Pleasure and Danger at
157 (cited in note 9) ('Women . . . are seen as capable of surrendering to men's advances,
without much awareness of their own decisions on the matter. 'Good women' should always say
no to a sexual advance. Those who say yes are automatically assumed to be less virtuous by
everyone, including the same man with whom they consent to have sex").
171. See, for example, Harvey, Domestic Violence, in Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex and
Violence at 72 (cited in note 14). Harvey writes: "[Y]oung [Peruvian women] will never admit to
having willingly had sexual relations with men. They always say they were tricked into it--'he
deceived me' (me engafio). Active resistance is expected and is often understood by the men as
an expression of desire." Id.
172. Although popularized representations of rape reflect cross-cultural similarities, par-
ticularly as intercultural exchange increases, the emphasis in the rape narratives circulating in
Latin popular culture is not that women enjoy being injured and degraded, but rather that rape
is an appropriate way to overcome a woman's unreasonable rejection of "a good man." See, for
example, El Ladron de Mi Amor, a very popular soap opera aired in Miami, Florida from 1985
through 1986 in which a lower-class man rapes and impregnates an upper class woman. The
rape is portrayed as the expression of the man's overwhelming desire for the woman, which is
frustrated by a class structure that purports to elevate the woman beyond his reach. The man
is portrayed as a fundamentally "good man," since he educates himself out of his lower-class
status to become a prominent lawyer and eventually marries the woman he raped, ultimately
winning her love.
Put differently, Latin cultural narratives will implicitly (and in some instances explicitly)
applaud rape as a legitimate means of appropriating a woman. For example, if the man's sexual
desire is an expression of genuine love for the woman, and the woman's rejection is viewed as
unreasonable, as when it is an expression of class prejudice or submission to familial objections.
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The popularity of these rape dramas can only be understood as
a response to the ubiquity of the virgin/whore dichotomy.173 The logic
of this dichotomy-in which mutual and consensual sex automatically
makes women into whores-means that complicity in enacting the
scripted narratives of a rape, or seduction, becomes the only accept-
able vehicle through which women can enjoy otherwise immoral sex
without incurring moral blame or dishonor, while men enjoy ego
gratification from enacting the subject position of overwhelming
sexual prowess. For many Latin women, the virgin/whore dichotomy
means that sexual intimacy, at least outside (and at times even
within) the bonds of holy matrimony, is only possible at the cost of
reinscribing narratives of male sexual dominance and female lack of
sexual agency or desire. The costs to women can be staggering. 74
Practices that define female sexuality as submission to male
sexual prowess can blur the line between sexual domination and sex-
Rape is, therefore, an image that codes male sexual desire as socially uncontrollable and ulti-
mately irresistable. The physical and psychological harm inflicted on women is sublimated by
representing rape as the means through which male agency liberates true love from the re-
straints imposed by female acquiescence to socially imposed expectations.
173. For an intriguing analysis of the popularity of Harlequin romances, see Ann Barr
Snitow, Mass Market Romance: Pornography for Women is Different, in Snitow, Stansell, and
Thompson, eds., Powers of Desire at 245-63 (cited in note 8). Discussing an unpublished talk by
Peter Parisi, Snitow writes: "Harlequin romances are essentially pornography for people
ashamed to read pornography .... [T]he reader's qualms are allayed when the novels invoke
morals, then affirm a force, sexual feeling, strong enough to override those morals.... IT]he
books' sexual formula (which sexualizes male dominance) allows both heroine and reader to feel
wanton again and again while maintaining their sense of themselves as not that sort of woman."
Id. at 254-55. See also Coombs, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. at 305 (cited in note 43) (discussing
bodice ripper romances).
174. Female complicity in enacting the scripts of sexual submission is often deployed as
ammunition in anti-feminist attacks on legal reforms designed to protect women from sexual
abuse. See Estrich, 95 Yale L. J. at 1127-41 (cited in note 54). Estrich explains the legal re-
quirement in rape cases of proving the victim's physical resistance, defined initially as "utmost
resistance" and later as "reasonable resistance," as a function of the no-means-yes approach to
female sexuality. Id. She criticizes this requirement, correctly I think, by focusing on its
implications for women's sexual autonomy: "Were the purpose of the consent requirement
really to afford autonomy to women, there is no reason why a simple but clearly stated 'no'
would not suffice to signify non-consent. Viewing women as autonomous human beings would
mean treating them as persons who know what they want and mean what they say. A woman
who wanted sex would say yes; a woman who did not would say no." Id. at 1127. This is
certainly an acceptable account of what sexual autonomy could mean for women. The "real"
problem, however, is identifying the most effective forms of legal intervention, as many women
do not experience themselves to have either the freedom to say yes or the power to say no. This
happens because of social, economic, and physical power differentials that advantage men, and
also because of the cultural images (like the virgin/whore dichotomy) women often internalize.
In this context, legal interventions that target the substantive elements of rape (as opposed to
the production of popular culture and the public policies and private practices that reinforce
women's economic and social subordination) are perhaps more likely to trigger the organization
of backlash resistance than to achieve sexual autonomy for women. See, for example, Recent
Cases, 106 Harv. L. Rev at 969 (cited in note 165).
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ual intercourse for both men and for women. While women know
when we have been raped,175 we often do not know what to do about it,
particularly in on-going relationships where the lines between inter-
personal connectedness and individual autonomy are constantly rene-
gotiated. When female sexuality is enacted as submission to male
sexual desire-a defensive position Latin women may take to avoid
occupying the whore side of the dichotomy' 76 -this line-drawing be-
comes even more complicated because interpersonal intimacy depends
upon the woman's abdication of sexual autonomy. A woman's subse-
quent assertions of autonomy are consequently seen as a direct threat
to interpersonal intimacy that must be reestablished through enforced
submission. Accordingly, the woman's resistance increasingly loses
its significance each time she capitulates. To the extent this dynamic
of sexual dominance and submission is driven by the specter of the
virgin/whore dichotomy, female sexual autonomy depends on shatter-
ing its cultural power. The image and narratives of the sacred prosti-
tute, as presented in the discourse of Jungian analytical psychology,
offer an alternative discursive regime that could advance this
struggle.
Read through Jungian psychoanalytic theory, the virgin/whore
dichotomy and the narratives it supports project impoverished arche-
typal images of women. 177 Jung believed that
every man [and woman] carries within him [or herself] the eternal image of
woman, not the image of this or that particular woman, but a definite feminine
image. This image is fundamentally an unconscious hereditary factor of pri-
mordial origin and is engraved on the living system of man, an imprint or
"archetype" of all the ancestral experiences of the female.178
175. See Coombs, 2 Tex. J. Women & L. at 280 n.9 (cited in note 43) ("[W]hen I refer to
women's 'true stories' I am claiming, first, that women's assertions that they were sexually
violated are almost always an accurate representation of what they felt").
176. See, for example, Espin, Sexuality in Hispanic/Latin Women, in Vance, ed., Pleasure
and Danger at 156 (cited in note 9) ('To enjoy sexual pleasure, even in marriage, may indicate
lack of virtue"); Harvey, Domestic Violence, in Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex and Violence at 72
(cited in note 14) (noting the female practice of denying sexual desire: mie engailo (he tricked
me)).
177. Not only does this dichotomy invite individual men and women to enact impoverished
sexual identities, it is also deployed to restrict and subordinate women precisely because of their
sexuality. See Gravdal, Ravishing Maidens at 21 (cited in note 166). This is evidenced by the
ease with which LaFree's categories of conformist and nonconformist female gender-role
behavior slips into the virgin/whore dichotomy. See notes 27-40 and accompanying text.




This image of woman is the individual's anima. It is the feminine side
of the psyche, which organizes the way individual men and women
think about actual women as well as the way they feel about those
aspects of their own selves which they identify as feminine. 179
In a provocative historical account and psychoanalytic analysis
of the sacred prostitute, Nancy Qualls-Corbett develops a thesis that
connects the practices of male sexual dominance and impotence to the
internalization of impoverished images of femininity or, more specifi-
cally, of an anima that suppresses the unity of spirituality and sexual-
ity, leaving only the split-image feminine that is inscribed within the
virgin/whore dichotomy. This split-image is expressed by men in rela-
tions of sexual domination in which female sexuality is simply an in-
strument for a superficial and narcissistic self-gratification. The
woman becomes the man's whore-object, to be used on demand.
Alternatively, men may express this split-image feminine in relations
of sexual impotence in which female sexuality is repudiated. Here the
woman becomes the inner-boy's mother/wife, to be sexually sup-
pressed and avoided. Women also internalize the split-image femi-
nine, which degrades female sexuality, expressing it in the extremes
of self-destructive promiscuity and other-destructive sexual refusal.
In Qualls-Corbett's account, the sacred prostitute is presented
as a feminine image, which "while not synonymous with an anima" is
nevertheless "relevant to every stage of development of man's [or
woman's] inner woman."180 She is the image in which the feminine
"offers pleasure, excitement and vitality, a personification of both
spirituality and earthiness. She is a lover whose beauty is exciting,
whose virginal nature brings forth new life and leads to
Wisdom-which is more than simply intellect."181 Rather than read-
ing the sacred prostitute as an archetype or analyzing it as a psycho-
logical phenomenon, I read it as an alternative narrative of feminine
sexual identity in order to re-examine the male/female relations
inscribed within the virgin/whore dichotomy. 82
179. Carl G. Jung, The Development of Personality 198 (Princeton U., R.F.C. Hull, trans.
1972); Wickes, The Inner World of Choice at 180-202 (cited in note 178).
180. Qualls-Corbett, The Sacred Prostitute at 104 (cited in note 12).
181. Id.
182. The Jungian theory of archetypes has a quasi-metaphysical element, projecting the
image of transpersonal psychic structures in relation to which individual psyches are consti-
tuted. Thus Qualls-Corbett writes:
An archetype is a pre-existent form that is part of the inherited structure of the psyche
common to all people. These psychic structures are endowed with strong feeling tones.
The archetype, as a psychic entity, is surrounded by energy which has the ability to ac-
tivate and transform conscious contents. When the archetype is constellated, that is,
activated, the release of that specific energy is recognized by consciousness and felt in
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The sacred prostitute and the ritual practice of sacred prostitu-
tion originated in the ancient matriarchies that flourished before the
one male God of Judeo-Christianity. In these societies,
nature and fertility were the core of existence.... Desire and sexual response
experienced as a regenerative power were recognized as a gift or a blessing
from the divine. Man's and woman's sexual nature and their religious attitude
were inseparable. In their praises of thanksgiving or in their supplications,
they offered the sex act to the goddess revered for love and passion. It was an
act, honorable and pious, pleasing to both the deity and mortal alike. The
practice of sacred prostitution evolved within this matriarchal religious system
and thus made no separation between sexuality and spirituality.183
The ritual practice of sacred prostitution had many variations,
but its core elements were: "the goddess [of love and passion], the
stranger who comes to the temple, the sacred marriage itself, and the
sacred prostitute." 184 These elements provide material with which to
generate alternative narratives of the psycho-spiritual significance of
feminine sexuality that can inform women's collective and interper-
sonal struggles to transform the misogynist practices of patriarchal
heterosexuality. According to Qualls-Corbett, the goddess of love and
passion was known by different names at different times and in dif-
ferent places. 185 To the Greeks, she was Aphrodite. To the Romans,
she was Venus. Whatever her name, the goddess of love was associ-
ated with beauty and feminine grace. She was the only goddess
sculpted nude in classical sculptures. She was called "the lover of
laughter," "the golden one," gold being something that symbolized
freedom from pollution and clarity of consciousness, something bright
and lucid. She was also considered virginal. The cultural dominance
of the virgin/whore dichotomy makes this hard to understand today.
To associate the image of passion with virginity seems paradoxical,
but "in Latin virgo means unmarried, while virgo intacta refers to the
lack of sexual experience."'186
the body through the emotions. Thus, for example, when the archetype of the goddess of
love is constellated, we are imbued with the vitality of love, beauty, sexual passion and
spiritual renewal.
Id. at 14. I do not follow this formulation simply because reading the image of the sacred
prostitute as an alternative narrative of feminine sexual identity covers enough ground for my
purposes.
183. Id. at 30-31.
184. Id. at 57.
185. Id. at 57-58.
186. Id. at 58.
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As Qualls-Corbet explains, "the virginal attribute of the god-
dess simply means she belongs to no man; rather she belongs to her-
self."'18 7 She was not seen as a counterpart to other gods. She existed
in her own right, as one-in-herself, and was true to her own nature.
The myths involving the goddess also emphasize the "goddess'[s] emo-
tions-joy and pleasure, yet also her pain and grief." 88
In the ritual practice of sacred prostitution, the sacred prosti-
tute is the human embodiment through which the goddess energies of
love and passion are accessed and expressed. The stranger who
comes to the temple "to worship the goddess of love in intercourse
with the sacred prostitute was in ancient times viewed as an emissary
of the gods, or even the god in disguise."189 Just as the sacred prosti-
tute is an aspect of the anima that brings the joy and laughter
through which the male comes to feel "honor for, and devotion to, the
mystery of the feminine,"'19 the male stranger is "an aspect of... the
animus, the contrasexual side of a woman's psyche-an inner man,"
who "facilitates her transition from the innocence of maidenhood to
the realization of her full feminine nature."191
The positive stranger animus ... guides her into the conscious realization of
her femininity. She then has the ability to make choices that do not compro-
mise it.... Whatever she undertakes, she does so with confidence, without re-
gression, submissiveness or a feeling of inferiority to a patriarchal system....
She neither has to compete with men nor adopt masculine qualities.... The
woman who has come to know the presence of the masculine power within is
her own authority and stands constant to her feminine nature. She may not be
able to change the patriarchal system which surrounds her, but, more impor-
tantly, she doesn't allow the system to change her.192
In the temples of the goddess of love, "the sacred prostitute's
primary offering to the goddess was her welcoming of the
stranger.... Intercourse with her was a regeneration through the
mystery of sex.... The flesh and the spirit were united, each
supporting each other." This "sacred marriage" is an archetypal motif
187. Id. at 58-59.
188. Id. at 60. "Loss and death, unrequited love and abandonment, are all part of [the god-
dess's] realm. Indeed, only by these dark shadows does her golden brilliance become a complete
creation, smiling its immortal smile as well as looking on death with immortal eyes.
Permanence is of Hera's [the maternal) world, not Aphrodite's [the lover's world]. What belongs
to her is a deep acceptance that passionate love does not last forever; and an equally deep accep-
tance that man is made to love." Id. (quoting Arianna Stassinopoulos and Roloff Beny, The Gods
of Greece 83 (Abrams, 1983)).
189. Id. at 74.
190. Id. at 107.
191. Id. at 75-76.
192. Id. at 78.
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that is manifested on three levels: interpersonally when there exists
a deep, abiding love between two people; intrapersonally when the
opposition of masculine/feminine is reconciled at the intrapsychic
level-the psyche integrates its contrasexual side; and
transpersonally when the physical union becomes the vehicle through
which the experience of divine love is received and contained within
the self.19 3
According to Qualls-Corbett, heterosexual "dis-ease," expressed
actively in the practices of male sexual dominance and passively
through male sexual impotence, is the fruit of the patriarchal degra-
dation of female sexuality and feminine beauty. This is a degradation
expressed in and through the virgin/whore dichotomy. As Carl Jung
noted:
The overwhelming majority of men on the present cultural level never advance
beyond the maternal significance of woman, and this is the reason why the an-
ima [the internal feminine image men project onto women] seldom develops
beyond the infantile, primitive level of the prostitute. Consequently prostitu-
tion is one of the main by-products of civilized marriage.
194
This degradation is directly related to the cultural ascendance of the
virgin/whore dichotomy, which was the singular contribution of
Christianity.
On the one hand, the feminine was untouchable because it was elevated to the
extreme heavenly heights; on the other it was debased as wicked and vile. The
image of the sacred prostitute, simultaneously deeply spiritual and joyfully
sexual, was completely unviable. 195
There is a culturally dominant image of sexuality that can be
contrasted to the pornographic sexuality surrounding the image of the
whore and the asexuality of the virgin. That image is "romantic
love."196 This image of romantic love is reinforced by the narratives
193. Id. at 79, 83-87.
194. Id. at 93 (quoting Carl G. Jung, Civilization in Transition 40 (Princeton U., R.F.C.
Hull, trans., 2d ed. 1970).
195. Id. at 49. See also Gravdal, Ravishing Maidens at 22 (cited in note 166). For an
account that suggests that "Christian" misogyny is a post-Christ development, see Elaine
Pagels, The Gnostic Gospels 66-69 (Random House, 1979) (recounting the nature and extent of
Mary Magdalene's activities and status as a disciple of Christ).
196. See Joseph and Lewis, Common Differences at 263-64 (cited in note 2). "IT]he White
daughter of the dominant culture is shaped in the anticipation and dream of 'love and marriage.'
What we learn is: The right one will sweep you off your feet. He will be special,
exceptional .... Love will somehow give structure and meaning to your life, whatever the
social realities you live through (and the sexist terms of the union).... Whatever else women
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and images of commodified femininity, the consumption and (self-)
disciplinary regimens to which women are invited in order to make
themselves romantically attractive to men. Unlike virginal
femininity, commodified femininity is sexual, but (unlike porno-
graphic femininity, which targets the male subject) its target is the
female subject. Thus the sexuality it projects is calculated to invite
women's consent and allegiance, but not without significant costs to
women.
The romantic love ideologies transcend the sexual-and offer no resolution to
the dichotomy of the incompatible images which judge and condemn women's
enactment of sexual freedom while fetishizing their sexuality. Emotion is em-
phasized and sexuality is represented in a mist. The emotions that are en-
couraged emphasize abandonment, loss of self, the pleasure of being uncontrol-
lably overwhelmed by the male presence and redefining your whole world in
terms of him. It is a celebrating of powerlessness. The pleasure is in the giv-
ing up of power and autonomy to become a part of what is made to appear as
the "natural universality"-the male centered unit.197
Put differently, romantic love is the feminine side of sexual desire
because the expression of raw sexual desire makes women too vulner-
able to male sexual aggression, precisely to the extent they have not
progressed beyond the virgin/whore dichotomy.
By contrast, the symbolic images of the goddess of love and her
human expression in the sacred prostitute project a sense of feminine
beauty that links sexual desire to the experience of reverence. These
images express the unity of sexuality and spirituality. Michael
Ventura discusses a related image. Speculating on the cultural and
spiritual significance of Neolithic-era images of "the Great Goddess"
sculpted onto carvings of an erect penis, Ventura writes:
We can only guess at what they meant by carving the Great Goddess onto the
cock. Was it the Goddess tattooing her claim onto the very maleness of men?
Was it the man finding a passion in sexuality that couldn't be wholly satisfied
by the physical, a yearning in him for something of the spirit to mix with his
passion? Or was it the meeting not only of the divine and the physical, but of
the masculine and the feminine cohabitating the cock itself? 198
may hope to achieve, our culture reinforces the longing for a unique, synthesizing, romantic
connection (with a man) which should result in monogamous bonding and the institution of
marriage." Id.
197. Id. at 264.
198. Ventura, Notes on Three Erections, in Harding, ed., Wingspan at 44 (cited in note 58).
Ventura continues: "If the cock is also feminine, then where does 'feminism' hide and where
does 'macho' run?... The erection, which the feminist and the macho alike have seen as such a
one-note, one-purpose organ, is less a sword than a wand." Id. Ventura then adds:
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According to Qualls-Corbett, the lost image of the sacred pros-
titute, which unifies sexuality and spirituality, produces a compulsive
need for control in both men and women. 199 If sex is not an act of rev-
erence and joy, then it is an act of domination and consumption.
Internalizing the image of the goddess, however, can help women es-
cape the equally destructive polarities of promiscuity and sexual
withdrawal. Through this image, the woman grows to appreciate the
spiritual dimensions of feminine sexuality and develops the integrity
that enables her to be both true to herself and affirming of others.200
The woman who is virgin, one-in-herself, does what she does-not because of
any desire to please, not to be liked, or to be approved.., not because of any
desire to gain power over another, to catch his interest or love, but because
what she does is true.... She is what she is because that is what she is.
201
The image of the goddess of passion is also an aspect of the
man's anima, the internal feminine image that would lead a man to
Every erection is, in affect, a dream. It rises from a dream, it is sustained by a dream, it
seeks to penetrate a dream.... There are the man and the woman and all that each is
and all that they want to be and all they pretend to be and all that they think they are
and all that they see in each other.... And the link through which these aspects pass,
the connector, is the erection. Again: the wand.
Id. at 45. My point here is precisely to embrace Ventura's interpretation of the image of the
goddess. While the white feminist movement has done much to show that women's sexual
pleasure is not limited to the experience of male penetration, see, for example, Cornell, 100 Yale
L. J. at 2267 (cited in note 4) (discussing sex as kissing and caressing), the idea that men are the
only ones who experience their heterosexuality through erections and intercourse simply
dismisses the extent to which (at least some) women do too. See Joseph and Lewis, Common
Differences at 214-15 (cited in note 2) (Betty's comment, quoted in note 58).
199. Qualls-Corbett, The Sacred Prostitute at 67 (cited in note 12). 'The neglect of the
goddess results in a sterile, abrasive encounter with life; dullness and lack of purpose creep in.
A compulsive need for power replaces the joy of love. When feminine nature is valued, not seen
as a toy to be played with but as an energy to be embraced, psychic life blossoms and becomes
fruitful, bringing a new perspective." Id.
200. Id. at 62. "The woman conscious of the goddess cares for her body with proper nutri-
tion and exercise and enjoys the ceremonies of bathing, cosmetics and dress. This not just for
the superficial purpose of personal appeal, which is related to ego gratification, but out of re-
spect for the nature of the feminine. Her beauty derives from a vital connection to the Self." Id.
Compare Bartky, Foucault, Femininity, in Diamond and Quinby, eds., Feminism & Foucault at
81 (cited in note 49) (describing the ways in which the commodification of feminine sexual
identity distorts women's relation to their own femininity and enslaves them in the narratives
and disciplinary practices of commodified femininity); Duncan Kennedy, Sexy Dressing, Etc.
162-213 (Harvard U., 1992) (illustrating the ways in which women's dress and personal
appearance are interpreted through the lens of male sexual narcissism); Timothy Beneke,
Intrusive Images and Subjectified Bodies: Notes on Visual Heterosexual Porn, in Kimmel, ed.,
Men Confront Pornography at 168, 172 (cited in note 58) (interpreting women's sexy
dress/persona through the lens of male sexual inadequacy).
201. Qualls-Corbett, The Sacred Prostitute at 62-63 (cited in note 12) (quoting Esther
Harding, Woman's Mysteries 125 (Harper & Row, 1971)).
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value those aspects of himself that make erotic spirituality possible
and protect him from an obsession with masculinity. For men, the
image of the goddess offers the narrative elements necessary to estab-
lish reverence and respect for, rather than fear and resentment of, the
power of feminine sexuality. According to Fred Small,
most men do not perceive women as powerless, in part because women hold
the power of rejection.... We are trained from childhood to believe that real
men get sex from women, that if we do not get sex from women we are not
men, we are nothing. Women can deny sex to men, thereby denying our man-
hood, our existence. Men do not want to hurt women. Men hurt women only
when they have been fooled into believing with all the force of hallucination
that they must hurt women in order to save their own lives.
202
Timothy Beneke strikes a similar theme by connecting male sexual
violence to the male experience of women's sexuality as a power that
humiliates them. 20 3
From this perspective, male sexual violence is coded as re-
venge, an assault directed not so much at women as at the sexiness of
women, at that aspect of women that makes men want and feel pow-
erless before us. Interviewing men on the subject of rape, Beneke
reports frequently hearing men say in one way or another: "I have
been injured by women. By the way they look, move, smell, and
behave, they have forced me to have sexual sensation I didn't want to
have. If a man rapes a sexy woman, he is forcing her to have sexual
sensation she doesn't want. It is just revenge.'2 °4
The ritual practice of sacred prostitution offers numerous
counter-narratives through which this hostile male posture toward
feminine sexual beauty can be understood. This hostility is not an
expression of genuine sexual longing. Rather it is a symptomatic
frustration inherent in the posture of appropriation, a posture in
202. Fred Small, Pornography and Censorhip, in Kimmel, ed., Men Confront Pornography
at 77 (cited in note 58). Small continues:
Playboy offers men a dream vacation from this system. In its pages, women are not
aloof and rejecting, but welcoming and sexually accessible.... In these purposefully
constructed images, women greet us with flattery and invitation, with airbrushed smiles
that speak eager, delighted consent; they are not powerless, they freely surrender their
power of rejection; they are not coerced or hurt; they are on our side. They seem to say
to us: "I want sex with you. Therefore, you are a man."
Id.
203. "Stealing images of women's bodies is a troubled activity that pervades many hetero-
sexual men's adolescent and postadolescent social experience ... [experienced by men] ... as a
chronic, fearful, humiliated stance toward women that often pervades men's daily social experi-
ence of sexual longing." Beneke, Intrusive Images, in Kimmel, ed., Men Confront Pornography
at 170 (cited in note 58).
204. Id. at 171.
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which men seek to acquire and control anything and everything they
value for themselves. The image of the goddess of love projects an
image of feminine sexual beauty that cannot be appropriated by
individual men. Men are able to enjoy the beauty of the goddess
through the experience of sexual intercourse with her sacred
prostitute. Yet even then the stranger's access to the human woman
is neither permanent nor exclusive.
The ritualized intercourse between the stranger and the sacred
prostitute codes sexual longing and fulfillment as non-possessory and
transpersonal. Neither the male nor the female can acquire the other
through sex. The narrative elements of the ritual instruct men to en-
joy and revere the sexual energy and sensations they have through
their experience of women's sexuality, without feeling entitled to ap-
propriate or compelled to degrade the individual women who trigger
these sensations. The fact that men cannot always get what they
want does not mean that they are not men. It simply means that
women are not to be had. In these narratives, sexual ecstasy is the
nonappropriable gift of the goddess, and the sexual beauty of the
human woman is a further instance of her divine manifestation.
Conversely, the fact that the human man would leave after the
ritual intercourse, did not mean that the sacred prostitute was aban-
doned or alone. The stranger was always with her, integrated into
her own self and embodied in the others that would follow. She did
not access the goddess through any one particular man, but rather
through the masculine energy any man could embody. While the sa-
cred prostitute in this ancient ritual was expected to give herself to
any stranger who went to the temple, this element did not degrade
her or reduce her status because only the reverent were expected to go
there. More importantly, intercourse with the strangers did not de-
grade the prostitute because it was precisely through the giving of her
body that she worshipped the goddess and manifested her healing,
enlivening energies.
In discussing the images of women and the missing image of
the sacred prostitute, my point is not to suggest that a critique of cul-
turally dominant images of female sexuality is enough to change the
dynamics of a misogynistic heterosexuality.205 On the contrary, the
205. See, for example, bell hooks, Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of
Freedom 47 (Routledge, 1994) ('Many times people will say to me that I seem to be suggesting
that it is enough for individuals to change how they think. And you see, even their use of the
enough tells us something about the attitude they bring to this question. It has a patronizing
sound, one that does not convey any heartfelt understanding of how a change in attitude
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use of alternative feminine images has the most transformative po-
tential precisely at the point where the material empowerment of
women proves to be insufficient. The fact that sacred prostitutes
were, in ancient times, accorded social status and education speaks to
the material reality underlying the rituals of sacred prostitution.206
Thus, the sacred prostitute's freedom to enact the ritual inter-
course with any particular man was profoundly connected to the hu-
man woman's material independence from that man, as well as to the
social honor that her status as the goddess's medium afforded her. By
contrast, under conditions of social and political subordination to men
as well as economic and interpersonal dependence upon men, women
cannot change the dynamics of heterosexual relationships simply by
internalizing the image of the sacred prostitute or by enacting the
narratives of feminine sexuality that are related to her image. These
narratives can, however, help women define the kinds of relationships
and personal autonomy that are worth the wanting and the struggle.
The first and foremost elements of this autonomy are the freedom to
love the men who honor and respect our sexuality, the power to reject
the ones who do not, and, through this autonomy, the ability to shat-
ter the power of the virgin/whore dichotomy.
As counter-narratives, these images provide important concep-
tual and rhetorical devices for combating the anti-feminist forces that
use the virgin/whore dichotomy to attack women's search for sexual
fulfillment and personal autonomy. Public policies, legal doctrines,
and law enforcement practices that enforce women's economic de-
pendence2 7 and define our sexual morality in terms of whether or not
we belong to some particular man 2 8 deprive women of the material
and psycho-social equality that would enable us to express the
spontaneous, joyful, and nonappropriating sexuality of the sacred
prostitute. The circulation of these alternative images might help
(though not a completion of any transformative process) can be significant for colo-
nizedloppressed people. Again and again Friere has had to remind readers that he never spoke
of conscientization as an end in itself, but always as it is joined by meaningful praxis").
206. In the code of Hammurabi, special legislation protected the rights and good name
of the sacred prostitute; she was protected from slander, as were her children, by the
same law which upheld a married woman's reputation. Also by law, [she] could inherit
property from her father and receive income from the land worked by her brothers. If
dissatisfied she could dispose of the property in ways which she saw fit. Considering the
role of women at the time, this was an extraordinary right.
Qualls-Corbett, The Sacred Prostitute at 37 (cited in note 12).
207. See Part VI (discussing the impact of welfare eligibility rules and child-custody adjudi-
cation practices on women's sexual autonomy).
208. See, for example, notes 28-38 and accompanying text (discussing the deployment of
gender-role stereotypes in the processing of rape cases); Murthy, 79 Cal. L. Rev. at 550 (cited in
note 165).
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create the conditions under which we could express our sexuality
without fear of rape, harassment, or other forms of coercion through
which men attempt to appropriate our sexuality for themselves.
IV. AGAINST "MACHISMO": IN DEFENSE OF MATERNAL POWER AND
FEMININE SEXUAL SUBJECTIVITY
My analysis thus far has focused on the ways in which differ-
ent images of women, as mothers and as sexual beings, circulate in
the dominant narratives of white, middle-class culture, both in its
feminist and anti-feminist manifestations. In this Part, I emphasize
two very simple, but crucial points. The first point is that male su-
premacy is a network of self-referential, normative positions that are
often consciously embraced or unconsciously expressed as much by
women as by men. Thus, an important part of what it will take to se-
cure women's sexual autonomy is to recognize and combat the ideo-
logical pull of those male supremacist discourses that attack both
maternal power and the subjectivity of feminine sexuality.
Section A focuses on the obstacles any feminist intervention
must inevitably confront when using Black and Latin images of
maternal power to promote changes in the legal regulation of
motherhood. Section B explores the ways in which women's attitudes
toward each other's heterosexuality generates obstacles in our
struggle to achieve genuine sexual autonomy. This struggle must be
as much about the freedom to say yes as it is currently about the
power to say no.
The second point emphasizes that the successful circulation of
alternative images of feminine identity depends on the circulation of
alternative images of men, masculinity, and male power. Even if
popular culture were to embrace images of women as powerful moth-
ers and sacred prostitutes, the increased circulation of these images
would not generate the social changes necessary to reform either the
legal regulation of motherhood or the racialized sexism expressed in
the rules of sexual accessibility. 2 9 This transformation will not occur
until the dominant culture begins to circulate alternative images of
men, a theme I explore more directly in Part V.
209. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
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A. Machos, not Mothers, Make Machos
The most important objection raised against using the images
of maternal power in Black and Latin culture to change the legal
regulation of motherhood has been the prevalence of "machismo," par-
ticularly in Latin culture. This objection, however, reflects a failure to
understand the broader significance of Kurtz's psychoanalytic analy-
sis of the child-rearing practices in matrifocal extended families. In
fact, my point is not that Black or Latin culture is any less crippled by
the ideology and practices of male supremacy. Rather, my point is
that male supremacy cannot be so readily explained as inherent in the
psycho-dynamics of female mothering precisely because male
supremacy thrives in cultures where child-rearing practices are
organized differently from the symbiotic one-to-one relationship of the
mother and infant. This symbiotic relationship characterizes the
traditional nuclear family of white, middle-class suburbia and drives
the anti-mother narratives I examined in Part III.A. The fact that an
ideology of male supremacy exists in both cultures despite their
different child-rearing practices is a crucial point for feminists to
understand because it suggests that this ideology is not grounded in
the mother/infant relationship.210 A number of insights follow from
this realization.
First, the fact that male supremacy has been explained as a
defensive response to maternal power, despite the existence of ma-
chismo in cultures with very different familial structures, 21' supports
the hypothesis that male supremacy does not originate from the
practice of female mothering.212 This observation encourages inquiries
along two lines, both of which are likely to produce more fruitful
trajectories for promoting women's sexual autonomy. The first is the
search for alternative explanations of the psycho-cultural origins of
the ideology and practices of male sexual dominance. Once we see the
210. Though some feminists may welcome theories linking male-supremacist masculinity
to female mothering because this linkage supports their struggles to make men assume more
responsibility for domestic work and child care, the legal doctrines and public policies that un-
dermine maternal power also increase many women's sexual vulnerability. See Part VI (dis-
cussing the link between welfare policies and divorce law reform proposals that undermine
maternal power and the assault on women's sexual autonomy).
211. See, for example, Jose Sanchez Parga, iPor que golpearla? (Ecuador, 1990)
(articulating a controversial apology linking domestic violence in Andean culture to "a family
structure in which mothers are all-powerful in the home, excluding their husbands and creating
excessive emotional bonds with their children"), discussed in Harris, Condor and Bull, in
Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex and Violence at 42-43 (cited in note 14).
212. See, for example, Benjamin, The Bonds of Love (cited in note 10) (responding to
Chodorow and Dinnerstein).
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inadequacy of theories that explain male supremacy as a defensive
reaction to maternal power, we further the search for alternative
explanations. For example, it may be that machismo in Black and
Latin culture is a defensive response to the economic, social, and
political subordination produced by race discrimination and economic
exploitation. 213
Deconstructing the supposed link between maternal power and
male supremacy is also important because it clears the way for more
affirmative narratives of maternal power. These narratives provide
the ideological foundation needed to secure the policies and legal doc-
trines that support child-rearing practices and familial arrangements
that do not compel women to depend on individual men. Protecting
motherhood from the socioeconomic imperatives that currently rein-
force women's dependence on men is probably the single most impor-
tant reform needed to reduce many women's sexual vulnerability and
increase our sexual autonomy.
B. Transforming the Macho Within Us: Female Sexuality,
Subjectivity, and Solidarity
Like representations of maternal power, the representation of
female heterosexuality as an object of the male gaze is an important
place for feminist resistance because it lies at the root of a divisive
dynamic between women, that is, the way women respond to the
sexuality of other women. While men routinely view feminine sexual
expression as an exercise of power over them 214 and bond around their
ability to rape women,215 women do not bond around their ability to
213. See, for example, Comas-Diaz, 16 J. Community Psych. at 22-23 (cited in note 83). See
also note 264 and accompanying text (discussing the racial dimension in the practices of
pornographic masculinity). Needless to say, the meanings and effects of Latin machismo will
not be adequately understood until Latin families and child-rearing practices are subject to the
careful comparative analysis of psychoanalytic anthropologists like Stanley Kurtz. See note
152.
214. See, for example, Beneke, Intrusive Images, in Kimmel, ed., Men Confront
Pornography at 168 (cited in note 58).
215. Gang rape effectuates male bonding for a variety of purposes, ranging from the pun-
ishment of nonconforming women, see, for example, Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes
on the "Political Economy" of Sex, in Rayna R. Reiter, ed., Toward an Anthropology of Women
163 (Monthly Review, 1975) (describing how women "are frequently kept in their place by gang
rape when the ordinary mechanisms of masculine intimidation prove insufficient"), to the
expression of otherwise repressed homoerotic affinities, see Menachem Amir, Patterns in
Forcible Rape 184 (U. Chicago, 1971). See generally Mariah Burton Nelson, The Stronger




attract men. Indeed, feminists do not view being sexy and acting sexy
as a power over men that all women share and need to protect.
Instead, women often respond to female sexual expression as an invi-
tation to be objectified by the male gaze and overpowered by male
aggression. The question, of course, is why?
Certainly part of the answer is that men have succeeded in
representing themselves as victims of, and their sexual aggression as
the uncontrollable response to, female sexuality.216 For women to
claim the right to be sexy and yet be free of male aggression is to
claim the right to sexual subjectivity.217 The cultural deployment of
ideological and material resources, however, represents female sexu-
ality as an object of male desire rather than the expression of a sub-
ject position. When women accept this representation, they view
other women's sexuality as competition for the male gaze and are as
ready as men to condemn women who flaunt their sexuality through
dress, conduct, or other assertions of autonomy. For example, women
condemn rape victims who are deemed to have "flaunted" their sexu-
ality as much, and possibly more, than men.2 18
Female sexuality is not represented in our culture as an ex-
pression of female subjectivity, and women's desire for men is usually
coded as female desire for male dominance. The ways in which fe-
male sexual identity is commodifled for male consumption make it
easy to understand why women tend to disown or disapprove of ex-
pressions of female sexuality.29 Such sexual expressions trigger a
response that aligns women with the imagined subjectivity of the
male viewer, through which the woman becomes a provocation or an
object to be appropriated, rather than the imagined subjectivity of the
woman, for whom any particular man may or may not be a desired
object. From the perspective of a female subject desiring men, the
assault on a woman who has acted intentionally to attract male sex-
ual attention is a direct assault on the subjectivity of female sexuality.
When a woman is attacked for being sexual, the attack reinscribes the
fact that we are not the subjects of our own desire. Being sexual
makes us objects of male desire, which in turn entitles men to respond
216. See generally Kimmel, ed., Men Confront Pornography (cited in note 58); Gravdal,
Ravishing Maidens (cited in note 166).
217. See note 200 (discussing the difference between ego gratification based on "personal
appear' and women's respect for their own femininity).
218. See LaFree, Rape and Criminal Justice at 213, 217-18 (cited in note 1) (quoting female
jurors). LaFree suggests, however, that 'jurors' gender role attitudes are more important than
their personal characteristics for understanding their perceptions of rape." Id.
219. See the discussion of Catharine MacKinnon's Feminism Unmodified in note 252 and
accompanying text.
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to us as objects of desire and, additionally, makes us responsible for
whatever form that response takes.220
The assault on a woman who is sexual is thus an attack on any
woman who claims the right to sexual subjectivity, the right to deter-
mine how she will express her sexuality.221 Women see this clearly
when we empathize with a woman who has been falsely accused of
acting sexually, despite taking all the steps deemed warranted to
avoid sending off sexual messages. But if women accept the idea that
being sexual turns other women into objects of male desire and their
bodies into appropriate targets for male aggression, then we can only
be sexual when men say we can be sexual and safe.222  Female
sexuality exists for the men who desire women, rather than for the
women who desire men. Heterosexuality is thereby reinscribed as a
subject/object, rather than a subject/subject relation.
The next Part of this Article examines the images of men cur-
rently projected in the dominant cultural narratives of masculinity
and male power. The analysis explores the hostility of these narra-
tives toward female power in general and female sexuality in particu-
lar. Circulating positive images of maternal power and female sexual-
ity will further women's struggles to create empowered sexual identi-
ties. Indeed, as I argue in Part VI, these images may also help us
reform policies that currently increase women's economic dependence
on and hence our sexual vulnerability to individual men.
Nevertheless, the actualization of women's sexual autonomy depends
at least as much on changing the way men think about women as it
depends on changing the way women think about ourselves. At the
same time, the way men think about women is driven by the way they
think about men. Put differently, even when women achieve
empowered sexual identities and economic independence, we will
continue to confront the practices of male sexual dominance as long as
the images of pornographic masculinity remain prevalent in the
culture. Thus, changing the way men think about women depends on
changing the way men think about themselves.
220. This is the Stoltenberg "mind-fuck." See Stoltenberg, Refusing to be a Man at 24 (cited
in note 114).
221. To claim this right does not mean to have the power. In a rape culture, the claimed
authority only expresses a subjective state of mind, rather than an objective reality to the extent
that male aggression is a permissible response to this kind of female behavior. See Coombs, 2
Tex. J. Women & L. at 277-93 (cited in note 43).




V. IMAGES OF MEN: IN AND BEYOND THE SPIRITUAL PATHOLOGIES OF
ENACTING A MASCULINE IDENTITY
To be a man in America is to be aggressive and dominant, to
consume and appropriate. Men must play these roles with complete
conviction and unshakable certainty that wanting what they want
and getting what they want is a sex-given right.223 In this Part, I
criticize these images of male sexual identity, arguing that they are
driven by the narratives of pornographic masculinity, of sex and
dominance, just as the narratives of commodified femininity drive
women to enact scripts of love and submission. Moreover, just as the
images of commodified femininity strip women of sexual depth so that
expressions of sexual desire make them appear less feminine, the
images of pornographic masculinity strip men of spiritual depth so
that expressions of spiritual desire make them appear less masculine.
While these images of masculinity are peddled by pornogra-
phers and attacked by feminists as narratives of male power, I com-
pletely reject the idea that these narratives empower men in any
meaningful way. By contrast, I explore the images of power and nar-
ratives of masculinity found in the Jungian archetypes of the mature
masculine. 224 Like the images of the powerful mother and the sacred
prostitute, these images do not circulate in the public discourses of
white America. My purpose is to show why we are all the worse for
their absence.
A. The Images of Pornographic Masculinity
Beginning in the 1970s, with the important work of Andrea
Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, 225 feminists have attacked the
images disseminated by the pornography industry. These images
project narratives of masculinity that make male dominance and sex-
ism sexy. According to John Stoltenberg:
223. See Stoltenberg, Refusing to be a Man at 16-17 (cited in note 114).
224. Moore and Gillette, King, Warrior, Magician, Lover at 49-141 (cited in note 19)
(providing alternative accounts of masculine power organized around four Jungian archetypes of
masculinity).
225. See generally Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (G.P. Putnam's
Sons, 3d ed., 1981); American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), 271
F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affirmed 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at
163-97 (cited in note 4) (presenting the feminist legal and social theory driving efforts to
regulate pornography as a practice of sex discrimination).
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[P]ornography does make sexism sexy;... [it] define[s] what is sexy in terms of
domination and subordination, in terms that serve us as men... because it
serves male supremacy, which is exactly what it is for.... [Those of us who
live in this setup as men ... recognize-in the world and in our very own
selves-the power pornography can have over our lives: It can make men
believe that anything sexy is good.., that our penises are like weapons. It
can make men believe-for some moments of orgasm-that we are just like the
men in pornography: virile, strong, tough, maybe cruel. It can make men
believe that if you take it away from us, we won't have sexual feelings. 2 6
Just as a man may rape a woman in order to orgasm or to participate
in a practice he believes degrades women, a man consumes pornogra-
phy for the same reasons.
The essence of pornographic masculinity is the negation of
femininity in men through the domination and appropriation of
women's femininity. Similarly, male sexual aggression is the male
desire to enact a form of masculinity that draws its essence from op-
position to the feminine.227 Still, the question is whether pornography
empowers men.
Certainly, the public display of pornography, like the private
enactment of pornographic narratives, is as much an expression of
male supremacy as it is an assault on the subjectivity, autonomy, and
integrity of women.228  But accounts of the private consumption of
226. Stoltenberg, Pornography and Freedom, in Kimmel, ed., Men Confront Pornography at
60-71 (cited in note 58). The problem is that Stoltenberg's exhortations, "We've got to be telling
[x, y, & z] that it's not okay," do not sound compelling precisely because they do not answer
Duncan Kennedy's question-what's in it for men? See Kennedy, Sexy Dressing at 126-30, 142-
47 (cited in note 200) (using a cost-benefit analysis to identify men's interests in transforming
laws and law enforcement practices that perpetuate women's vulnerability to men). The only
compelling answer requires a substantive notion of true power (versus the illusion of
supremacy). It must address subject/subject relations and explain why we should value and
desire them, when a subject/object relation is so familiar, superficially gratifying, and difficult to
escape.
227. Stoltenberg, Refusing to be a Man at 31-34 (cited in note 114). Stoltenberg explains:
People born with penises must strive to make the idea of male sexual identity personally
real by doing certain deeds, actions that are valued and chosen because they produce the
desired feeling of belonging to a sex that is male and not female .... To achieve this
male sexual identity requires that an individul identify with the class of males-that is,
accept as one's own the values and interests of the class. A fully realized male sexual
identity also requires nonidentification with that which is perceived to be nonmale, or
female.... His identity as a member of the sex class "men" absolutely depends on the
extent to which he repudiates the values and interests of the sex class "women."
Id. Contrast this account to the account of masculinity (the relation of man to woman) in the
images of the King, Warrior. See notes 279-306 and accompanying text.
228. See generally U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography, Final Report 197-223 (1986) (including the testimony of Andrea Dworkin and a
number of victims of "porn rape" and detailing the consequences for the victims: forced sex,
950 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 49:869
pornography suggest that there is also a decidedly negative impact on
the men who consume it. Indeed, these accounts suggest that what
pornography institutionalizes is the illusion of male supremacy.
Some men act out the scenarios, relations, and events depicted in the
pornography they consume.2 29 More men probably use it as a substi-
tute for sex with real women.23 0 Consider, for example, the marked
difference between the images of male sexuality in pornography 31
with the image of men consuming pornography:
He keeps them in the closet. In piles. Their poses are improbable and promis-
ing, no flesh is hidden. It is late afternoon, sounds of the freeway drift through
the room. His wife is working, she will not see him. He is tired. He may or
may not know he is depressed. He goes to the closet. He rummages through
the piles, looking for one that will spark him, that will let him go. Through the
hundreds of magazines, not one can satisfy him.... He drives through stop-
lights, his mouth clamped on a joint. Into a parking lot. Pulls in beside the
spray-painted scrawl---Torn Hurts Women." Rushing past, he
enters... Picking up the magazines wrapped in plastic, the man tries to guess
by the covers what lies inside. Never quite sure, stoned, he takes nearly an
hour to make his choice .... He asks for quarters. Heads back to the video
booths.... He is looking for the perfect film, the blonde that will stun him
with her moans, the whimpering that sets off a trembling inside him, released
by a cock of monstrous proportions, which dwarfs his own with envy, with the
certainty that only here, here in this booth, its damp sticky floor, its private
dark, can he possess this image, let it consume his life. He unzips his pants
and slips in the quarter. The reel rolls, music and moaning, ending abruptly.
Five minutes. Another quarter. Five minutes. Another quarter. Again,
again, from booth to booth, the hour slips by. He does not want to come. He
wants to hold it, the tension as long as he can. He leaves the store with three
magazines which he cannot help but begin unwrapping in the car. He stops
himself. He knows he needs to nurse their charge. One time through and he
will need another. He drives home with one hand on himself.
Up in his bedroom, he undresses, spreads the magazines on the bed, lies
beside them. He studies each image, noting each position, the expression on
each face. He reads the captions, how the women tell the men how they want
it, how they can't get enough. He is still trying hard not to come.
torture, murder, imprisonment, suicide, prostitution, not to mention psychological trauma and
venereal disease).
229. Id.
230. For example, in the Commissioner Statement of Judith Becker, Ellen Levine, and
Deanne Tilton-Durfee, the Commissioners expressed sympathy for the victims, but were
unwilling to generalize that the production and consumption of pornography causes or even
encourages porn rape because of the "near impossibility" of finding "people willing to
acknowledge their personal consumption of erotic and pornographic materials and comment
favorably in public about their use.... Since such material is selling to millions of apparently
satisfied customers, it seems obvious that the data gathered [that is, the porn rape victims'
testimony] is not well balanced." Id at 541.
231. See, for example, Stoltenberg, Pornography and Freedomn, in Kimmel, ed., Men
Confront Pornography at 60-61, 63, 65 (cited in note 58). See generally Dworkin, Men
Possessing Women (cited in note 225).
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An hour later he hears his wife drive up. He picks up the magazines, he
pants, runs to the washroom, worried she will find him, angered by her arrival,
disrupting his peace. He will rush his orgasm. He will not feel satisfied. He
will feel the hours he has wasted, the shame emerging. He will say he needs
to take a shower. The magazines are in the bathroom. Already they are not
enough. 23
2
In this account, consuming pornography is hardly a vehicle for
actualizing masculine power. On the contrary, the image of the hus-
band desperately trying to orgasm before his wife gets home from
work is simply pathetic. Why, for example, isn't he waiting for his
wife, so they can have sex together?233 Since most men who consume
pornography refuse to discuss it honestly and openly, 234 it is hard to
know why, or even how many of them are masturbating in the bath-
rooms of America. What we can know is that rather than doing the
hard work it takes to develop the real power of the King, Warrior,
Magician, and Lover,235 pornography encourages these men to retreat
into the fantasy world of sexual dominance.236 If they accept that
invitation, they risk addiction to the consumption of images, an
addiction that serves capitalist profit, rather than male sexual
fulfillment.237 David Mura puts it this way:
232. David Mura, The Bookstore, in Kimmel, ed., Men Confront Pornography at 133 (cited
in note 58).
233. It is the image of a man whose sexual identity is so fragile that intercourse with a real
flesh and blood woman is coded as potential confrontation and repudiated in favor of masturba-
tion. The consumer of images is unable to sustain an erection. Interestingly, Robert Staples
argues that "porn is a white man's problem-a particular kind of white man's problem." Robert
Staples, Blacks and Pornography: A Different Response, in Kimmel, ed., Men Confront
Pornography at 111 (cited in note 58). According to Staples, a 1970 presidential commission
"found that the typical consumer of porn was a white male and that blacks were under-
represented among the purveyors of erotica." Id. Staples attributes this asserted difference in
pornography consumption to the fact that "[b]lacks have traditionally had a more naturalist at-
titude toward human sexuality, seeing it as the normal expression of sexual attraction between
men and women." Id. at 112. Whatever the merits of these arguments (and they are worth fur-
ther exploration), race is undeniably a prominent theme in the deployment of pornographic im-
ages where racial stereotypes of unrestrained sexual desire are graphically coded as male bes-
tiality and female insatiability, and are used to debase both men and women. See Dworkin,
Men Possessing Women at 153-60 (cited in note 225) (describing scenes from a Mexican jail). For
further discussion of the racial dimensions of "pornographic masculinity," see notes 264-72 and
accompanying text.
234. See note 230 (indicating that millions of men consume pornography, but hardly any of
them testify).
235. See Part V.B.
236. Drucilla Cornell puts it well: "[P]ornography is what wimps need, not what men
want." Cornell, 100 Yale L. J. at 2270 (cited in note 4).
237. See David Mura, A Male Grief: Notes on Pornography and Addiction, in Kimmel, ed.,
Men Confront Pornography at 124-25 (cited in note 58). Mura writes: "IT]he addict to
pornography desires to be blinded, to live in a dream. ... Those who are addicted to pornog-
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The addiction to pornography is not fun. Underneath all the assertions of lib-
erty and "healthy fun" lie the desperation and anxiety, the shame and fear, the
loneliness and sadness, that fuel the endless consumption of magazines and
strip shows, x-rated films, visits to prostitutes. If addicts portray themselves
as hedonists or carefree, this portrayal is belied in those moments and feelings
they do not let anyone else see. Like all actors, they mistake their life on stage
as being truest and most real. What happens offstage cannot possibly have a
bearing on who they are.
238
Men, like women, long for sexual and spiritual unity.239 The
narratives of pornographic masculinity are designed, however, to
make men think they are lesser men for wanting it. These narratives
encourage men to act out their relations to women 240 in ways that
benefit a profit-oriented system of exchange at their own expense as
human beings241 and even as men. From this perspective, feminists
do themselves and men a serious injustice by contributing to the
notion that pornography reflects or produces male power. We should
stop. This formulation only makes men want it more. More
raphy attempt to erase the distinction between art and life. On the one hand, the addict knows,
at some level of consciousness, that the world of pornography is unreal.... Lile all addicts, the
addict to pornography dreams then of ultimate power and control. When reality invades this
dream and causes doubts, the addict thinks: I have nothing else. I have, all my life, done my
best to destroy through my addiction whatever could replace this. Thus the addict returns to
the inertia of the dream." Id.
238. Id.
239. The endless consumption of pornographic images derives from the mistaken
assumption that one can feed a spiritual hunger through a desire for control, distance,
and eventual destruction. Such a desire is not a desire of the flesh. As so many have
pointed out, pornography is not primarily a sensual experience. Instead, the
consumption of pornography is, in its profoundest sense, an intellectual and emotional
perception which is based on repression and false premises. Since one's spiritual hunger
can never be satisfied by such means, the addict can either keep consuming
pornography in greater amounts, hoping that somehow quantity will change its quality,
or else he can give up pornography and seek a different sustenance. [The real thing.]
Mura, A Male Grief, in Kimmel, ed., Men Confront Pornography at 135 (cited in note 58).
240. The pornographic image of the woman: all surface, no depth; complete devotion, no
boundaries, no struggle. See id. at 123. Mura writes: "A man wishes to believe there is a
beautiful body with no soul attached. [Why does he wish it? Because that soul may lay
reciprocal claims upon him.] Because of this wish, he takes the surface for truth. There are no
depths.... Only the surface can be known and loved, and this is why the image is so easily
exhausted, why there must be another. What is this danger that lies beneath the surface? How
can it hurt him? It reminds him of the depths he has lost in himself." [The lies he has lived].
Id.
241. See Joel Kovel, The Antidialectic of Pornography in Kimmel, ed., Men Confront
Pornography at 164 (cited in note 58). Kovel writes: "Can one imagine any genuine resistance,
any critical capacity whatsoever, germinating in the sex shops? Pornography is good for busi-
ness.... A nation of pornography consumers is no different, politically speaking, than a nation
of heroin junkies. It is not hard to envision the video-display terminals at the office of the
future being programmed to show pornography-soft-core, no doubt-during lunch
breaks.... [Tihe main point of distinction between the erotic and the pornographic [is precisely
this]: that the latter represents sexuality firmly under the control of capital while the former
dissolves capital." Id. (emphasis added).
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importantly, it is simply not true. What pornography does do is
glorify a male sexual identity that makes huge profits for porn
capitalists off of men's fantasies and despair. This cycle harms
individual men as much as individual women, destroying
interpersonal solidarity at its sexual core. 242
The pornographic narratives of masculinity oppress and ex-
ploit men as men because these narratives urge men to enact a form
of masculinity that is impossible for self-conscious human beings to
sustain except at great emotional and interpersonal cost. The will to
dominate means a constant anxiety and insecurity over the inability
to dominate. Emotional withdrawal means frustration and loneliness.
It means never saying what you really feel, never giving or asking for
love, tenderness, or understanding, never sharing or compromising or
accepting the challenge to change. It means getting what you want
with lies, manipulation, false and hypocritical accusations, and tem-
per tantrums. 243 To the extent that a man needs love and understand-
ing, the narratives of pornographic masculinity will make him feel
less like a man. The men in those narratives demand submission but
do not need love, making ordinary men think, "if they are men, then I
am not.'"244
At the same time, the cost to men of attempting to enact a por-
nographic masculinity is more than emotional. It is practical and
concrete and has a direct bearing on the kind of women these men are
likely to "attract." Men who suppress their need for intimacy and love
242. See Cornell, 100 Yale L. J. at 2250 (cited in note 4) ("MacKinnon's reduction of
feminine sexuality to being a 'fuckee' endorses this fantasy as 'truth' and thereby promotes the
prohibition against the exploration of women's sexuality and 'sex' as we live it and not as men
fantasize about ie').
243. This has been termed the Stoltenberg "mind-fuck." See notes 114, 220 and
accompanying text; Stoltenberg, Refusing to be a Man at 24 (cited in note 114). From this
posture, every interaction is an assertion of power rather than an effort to build relationships.
244. These images of masculinity, like the images of women's sexual morality, serve to fa-
cilitate the imposition of a capitalist labor discipline. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse,
Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 Stan. L. Rev.
1, 33-34 (1988). Observing the similarities in the attitudes of young Chicano and other low-
status male workers, Professor Austin notes that images of masculinity perform a multi-purpose
function: dignifying menial manual labor, sublimating brutality, reinscribing sexual difference,
and justifying the sexual division of labor. It does this even as it claims the male workers'
consent to abuse, "the brutality of the working situtation is partially re-interpreted into a heroic
exercise of manly confrontation with the task. Difficult, uncomfortable or dangerous conditions
are seen, not for themselves, but for their appropriateness to a masculine readiness and
hardness.... [l]n the machismo of manual work the will to finish a job, the will to really work,
is posited as a masculine logic and not as the logic of exploitation." Id. at 33 (quoting Paul




and live off interpersonal strategies of deceit and coercion are not par-
ticularly attractive partners. Certainly, these men have nothing to
offer women who prioritize emotional engagement and sexual inti-
macy over the economic support or social status most men offer most
women. These men offer nothing precisely because coercion and emo-
tional withdrawal-the tactics used to get what they want without
expressing need, dependence, or vulnerability-circumvent the reci-
procity inherent to intimacy.
In this interpersonal context, a man's refusal to express his
needs appears, in some instances, as a refusal of intimacy and, in oth-
ers, as a manipulative ploy serving a selfish refusal to open himself to
reciprocal requests for support and understanding.245 Such requests
are threatening to men precisely because they cannot be satisfied by
emotional withdrawal or male domination; instead they require a
man to reach out beyond himself and meet the woman's needs.
Because such men have nothing to offer, the women who do stay, stay
either because they have given up trying to achieve the emotional and
sexual intimacy these men cannot give, or they stay because of fear
and a lack of feasible alternatives.246
B. Jungian Archetypes of Mature Masculinity
A central theme in my discussion of culturally dominant im-
ages of motherhood and female sexuality has been to explore some of
the ways in which race, class, and culture drastically alter how
women perceive different images of female autonomy, and whether
they are experienced as liberating or oppressive. Just as these
differences affect our investments in alternative images of
motherhood and female sexuality, they also influence the way we
respond to alternative images of men and masculinity. In this
Section, I explore some alternatives to the narratives of pornographic
masculinity and interrogate these alternatives by examining the
245. Rivaka Polatnick provides a good example and label for this interpersonal dynamic.
They are the tactics through which men deploy "the principle of least interest." As Polatnick
explains: "By propogating the belief that women are the ones who really desire children, men
can then invoke a 'principle of least interest:' that is, because women are 'most interested' in
children [or, one might add, in marriage, in 'the relationship' or indeed in anything else], they
must make the most of the accommodations and sacrifices required to rear them [or to maintain
the relationship]." Polatnick, Why Men Don't Rear Children, in Trebilcot, ed., Mothering at 27
(cited in note 93). Put differently, emotional withdrawal, lack of interest in, and/or "fear of com-
mitmenf' to marriage or children are self-serving, albeit effective, strategic maneuvers through
which men shift the practical burdens of sustaining these relations to women. Id.
246. See generally Mahoney, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 1 (cited in note 13) (discussing separation
assault).
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kinds of power they invite men to enact in their lives. My purpose is
to explore the impact these alternative narratives could have on
women's interests, both as feminists and as heterosexual desiring
subjects.
This search for alternative narratives of masculinity is an im-
portant project for feminists because cultural narratives are the
resources individuals use to construct their identities and
relationships. The things we do in order to be who we are, in turn,
are the practices through which some narratives become culturally
dominant while others are suppressed.247 These narratives are also
the resources officials use to interpret events and apply legal norms.24
At the same time, the search for acceptable images of mascu-
line power cuts into the heart of one of the most intensely divisive in-
trafeminist debates over female sexual desire. 249  Women's hetero-
sexual desire became a fundamental problem in feminist legal theory
when radical feminists resuscitated an idea, as old as the early
Christian hagiographies of the female saints, 250 that women's sexual
desire for men is completely incompatible with their struggle for
equality, dignity, and autonomy. The most notable proponent of this
position in recent feminist legal theory has been Catharine
MacKinnon.251 Professor MacKinnon believes that:
Sexual desire in women, at least in this culture, is socially constructed as that
by which we come to want our own self-annihilation. That is, our subordina-
tion is eroticized in and as female; in fact, we get off on it to a degree, if no-
where near as much as men do. This is our stake in this system that is not in
our interest, our stake in this system that is killing us. I'm saying femininity
247. See notes 71-73, 113 and accompanying text.
248. Narratives perform this function in the processing of rape cases. For example, LaFree
quotes numerous jurors whose comments suggest they were reacting to rape allegations
through narratives of pornographic masculinity-the overwhelming sexual needs that make all
men victims of female provocation: "Come on! Girls think they know so much these days. They
try to lead a man on and then they get so far he can't stop and the woman hollers rape." Male
sexuality is represented as inherently dangerous and men as always ready for sex-carelessness
indicating evidence of consent: "You don't get in a car at midnight with two complete strangers
and not expect to do something." A Black female told LaFree that the victim "put herself in a
position for it. She asked for it and got it. It's a poor man who turns down anything for free."
LaFree, Rape and Criminal Justice at 148 (cited in note 1) (emphasis added) (quoting jurors).
249. For one account of the history of this debate, see Kate Ellis, I'm Black and Blue From
the Rolling Stones and I'm not Sure How I Feel About it: Pornography and the Feminist
Imagination, 14 Socialist Rev. 103 (1984). For an additional account, see Pesquera and Sugura,
There is No Going Back, in Alarc6n, et al., eds., Chicana Critical Issues at 99 (cited in note 2).
250. See Gravdal, Ravishing Maidens at 22 (cited in note 166).
251. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda
for Theory, 7 Signs 515, 531 (1982); Macinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 54 (cited in note 4).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:869
as we know it is how we come to want male dominance, which most emphati-
cally is not in our interest.252
This image of female sexual desire prompted vigorous objection
from feminists who rejected Macinnon's reduction of female sexual
identity to victimization by men. As Drucilla Cornell points out: "The
possibility of feminine desire... that is irreducible to being fucked by
men and liking it is foreclosed by MacKinnon's analysis."253
Indeed, this reduction constitutes little more than an outright
rejection of and hostility towards feminine sexual difference.
According to Cornell, Maclinnon accepts current male fantasies of
women and our sexuality as reality,2 54 even though "[tihe celebration
of the feminine 'sex' and women's sexuality... suggests that our
sexuality is not represented by any of the current male fantasies of
woman and sex within patriarchy."255 In order to celebrate this femi-
nine sexual difference, Cornell uses the work of Luce Irigaray to de-
ploy the positive image of lesbian love-making in which Irigaray cele-
brates the loss of boundaries experienced in sexual intimacy. 56
The problem with Cornell's response is that even if women do
not agree with MacKinnon's formulation that "what men think is sex,
women think is rape," it does not follow that images of lesbian love-
making can guide or sustain the practices of a deeply intimate
subject-to-subject heterosexuality.257 Indeed, Cornell's response to
252. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 54 (cited in note 4).
253. Cornell, 100 Yale L. J. at 2266 (cited in note 4). Cornell continues: "We are left
instead with a disjuncture between sex and freedom. To quote MacKinnon [quoting Ti-Grace
Atkinson] ... 'I do not know any feminist worthy of the name who, if forced to choose between
freedom and sex, would choose sex. She'd choose freedom every time.'" Id. at 2266.
254. Id. at 2270. MacKinnon's approach means that "a feminist perspective is impossible
as anything other than the recognition of the totalization of the masculine viewpoint.
Therefore, the most we can do is simply reverse the meaning of the totality, rather than chal-
lenge it in the name of the feminine. In MacKinnon's reality, what men see as sex, women see
as rape." Id. at 2266. Indeed, not only does she accept male fantasies of female sexuality as
reality, these are the fantasies of wimps. Cornell puts it quite well: "A man who needs to
imagine a woman in chains is no man at all: 'pornography is what wimps need, not what men
want."' Id. at 2270.
255. Id. at 2267.
256. According to Cornell, "Irigaray beautifully imagines two women making love as an
alternative to MacKinnon's vision of'getting fucked.' As Irigaray writes, '[n]o surface holds. No
figure, line, or point remains. No ground subsists. But no abyss, either. Depth, for us, is not a
chasm. Without a solid crust, there is no precipice. Our depth is the thickness of our body, our
all touching itself. Where top and bottom, inside and outside, in front and behind, above and
below are not separated, remote, out of touch. Our all intermingled. Without breaks or gaps.'
Id.
257. Cornell is careful not to accept MacKinnon's construction of feminine sexual identity
as an accurate representation of heterosexuality: "Nor am I arguing that the practice of hetero-
sexuality is reducible to MacKinnon's and Dworkin's view of 'sex' as 'intercourse' or of
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MacKinnon's argument may be particularly troubling to straight
women of color. As straight women, our sexual orientation means
that celebrations of feminine sexuality that ignore the male term,
even as they glorify images of merged identity, may not be helpful to
our struggles for sexual autonomy. This is true because the problem
heterosexuality creates for women is not so much the problem of
achieving the sense of oneness and loss of boundaries that Irigaray's
image celebrates. 258 Instead, the problem is one of achieving the social
and interpersonal conditions under which a woman, having experi-
enced that loss of boundaries with a man, can reassert her individual-
ity, autonomy, and separation from that man without triggering male
aggression or depression. 259
If our sexual orientation makes it difficult to accept images of
sexuality that ignore men, our racial and ethnic identities make it
hard to accept images of men that threaten or degrade their
masculinity.260  Part of being straight means loving and wanting
men.261 Part of being colored means understanding the degree to
which men experience their oppression as assaults on their
'intercourse' as 'getting fucked.'" Id. at 2270. The image she offers of sexuality is, however,
extremely problematic if offered as a path toward non-subordinated/ing heterosexuality.
258. See notes 95-96, 172-75 and accompanying texts (discussing the psycho-sexual
dynamics of sexual intimacy).
259. See, for example, Mahoney, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 93 (cited in note 13). Mahoney's image
of "separation assault!' is a powerful concept that can incorporate the many ways men resist the
expressions and activities through which "their women" assert an individuality separate from
them. Why is this the crucial problem? Because men's needs need to be reconstructed. Males
and females are emotionally and psychologically caught in a subject/object structure rather than
the subject/subject structure of interpersonal relation. See notes 85-86 and accompanying text
(discussing a psychonanalytic theory of sexual dominance). See generally Benjamin, The Bonds
of Love at 75-84 (cited in note 10); West, 3 Wis. Women's L. J. at 118-33 (cited in note 4)
(discussing the problem of erotic submission). To have needs that only another subject can
satisfy means to have needs that do not depend on appropriation for satisfaction. The need for
intimacy can be satisfied without appropriation. All it presupposes is an ability to trust and the
will to be trustworthy. Yet even that trust must be qualified, not because we fear that the other
will intentionally betray us, but because we recognize and accept the finitude and ultimate
mortality of the other. Intimacy is the one need that we cannot satisfy for ourselves or by
ourselves. In order to recognize and accept our dependence without abdicating our autonomy,
we need to redefine intimacy as the trust that holds two subjects together as the boundaries
they draw are lost and redrawn without fear.
260. Latin women routinely tend to value and desire "masculinity" in men. Indeed, the
way Latin women insult men is by suggesting that "they are no longer sexually active, an insult
which hinges on the perceived failure to display effective male agency." Harvey, Domestic
Violence, in Harvey and Gow, eds., Sex and Violence at 74 (cited in note 14). Absent positive
and non-misogynistic images of masculinity, however, see, for example, Part IV.B, the difference
between "masculine" and "macho" may be a line too fine for our own good.
261. Part of wanting men means wanting their desire. Linda King, Erotic Code, in Grewal,
et al., eds., Charting the Journey at 221 (cited in note 2).
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manhood.26 2 Putting these two positions together may mean listening
to what men say about their struggles to construct self-confident and
other-affirming masculine identities. Their work suggests that there
is a direct connection between male abuse of women and the complete
lack of any positive, affirming images of masculinity, images that do
not make male power depend upon female subordination. 26 3
For example, Abdul JanMohamed reads the abuse of women
depicted in Richard Wright's novel Native Son as a means of resisting
the effects of white racism, that is, "the 'feminization' or
'infantilization' of the Black man within a phallocentric system."26 4
According to JanMohamed, "Wright proceeds from the perspective of a
protagonist so profoundly castrated that he experiences himself as an
262. See Comas-Diaz, 16 J. Community Psych. at 23 (cited in note 83); Joseph and Lewis,
Common Differences at 215 (cited in note 2) (describing the ego gratification Black women
provide to Black men through sex). Certainly my position is not that women should use sex to
build male egos. My point is simply that the fact that they do cannot be explained away as the
expression of a desire for self-annihilation. Another interpretation might be that these women
recognize precisely what men so often fail to see: that their interests are better served by
practices that promote their partners' self-confidence and self-esteem. Sexual intimacy can
often do both.
263. Writing generally about changing expectations in (white) working-class and middle-
class homes, Victor Seidler notes that as white women "are forced to work outside the home,"
they are "increasingly making demands upon men to share in the housework." Victor J. Seidler,
Recreating Sexual Politics: Men, Feminism & Politics 44 (Routledge, 1991). According to
Seidler, the tensions generated by these demands appear to stem from the culture's failure "to
provide a way of helping men to a redefinition of their identity as men. Often men feel threat-
ened by this new independence of women, feeling the need to reassert their own power and
show 'who's boss.' Often much energy is taken up within these domestic struggles." Id. The
only certain thing is that images of pornographic masculinity are not going to do the job.
264. JanMohamed, Racialized Sexuality, in Stanton, ed., Discourses of Sexuality at 107
(cited in note 9). Other writers draw similar connections between the sexual abuse of women
and the frustrations caused by racist restrictions on minority male economic opportunities. See,
for example, Schecter, Women and Male Violence at 236 (cited in note 14) ("[Racially
subordinated] men seek to compensate for this lack of [economic and political] control by
intensifying their identification with sexual aspects of manhood. Often this means sexual
domination, which easily manifests itself in rape, battering and other forms of violence against
women"). Robert Staples contrasts the low rate of pornography consumption by Black males to
the high rate of rape prosecution against Black males in order to make a suggestive (though
highly problematic) argument that "it is the denial of economic rights, not porn, that is in large
part responsible for rape in this country." Staples, Blacks and Pornography, in Kimmel, ed.,
Men Confront Pornography at 113 (cited in note 58). According to Staples, "a porn commission
without a political axe to grind might have concluded that when other expressions of manhood
such as gainful employment and economic success are blocked, those men will express their
frustration and masculinity against women .... Such a conclusion, [however], would not go
down well with the Reagan administration, whose policies have led to the burgeoning number of
unemployed black males." Id. at 112-13. Staples's argument resonates with other evidence
connecting rape to male experiences of masculine inadequacy even though his premises and
inferences are highly problematic. Black rapists may be overrepresented in criminal
proceedings simply because of white racism/sexism, the idea being that white men rape more
often than criminal statistics have registered. See LaFree, Rape and Criminal Justice at 43-46,
239-40 (cited in note 1).
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already 'feminized' Black male who needs to (re)assert his 'manhood'
through rape and murder."265
Although JanMohamed rejects the fundamental premise of
Native Son, namely that "the protagonist can become a 'man' through
rape and murder and overcome the racialization of his subjectivity,"
his analysis suggests that violence against women is a vehicle
through which racially subordinated men can reclaim their
masculinity.266 JanMohamed argues that "the violent 'appropriation'
of [the white woman's] sexuality not only allows Bigger to enter into a
system of 'exchange' with white men and become their 'equal'; it also
permits him to enter the symbolic realm and possess the phallus."267
This is the logic that explains how raping women becomes a
vehicle through which racially subordinated men reclaim their mascu-
linity. If being a man means having the power to rape women with
impunity, then laws and public interventions that protect women
from rape, particularly those that operate in racially biased ways,
deny racially subordinated men their right to be men. The law, read
now as the white man's law, constitutes them as less than men and
preserves the rights of manhood, that is, "the right" to rape with im-
punity, exclusively for white men.268  In this logic, rape is used not
only to show that racially subordinated men are indeed men (because
they are able to rape), but that their manhood exceeds the white rac-
ist efforts to emasculate them. From this subject position, they claim
the will to assert their manhood even if it costs them their life or their
liberty, although the fact that most rapes are intraracial means they
usually risk neither.
265. JanMohamed, Racialized Sexuality, in Stanton, ed., Discourses of Sexuality at 108(cited in note 9). "Every time [Bigger] felt as he had felt that night, he raped. But rape was not
what one did to women. Rape was what one felt when one's back was against a wall and one
had to strike out, whether one wanted to or not, to keep the pack from killing one. He
committed rape every time he looked into a white face .... But it was rape when he cried out
in hate deep in his heart as he felt the strain of living day by day.... The knowledge that he
had killed a white girl they loved and regarded as their symbol of beauty made him feel the
equal of them, like a man who had been somehow cheated, but had now evened the score." Id.
at 109-10 (quoting Richard Wright, Native Son 155, 213-14 (Harper & Row, 1940)). See also
sapphire, Wild Thing, in Miquel Algarin and Rob Holman, eds., Aloud: Voices from the
Nuyorican Poets Cafe 266, 266-74 (H. Holt, 1994) (the poet "feel[s] good baby/[he] just did/the
wild thing," but he's still impoverished, illiterate, (maybe) retarded, and nowhere nearer to
free).
266. JanMohamed, Racialized Sexuality, in Stanton, ed., Discourses of Sexuality at 108
(cited in note 9).
267. Id. at 110.
268. See LaFree, Rape and Criminal Justice at 237-39 (cited in note 1).
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In a thoughtful and profoundly affirming interpretation of
Alice Walker's novel The Color Purple, Professor Steven Hobbs offers
a very different account of what being a man really means.269 His
reading of Walker's novel examines the dynamics of dominance and
submission that almost destroy the marriage between Harpo and
Sofia. Hobbs attempts to resolve the tensions this dynamic generates
by projecting an image of masculine power that can engage female
subjectivity in a way that respects women's dignity, autonomy, and
equality, while preserving what is male about men. Hobbs writes of
Harpo's marital problems:
Initially, [Harpo] is very happy with married life, joyfully sharing the respon-
sibilities of the household. His dilemma begins with his belief that he has to
rule his house just as his father had. He believes that Sofia is to obey him and
let him take the lead. To Harpo, Sofia is unbowed, unbreakable, and overly
bossy .... [She] fits the stereotype of the domineering Black woman so much
maligned by history and scholars.
For Harpo, his only chance for redemption, from being viewed as "less of a
man" was by beating Sofia into submission. But Sofia refuses to be whipped
by anyone; she fights back with determined self-preservation. Consequently,
their marital relationship turns into one physically bruising fight after another
with no winners. The beatings stop when Sofia takes her children and
leaves.
2 70
According to Hobbs, Harpo's situation is "illustrative of a
struggle that a Black man may face in defining his role within his
family."271 When Harpo asks his father what he should do about
Sofia, he is asking, "How can I be a man?" The problem is that the
question already presupposes an expectation that Sofia should obey
him-that her refusal to obey is a challenge to his manhood, rather
than a simple assertion of her autonomous subjectivity-her sepa-
rateness from him. In this formulation, the very elements that make
her a subject to herself, make her a challenge to him-namely her in-
dependent objectives and desires. Framed this way, his manhood
comes to depend upon his ability to control her. If he can make her do
what he wants and not what she wants, then he will be "a man.
''272
Hobbs rejects this image of manhood, which calls men to invest
in controlling women, in favor of the alternative image of "a do-right
kind of man," an image of masculine power that calls men to develop
269. See generally Steven H. Hobbs, Gender and Racial Stereotypes, Family Law, and the
Black Family: Harpo's Blues, 4 Intl. Rev. Comp. Pub. Pol. 35 (1992).
270. Id. at 40.
271. Id. at 39.
272. Id.
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the strength of character that will enable them to love, respect, and
accept the women in their lives. According to Hobbs:
Acceptance is also a vital part of respect. A man cannot have control over the
dreams, desires and personality of his woman. He cannot mold her in his im-
age with physical violence or emotional intimidation. He respects her right to
bodily and emotional integrity. In offering respect, love and protection, he
does right by her.
273
The image of the do-right kind of man presupposes and offers
the promise of resolving the tensions inevitably generated by an im-
age of male sexual identity that makes male power depend on female
powerlessness. Hobbs's advice to men is thus a complete inversion
and repudiation of the basic assumptions that drive Harpo's father to
advise Harpo to beat Sofia.274 Rather than seeking his "manhood" in a
struggle to render his woman powerless or submissive, Hobbs's advice
is to accept, respect, and to "recognize that within her and with her
you can achieve great strength."2715 Male and female power is repre-
sented as co-equal, complementary, and synergistic.
This alternative vision of the relationship between male and
female power is profoundly affirming and pregnant with possibilities.
In a provocative defense of masculinity, Robert Moore and Douglas
Gillette insist that the mature masculine is not wantonly violent or
abusive. They propose an alternative account in which the central
opposition at the root of male dominance is not an opposition between
masculinity and femininity, male and female, but rather between ma-
ture and immature masculinities. 276 Drawing on Carl Jung's under-
standing of the Archetypal Self, they articulate four psychological con-
273. Id. at 44-45.
274. For somewhat different advice, see asha bandele, In Response to a Brother's Question
about What He Should Do When His Best Friend Beats Up His Woman, in Algarin and Holman,
eds., Aloud at 392 (cited in note 265).
275. Hobbs, 4 Intl. Rev. Comp. Pub. Pol. at 44 (cited in note 269).
276. Moore and Gillette, King, Warrior, Magician, Lover at xvii-xix (cited in note 19). The
authors distinguish "Man psychology" from "Boy psychology," arguing that patriarchy is not the
expression of a "deep and rooted masculinity," but rather the expression of "Boy psychology." Id.
at xvii. According to the authors, "Boy psychology is everywhere around us, and its marks are
easy to see. Among them are abusive and violent acting-out behaviors against others, both men
and women; passivity and weakness, the inability to act effectively and creatively in one's own
life and to engender life and creativity in others (both men and women); and, often, an
oscillation between the two-abuse/weakness, abuse/weakness." Id. at xvi-xvii. "Patriarchy...
is an attack on masculinity in its fullness as well as femininity in its fullness. . . . The
patriarchal male does not welcome the full masculine development of his sons or his male
subordinates any more than he welcomes the full development of his daughters, or his female
employees." Id. at xvii.
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figurations that constitute the fundamental structures of a mature
masculine psyche. They call these configurations the archetypes or
primordial images of the King, Warrior, Magician, and Lover. These
archetypes are the psychic energies that, in dynamic relationships,
constitute "the blueprints for the calm and positive mature mascu-
line," a masculinity that is "nurturing and generative, not wounding
and destructive.."277
Rather than reading these archetypes of masculinity as psy-
chological phenomena, I read them as alternative narratives of mas-
culine power, which invite men to enact a different kind of male sex-
ual identity than the one I have been attacking as pornographic mas-
culinity. Reading these images as narratives that feminists may want
to see widely disseminated in mainstream culture, we can examine
the kinds of relationships these narratives encourage, without re-
treating into an individualistic psychology of male dominance.
27 8
Whether individual men will have the emotional strength and inter-
nal discipline to enact alternative sexual identities is not directly
relevant to my analysis. Instead, the question is whether the realiza-
tion of particular narratives of masculinity would be a good thing for
women, thus warranting our investment in increasing their cultural
circulation. At the same time, men's struggles to enact alternative
sexual identities will be facilitated the more culturally prevalent
these alternatives become.
In their account of mature masculinity, Moore and Gillette de-
scribe the core energies expressed in and through the four archetypal
277. Id. at 6. My own sense is that these energies are critical for mature femininity as
much as for mature masculinity.
278. I must emphasize (again) that this is not a proposal to ground female sexual liberation
on the psychological and spiritual actualization of individual men. Instead, by focusing on the
circulation of cultural images, my goal is to provide an account (and political trajectory) that si-
multaneously recognizes the socially contingent position of individual psychic life, that is the
cultural forces and power relations in which an individual's efforts to achieve spiri.
tual/psychological actualization are always embedded, even as it recognizes the importance of
psychic integrity to individual happiness. See, for example, Seidler, Recreating Sexual Politics
at 46 (cited in note 263). According to Seidler:
Adorno and Marcuse had already realized in the 1930s that the "individual" no longer
existed in bureaucratic capitalism.... [However,] [s]tructuralist Marxism has
completely misunderstood the situation. It has attacked the "individuar' as essentially a
bourgeois conception.... Its influence remains tacit in many of the discussions around
post-modernity wherein identities are seen as in constant flux. The importance of the
Frankfurt School was that it at least recognized the erosion of identity as a significant
problem. As men, we can live in fear, losing touch with our individuality. We can fear
moving so far out of touch with our "selves" that we cannot find a way back. We lose a
sense of connection with different aspects of our experience. But with so much social
theory, the "self' is treated as an essentialist fiction so that critical issues of identity can
barely be recognized.
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images. Their discussion first examines the archetypes in the positive
fullness of their mature expression and then turns to their shadow
expressions in an immature masculinity. The image of the King calls
men to live relations of internal order and other-affirming generativ-
ity through the practices of discernment, generosity, and the recogni-
tion and honoring of the goodness and excellence of others.279
Accordingly:
The King archetype in its fullness possesses the qualities of order, of reason-
able and rational patterning, of integration and integrity in the masculine psy-
che.... It defends our own sense of inner order, our own integrity of being and
of purpose, our own central calmness about who we are, and our essential un-
assailability and certainty in our masculine identity. It looks upon the world
with a firm but kindly eye. It sees others in all their weaknesses and in all
their talent and worth. It honors them and promotes them. It guides them
and nurtures them toward their own fifllness of being. It is not envious, be-
cause it is secure, as the King, in its own worth. It rewards and encourages
creativity in us and in others.280
These energies are contrasted to the energies of the Shadow
King, the active Tyrant, and the passive Weakling.281 Each shadow
expresses a destructive distortion of the King archetype. The Tyrant
actively perverts the King energies, leading a man to prioritize his
self-interests, repudiate the search for the right, and seek self-
affirmation by abusing others. The Tyrant does so because "he lacks
inner structure, and he is afraid-terrified, really-of his own hidden
weakness and his underlying lack of potency.2s2 Rather than confer-
ring recognition and honoring others from a position of security in his
own goodness and excellence, Tyrant Kings act out a narcissistic
selfishness enforced through expressions of rage. 283
The Weakling is the passive side of the Shadow King. Lacking
internal order and other-affirming compassion, the Weakling simply
wants to be adored even as he expresses a chronic sense of inadequacy
through self-serving self-pity and passive-aggressive assaults on oth-
ers. The difference between these variations of the King archetype is
279. Moore and Gillette, King, Warrior, Magician, Lover at 49-62 (cited in note 19).
280. Id. at 61-62.
281. Id. at 63.
282. Id. at 64.
283. These people really feel they are the center of the universe (although they aren't cen-
tered themselves) and believe others exist to serve them. Instead of mirroring others, they in-




the difference between "[r]ealistic greatness" as opposed to "inflation
and grandiosity."284 It is the difference between maturity and imma-
turity, and not a difference between male and female.
The Warrior archetype, like the King, is first described in its
mature expression and then in its shadow forms, the Sadist and the
Masochist. The Warrior is characterized by appropriate aggres-
siveness, discernment, and transpersonal commitments, which to-
gether constitute effective agency exerted for the sake of a greater
good.28 5 According to Moore and Gillette:
If we are accessing the Warrior appropriately, we will be energetic, decisive,
courageous, enduring, persevering, and loyal to some greater good beyond our
own personal gain.... [A]t the same time that we are "detached," [we will] be
warm, compassionate, appreciative, and generative. We will care for ourselves
and others. We will fight good fights in order to make the world a better and
more fulfilling place for everyone and everything. Our war making will be for
the creation of the new, the just and the free. 286
Thus the Warrior represents effective and goal-directed
engagement with life. The active and passive forms of the Shadow
Warrior reflect the ways in which these energies can be perverted by
immaturity. While the Warrior destroys in order to create, the Sadist
has a "passion for destruction and cruelty ... a hatred of the 'weak,' of
the helpless and vulnerable."287 Rather than expressing any genuine,
effective male power, the destructive energies of the Sadist are driven
by a man's internal insecurity about his own phallic power, a fear that
makes him hate "everything supposedly 'soft' and relational .... His
desperate fear of this leads him to wanton brutality."288
The Masochist is the passive expression of the Shadow
Warrior. This image refers to instances in which men accept their
own victimization. 28 9 Unlike the Warrior, the Masochist assumes a
position of powerlessness in relation to others. A man living under
this Shadow is incapable of defending himself or others who depend
upon him because he lacks the determination to confront evil and the
energy to stop it. He is incapable of establishing genuinely intimate
sexual relationships because intimacy depends on a dynamic balance
284. Id. at 70.
285. Id. at 79-87.
286. Id. at 95.
287. Id. at 90.
288. Id. at 90-92.
289. "The Masochist projects Warrior energy onto others and causes a man to experience
himself as powerless. The man possessed by the Masochist is unable to defend himself psycho-
logically; he allows others (and himself) to push him around, to exceed the limits of what he can
tolerate and still keep his self-respect." Id. at 94.
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between individual self-assertion and renunciation. This is a balance
the Masochist cannot maintain because, unlike the Warrior, he lacks
the will to assert himself in a positive and directed manner.
If we are under the power of the Masochist, we will take far too much abuse for
far too long and then explode in a sadistic outburst of verbal and even physical
violence.... We will dream but not be able to act decisively to make our
dreams come true.... We will lack the capacity to endure the pain necessary
for the accomplishment of any worthwhile goal .... We will look at the task
ahead and be defeated before we start. We won't be able to "leap into bat-
tle.,290
The last two archetypes are the Magician and the Lover. The
Magician is "the knower" and "the master of technology. 29 This ar-
chetype refers to energies expressed in a man's knowledge, insights,
and observations, his thoughtfulness and his ability to detect evil
when it masquerades as goodness. 292 It refers to the energies that
enable a man "to detach from the inner and outer storms and to con-
nect with deep inner truths and resources."293 In its active form, the
Shadow Magician appears as The Manipulator. In its passive form,
the Shadow Magician is the Denying Innocent One.294
The Manipulator perverts the Magician's knowledge and pow-
ers of observation for his own self-interests.
A man under this Shadow doesn't guide others, as a Magician does; he directs
them in ways they cannot see. His interest is not in initiating others by
graduated degrees--degrees that they can integrate and handle-into better,
happier and more fulfilled lives. Rather the Manipulator maneuvers people by
withholding from them information they may need for their own well-being. 295
An intimate relationship with a man possessed by this Shadow is
impossible because he lies. Unlike the Magician, he cannot be
trusted.
The Denying Innocent One is the passive form of the Shadow
Magician. This image refers to the energies expended to preserve the
illusion of mastery without actually engaging the tasks it takes to
290. Id.
291. Id. at 98.
292. Id. at 100.
293. Id. at 108.
294. Id. at 111, 115.
295. Id. at 111.
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achieve genuine mastery.296  Like the Manipulator, the Denying
Innocent One seeks his own self-interests, but pursues them "behind
an impenetrable wall of feigned naivet6." According to Moore and
Gillette:
Such men are slippery and illusive. They do not allow us to engage them fron-
tally.., thus keeping us off balance by seducing us into an endless process of
questioning our own intuitions about their behavior. If we challenge their
"innocence," they will often react with a show of tear-jerking bewilderment....
But we will not be able to escape the uneasy feeling that we have been ma-
nipulated. And, in that feeling, we will have detected the active pole of the
Magician's Shadow behind the smokescreen of "innocence." 
297
The Lover is the archetype of relatedness, both empathetic and
sensual. It is expressed by a man's playfulness, spirituality, and
passion. For the man who is accessing these energies,
all things are bound to each other in mysterious ways.... The Lover's con-
nectedness is not primarily intellectual. It is through feeling. The primal
hungers are felt passionately in all of us, at least beneath the surface. But the
Lover knows this with a deep knowing. Being close to the unconscious means
being close to the "fire"-to the fires of life.
298
The Lover's spirituality is the energy that enables a man to intuit "the
ultimate Oneness of all that is" and leads him to want to experience
that Oneness in his relationships with others.2 99  Like the sacred
prostitute, the Lover conveys an image of sexuality in which the
experiences of reverence and joy are intimately intertwined.
The Shadow Lover appears, alternatively, in its active and
passive forms as the Addicted Lover and the Impotent Lover. 300 The
Addict energies reflect the perversion of relatedness and sensuality by
a lack of boundaries and intolerance toward limits. The Addict is lost
in "the pleasure of the moment"301 and is, consequently, "eternally
restless." 302 Unlike the Lover, a man possessed by the Addict is un-
296. The Innocent One "wants the power and status that traditionally come to the man who
is a magician.... But he doesn't want to take the responsibilities that belong to a true magi-
cian. He does not want to share and teach.... He does not want to know himself, and he cer-
tainly doesn't want to make the great effort necessary to become skilled at containing and chan-
nelling power in constructive ways. He wants to learn just enough to derail those who are
making worthwhile efforts.... The Innocent One hides the truth for the sake of achieving and
maintaining his own precarious status." Id. at 115.
297. Id. at 115-16.
298. Id. at 122.
299. Id. at 124.
300. Id. at 131.
301. Id. at 136.
302. Id. at 135.
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able to sustain a deeply intimate sexual relationship, for while the
Lover desires "Oneness," the Addict wants "the ultimate and continu-
ous 'orgasm,' the ultimate and continuous 'high.' "303 Consequently,
[e]ach time his woman confronts him with her mortality, her finitude, her
weakness and limitations, hence shattering his dream of this tine finding the
orgasm without end-in other words, when the excitement of the illusion of
perfect union with her (with the world, with God) becomes tarnished-he
saddles his horse and rides out looking for renewal of his ecstasy.... He ends
by looking for his "spirituality" in a line of cocaine. 30 4
The passive form of the Shadow Lover is the Impotent Lover.
A distorted inversion of the Lover's connectedness and enthusiasm for
everything and everyone, the Impotent Lover experiences life in an
unfeeling way. He is sterile, bored, and listless.30 5 Like the Addict,
the Impotent Lover seeks to escape the limitations inherent in human
relatedness. While the Addict seeks his liberation by relating
sexually to any woman who crosses his path, the Impotent seeks it
through sexual withdrawal.306 Neither is capable of sustaining a
genuinely intimate sexual relationship.
Ultimately the images projected by these four archetypes con-
stitute a masculinity directly opposed to the images of male power
projected in the narratives of pornographic masculinity. These arche-
types call men to enact sexual identities that are generative and gen-
erous, decisive and empathetic, goal-oriented and compassionate,
playful and respectful of boundaries. They convey the image of
agency and mastery in the service of fruitfulness, excellence, and the
affirmation of others. They are images that facilitate the tasks in-
volved in constructing "a do-right kind of masculinity" and, in this
sense, they further the objective of female autonomy. Why?
The answer is found not only in the substantive content of the
images, but also in the strength they call forth. To enact these arche-
typal narratives, men must trade their delusions of superiority and
303. Id. at 136.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 138.
306. In short, the man's sex life goes stale:
His sexual and sensual sensitivity has been overwhelmed by other concerns. As his
sexual partner becomes more demanding, he withdraws even further into the passive
pole of the Lover's Shadow. At this point, the opposite pole of the archetypal Shadow
may "rescue" him by propelling him into the Addict's quest for the perfect satisfaction of




dominance for the demanding task of making excellence and mastery
a reality in their lives. This kind of strength is completely different
from the pseudo-power of male dominance. 30 7 Genuine effort presup-
poses the willingness to acknowledge deficiency, to confront inade-
quacy in order to transform it rather than be destroyed by it.
Male excellence and mastery are hardly oppressive of female
autonomy. It is rather the ways men try to hide (rather than correct)
their lack of excellence and compensate for (rather than overcome)
their lack of mastery that make them deceive, manipulate, suppress,
and abuse us. Unlike the narratives of pornographic masculinity, the
archetypal narratives of mature masculinity portray masculine power
as abundance, the ability to confer benefit, and to lead without
dominance. The King is not feared but beloved as a wise and fruitful
facilitator. The Warrior is decisive and effective; he destroys what
needs to be destroyed in order to promote what needs to be
promoted-that is, he does not allow himself or others who depend
upon him to be consumed by evil. The Magician uses his gift of
knowledge to enlighten and initiate rather than to manipulate and
obscure. The Lover understands the spiritual dimensions of sexuality
and is capable of deep, intimate connection with others. True power
is, from all perspectives, just the opposite of dominance and
oppression.
VI. LEGAL REFORMS: WELFARE WARS AND CUSTODY BATTLES
The purpose of my analysis has been to identify the legal inter-
ventions most likely to secure women's sexual autonomy in the femi-
nist struggle against rape. Gary LaFree's analysis of rape processing
patterns was used, in Part II.A, to explain why feminists may need to
redirect their struggles away from the substantive elements of rape
307. In the narratives of pornographic masculinity, men assert power without hesitation,
self-consciousness, or reflection, and it certainly makes no difference whether they are alone or
observed by others. See Stoltenberg, Refusing to Be a Man at 16-17 (cited in note 114). Thus
Stoltenberg writes:
Tlo act out convincingly a male sexual identity requires:
* an unfailing belief in one's own goodness and moral rightness of one's purposes,
regardless of how others may value what one does;
* a rigorous adherence to the set of behaviors, characteristics, and idiosyncrasies
that are appropriately male (and therefore inappropriate for a female);
* an unquestioning belief in one's own consistency, notwithstanding any evidence to
the contrary-a consistency rooted, for all practical purposes, in the relentlessness of
one's will and in the fact that, being superior by social definition, one can want whatever
one wants and one can expect to get it.
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law to a broader struggle over the ways discretionary power is legally
organized and practically deployed in the processing of rape cases.
Legal reforms that reduce the opportunity for unchecked discretion
are crucial to severing the link between rape processing patterns and
the cultural logics of white supremacy and male supremacy, a link
that is otherwise likely to survive any feminist redefinition of the sub-
stantive elements of rape.
At the same time, these institutional reforms are after-the-
rape interventions that do not address many of the instances in which
women's sexual autonomy is assaulted and our sexuality is ap-
propriated by men. To this end, Part II.B articulated three categories
of rape and emphasized the need for feminists to supplement their
legal struggles with a more generalized struggle against the policies,
practices, and legal doctrines that socially construct women's sexual
vulnerability.
This Part examines how culturally dominant images of mater-
nal power(lessness) and female sexual morality organize two areas of
public policy that are directly implicated in the social construction of
women's sexual vulnerability. Section A examines how these images
of women appear in the formulation of welfare policies that increase
poor women's dependence on male wage earners and penalize them
for their sexuality. Section B examines the gendered structure of pa-
rental rights and obligations constructed through child custody laws
and practices. In both instances, state power operates to reduce
women's sexual autonomy and increase women's sexual vulnerability.
Similarly, images of maternal power(lessness) and sexual immorality
are used to justify the economic dependence and enforced subordina-
tion effected by these forms of state action.308
Indeed, both examples illustrate two important and related
points: first, women's sexual vulnerability could be significantly re-
duced by reforming the public policies through which it is constructed;
second, the social production of women's sexual vulnerability is ef-
fected by the strategic deployment of these images in many contexts.
Welfare reform and child custody proceedings are only two illustrative
examples of my point that the circulation of images constitutes a de-
ployment of power both different in kind from and constitutive of
Id.
308. This focus on the deployment of images of women in welfare and family law is not co-
incidental. Carol Brown has aptly described these systems as the two faces of patriarchy, the
public and the private. See Carol Brown, Mothers, Fathers and Children: From Private to
Public Patriarchy, in Sargeant, ed., Women and Revolution at 239-67 (cited in note 2).
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other forms of power." 9 As a result, feminist legal interventions will
be most effective to the extent they circulate counter-images that can
combat the cultural logic, as well as the institutional impact of these
patriarchal images of women and men. Effective interventions de-
pend, however, not only on our ability to identify the ways in which
dominant cultural images are currently used to construct women's
sexual vulnerability, but also on our ability to take a critical look at
the substantive content of the "feminist" counter-images we em-
brace. 3l0
A. Images of Women in the Wars on Welfare
In this Section, I examine how recent policy initiatives "to end
welfare as we know it" have deployed images of maternal
power(lessness) and female sexuality.311 The debate over welfare re-
form is organized around a general consensus that links women's pov-
erty to three fundamental causes: women's efforts to raise their chil-
dren independent of a dominant male partner, women's expression of
nonmarital sexuality, and poor people's general unwillingness to
work.312 This consensus about the causes of poverty has, in turn, de-
fined the parameters of debatable reform, reducing the difference be-
tween the various welfare reform proposals to "nothing more than
arguments over the size of benefits, the definition of aid-worthiness,
and the means used to inculcate proper behavior.... [The
parameters of this debate have the effect of excluding arguments]
309. See note 52 and accompanying text.
310. Id. See also Part VI.B (assessing gender-neutral parenting models proposed by some
feminist reformers).
311. The Work and Responsibility Act of 1994 ('WARA"), H.R. 4605, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994), was introduced in Congress on June 21, 1994. President Clinton claimed WARA was
designed to "end welfare as we know it... to change it from a system based on dependence to a
system that works toward independence ... to change it so that the focus is clearly on work."
Backer, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 339 (cited in note 60). However, Clinton's bill was only
one of many welfare reform proposals on the table before the the Republicans won control of the
House, passing their own welfare reform bill on March 22, 1995. This bill was entitled the
Personal Responsibility Act of 1995 ("PRA"), H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The
President has since vetoed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995,
which reconciled these two bills. See Presidential Veto Message: Welfare-to-Work Provisions
Cited in Veto of Overhaul, 54 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 103 (Jan. 13, 1996) (outlining President
Clinton's objection to the bill on the grounds that it was designed to meet a budget target rather
than to enact real reform).
312. See generally Backer, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 339 (cited in note 60); Law, 131 U.
Pa. L. Rev. at 1299 (cited in note 60).
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about the ability of the socio-economic system to achieve a substantive
result, such as the eradication of poverty."313
At the same time, this consensus draws ideological ammuni-
tion from culturally dominant narratives of motherhood and female
sexual identity. These narratives condemn women's struggles for
sexual autonomy by racializing maternal power and sexual subjectiv-
ity through images such as the castrating matriarch and the pregnant
inner-city teenager.31 4
Even a casual review of recent welfare reform legislation illus-
trates how racialized images of maternal power and female sexuality
rationalize policies that will likely force poor women into greater eco-
nomic dependence on individual men. Economic dependence in-
creases women's sexual vulnerability to the men upon whom they are
forced to depend. In this sense, poor women's sexual vulnerability is
an artifact of public policies designed around the dominant cultural
understandings of white, American patriarchy. These understandings
locate the economic viability of families in the image of the male-
dominated nuclear family, rather than in alternative images of em-
powered motherhood or female sexual autonomy. Empowerment and
autonomy mean, in this context, access to the socioeconomic resources
women need to raise their children and freedom from unwanted preg-
nancies and the forms of coercion that produce them.3 15
313. Backer, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 353, 344-52 (cited in note 60) (proposing and
discussing seven assumptions defining the ideological parameters of welfare reform). The
acceptable "cures" for poverty depend, in part, on its presumed causes. If women are poor be-
cause they are unwilling to work, stand by their man, or stop having children, then the solution
is to implement policies that pressure them into altering their own behaviors which are respon-
sible for their poverty. If women are poor because there are no jobs available to them, the
available jobs do not pay a living wage, or the costs of securing child care exceed the wages paid
by available jobs, then the kinds of policies needed to end poverty become a more complicated
and potentially transformative question. Sylvia Law made this point more than ten years ago
in her path-breaking article. See generally Law, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1249 (cited in note 60).
314. Put differently, women who assert maternal power and sexual subjectivity are penal-
ized because they offend patriarchal expectations and also because they are acting "too much
like Black women." See Roberts, 5 Colum. J. Gender & L. at 148 (cited in note 60). Dorothy
Roberts made this point powerfully in answering Martha Fineman's question about why popular
cultural understandings so readily accept the idea that single motherhood is one of the main
causes of poverty despite abundant evidence to the contrary. According to Roberts, "Part of the
answer is the popular association of single motherhood with Black women. Welfare policy
penalizes Black single mothers not only because they depart from the norm of the father-headed
family, but also because they represent rebellious Black culture. To some extent, then, welfare
policy punishes white single mothers because they act too much like Black women." Id. at 148.
315. For an excellent account of the kind of reforms needed to achieve maternal empower-
ment, see generally Catharine A. Macinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality under Law, 100 Yale
L. J. 1281 (1991).
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A comparison of the Work and Responsibility Act of 1994
("WARA"), the Clinton Administration's welfare bill, and the Personal
Responsibility Act ("PRA"), the welfare bill passed by the House of
Representatives pursuant to the Republican "Contract with America,"
illustrates the limited parameters of reform.316 Both bills reflect "a
major attitudinal shift: poor women are now deemed to make better
workers than mothers."317 Accordingly, neither bill assures poor,
single mothers access to the socioeconomic resources necessary to
raise their children by themselves. On the contrary, both bills tell
poor mothers to get a husband or get a job-any job. In this respect,
the bills only differ in the extent to which they help single mothers
cope with the child care responsibilities and educational limitations
that restrict women's access to adequately paying jobs.s 1s
The specific provisions that induce all poor mothers to work
outside their homes and induce all single mothers to marry are
detailed elsewhere3 19 My point here is simply to illustrate how
welfare reformers deploy racialized images of maternal
power(lessness) and female sexuality to legitimize the economic and
psychological violence directed at poor, single mothers by recent wel-
fare reform proposals. These policies compel women to abandon their
children in order to work in dead-end jobs at sub-poverty level
compensation. To do so, they must leave their children alone at home,
in state-run day care facilities staffed by other AFDC recipients, or in
whatever private facilities are available to impoverished mothers.
316. See generally Backer, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 339 (cited in note 60). But Sylvia
Law's article shows the long history of welfare policies linking the elimination of poverty to the
male-dominated nuclear family. Law, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1252-61 (cited in note 60).
317. Backer, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 361 (cited in note 60).
318. For example, while WARA would have required states to provide child care services,
id. at 384, and job training programs, id. at 381 n.210, the PRA provides for neither, id. Indeed,
the PRA authorizes states to administer their programs in ways that only increase the economic
hardships of the unskilled and uneducated. Thus, states are authorized to pay lower benefits to
parents under 21 who have not graduated from high school or obtained a high school
equivalency degree. Id. at 384. If the lower benefit levels are supposed to provide incentives for
young mothers to finish high school, the question remains what will provide the means for them
to do so. Additionally, the PRA does not require states to provide job training programs because
poor mothers are deemed incapable of benefiting from them. As one PRA proponent expressed
it: ' The complete lack of effectiveness of government training programs is especially salient
given the very low cognitive ability levels of many mothers on AFDC." Id. at 381-82 n.210
(quoting Personal Responsibility Act: Hearings on H.R. 4 before the House Committee on
Economic and Educational Opportunities, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (prepared testimony of
Robert Rector, the Heritage Foundation) ("Rector Statement")).
319. See id. at 372-95 (cited in note 60); Roberts, 5 Colum. J. Gender & L. at 142-44 (cited
in note 60). See generally Joel F. Handler, "Ending Welfare as We Know It"---Wrong for Welfare,
Wrong for Poverty, 2 Georgetown J. on Fighting Poverty 3 (1994).
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In order to produce a consensus that these policies are rational
responses to the problem of poverty, proponents must persuade us
that poor, single mothers make better workers than mothers. 320 The
first step is to locate the economic viability of families in the image of
the male-dominated nuclear family. This makes it easier to ignore
systemic unemployment, inadequate public education, and the impact
of sexual harassment and discrimination on women's access to higher
education, high paying jobs, and commercial credit.321 The increased
hardship that poor mothers and children will experience as a result of
the proposed welfare reforms is characterized as a self-induced
phenomenon. Poor mothers will simply have to suffer the
consequences of their own behavior, that is, their willful refusal to
conform to the traditional family model. Poor mothers can conform to
this model either by refraining from nonmarital sex or by marrying
men who will help them provide for their children.322
For example, one proponent of the PRA argued that the
fundamental goals of welfare reform should be reducing illegitimacy
and restoring marriage.323  However, given the many problems
currently plaguing the male-headed nuclear family, most notably
male unemployment and domestic violence, welfare reformers need
more ammunition to justify the burdens their reforms will impose on
poor mothers and their children.3 24 Welfare reformers need, in effect,
320. For a critical analysis of this contemporary development in welfare policy, see Dorothy
E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 871 (1994).
321. As Larry CatA Backer notes, for traditional reformers, "[c]lassism, racism, sexism,
ethnocentrism, and heterosexism ... have 'nothing to do' with welfare." Backer, 30 Harv. C.R.°
C.L. L. Rev. at 397 (cited in note 60). For an excellent review of the ways sexual harassment
limits women's access to higher paying skilled and unskilled employment, see Marion Crain,
Women, Labor Unions, and Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment: The Untold Story, 4
Tex. J. Women & L. 9 (1995).
322. Both WARA and PRA link the eradication of poverty to the promotion of marriage and
explicitly condition benefit levels and eligibility in some way or another on the parents' marital
status. For example, under the PRA, mothers under 18 years of age will be denied AFDC pay-
ments for an illegitimate child unless they marry the child's biological father or a man who
adopts the child. Backer, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 338 (cited in note 60). States are also
given the option of prohibiting AFDC payments and housing benefits for mothers between the
ages of 18 and 20, unless the mother is the legal or biological parent of another child not born
out of wedlock. Id. WARA would promote marriage by making AFDC-UP a permanent and
mandatory program in states receiving federal funds. Id. at 387. Since AFDC-UP makes
benefits available to two-parent families, it eliminates one program-driven disincentive for poor
parents to marry. Id. at 388 n.242. WARA also encourages marriage by forgiving child support
arrearage in instances where poor "[p]arents conform to the traditional family model and marry
or remarry." Id. at 393 n.269.
323. Id. at 381-82 n.210 (cited in note 60) (quoting Rector Statement) (cited in note 318)).
324. Indeed, the objectives driving this push to make poor mothers work outside their
homes are particularly curious given the fact, for example, that a primary source of work pro-
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to discredit single motherhood as a viable alternative to the male-
dominated nuclear family.
Welfare reformers attempt to discredit single motherhood by
deploying their rhetoric along two trajectories. First, they attack the
female-headed family as inherently pathological and project the image
of "fatherless children" as irreparably deprived. In doing so, WARA
proponents pay some lip service to the fact that "many single parents
do a heroic job of raising their children."32 5  PRA rhetoric is, by
contrast, more vicious. 3 6 This difference, however, is purely cosmetic
because both proposals operate within the same ideological
framework. This ideology believes poverty is caused by the inherent
inadequacies of the "fatherless family," rather than by the political
inadequacies of a socioeconomic system that continues to produce
poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy. The reformers' message is
clear: single mothers are simply incapable of raising healthy, well-
adjusted, and self-disciplined children-not primarily because they
are poor, but because they are single. Accordingly, welfare policies
jects under WARA will involve staffing the day care facilities the Act provides for. Hence,
"recipients would still be receiving a standard amount of alms in return for which they would be
expected to care for dependent children." Id. at 393 n.270. This suggests that WARA's drafters
believe paying women to take care of other women's children is, in itself, more conducive to the
work-ethic and family values than paying them to take care of their own children by themselves.
The PRA and its proponents attack these AFDC-staffed day care centers from a different
perspective. The government should not spend any money to facilitate women's ability to
handle the conflicting demands of dependent child care and wage labor. Women can find a
husband, give up the children they cannot care for to adoption or orphanages, give up their
freedom by living in supervised residential group homes for unwed mothers, or suffer the
consequences of their own sexual activity. See id. at 388-89 n.246.
325. See id. at 386-87 n.235. Despite this lip service, the White House assessment is this:
"Poverty, especially long-term poverty, and welfare dependency are often associated with
growing up in a one-parent family." Id. Of course, the unaddressed problems begin with
another question: What else is poverty "often associated with?"
326. PRA drafters unabashedly blame single parenting for the high incidence of criminal
activity in poor, minority neighborhoods. "[T]he likelihood that a young black man will engage
in criminal activities doubles if he is raised without a father and triples if he lives in a neighbor-
hood with a high concentration of single-parent families." PRA § 100(3)(o). The PRA also notes
that "the greater the incidence of single parent families in a neighborhood, the higher the
incidence of violent crime and burglary." Id. § 103(p). The rhetorical force of these viciously
unfair assaults on poor, single mothers draws significant impetus from the increased circulation
these themes have enjoyed in the mainstream media. See, for example, Paul Magnusson and
Howard Gleckman, Reforming Welfare, Bus. Week 58 (June 13, 1994) ("A shocking number of
today's inner-city population is growing up without fathers, without their incomes, and without
the stability of a two-parent family.... The result is a downward economic spiral") (quoted in
Backer, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 385 n.229 (cited in note 60)). In a recent work, George
Gilder has described the "fatherless child" in this manner: "Like other fatherless youths, black
boys are less responsible, less able to defer gratifications, less interested in achievement, more
prone to crime, and even, as other studies have shown, lower in I.Q. than boys from intact
families of either race." George Gilder, Men and Marriage 80-81 (Pelican, 1992) (quoted in
Backer, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 399 n.299 (cited in note 60)).
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that enable the female-headed family to survive the hardships of
poverty are viewed as only exacerbating the more fundamental
problem of fatherlessness itself.32 7
The second rhetorical trajectory welfare reformers use to dis-
credit single motherhood traces the origins of the female-headed fam-
ily to the image of irresponsible and promiscuous sexual activity,
which welfare benefits only encourage. The Republican "Contract
with America" makes the point like this:
Currently, the federal government provides young girls with the following deal:
Have an illegitimate baby and taxpayers will guarantee you cash, food stamps,
and medical care, plus a host of other benefits.... It's time to change the
incentives and make responsible parenthood the norm and not the
exception.
328
This image of sexual irresponsibility is created by projecting
images of pregnant teenagers and nonstop breeders.329 The assump-
tion that both groups of women are intentionally deciding to have
(more) children "in order to 'cash-in' on welfare benefits" justifies the
denial of assistance. 3 0 Additionally, both images draw much of their
venom from their racialization.331 This rhetorical emphasis on female
327. Fineman, The Neutered Mother at 110-18 (cited in note 60).
328. Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas, eds., Contract with America: The Bold Plan by Rep.
Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey, and the House Republicans to Change the Nation 75
(Republican National Committee, 1994).
329. "Breeders" are poor women who continue to have more children while they are on wel-
fare, thus triggering the need for measures like the family cap. See Jennifer S. Madden, Family
Caps Threaten Women and Their Children, 10 Berkeley Women's L. J. 171, 171-75 (1995). See
WARA § 502 (permitting states to limit benefit increases for children born to parents already on
AFDC); PRA §106(a) (prohibiting states from paying benefits for any child born to an AFDC
recipient or to a woman who received benefits during the ten months prior to the child's birth).
330. See Carla M. da Luz and Pamela C. Weckerly, Will the New Republican Majority in
Congress Wage Old Battles Against Women?, 5 U.C.L.A. Women's L. J. 501, 528 (1995). The
authors cogently attack these assumptions, citing evidence that "teenage mothers account for
approximately five percent of AFDC recipients" and suggesting alternative reasons for teenage
pregnancy, including forced sex. Id. The authors also cite studies illustrating that "teenage
motherhood varies inversely with AFDC benefit levels; Mississippi offers the lowest welfare
benefits, yet has the second highest rate of unwed pregnancy." Id. at 529. These studies
suggest that eliminating welfare benefits will not reduce teenage pregnancies because teenage
girls do not get pregnant in order to obtain welfare. Id.
331. Roberts, 5 Colum. J. Gender & L. at 148-49 (cited in note 60); Backer, 30 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. at 348 n.42 (cited in note 60). The images of the pregnant teenager and non-stop
breeder are decidedly racialized despite the fact that the teen pregnancy epidemic did not start
until white teenage pregnancy increased and Black teen pregnancy decreased. See da Luz and
Weckerly, 5 U.C.L.A. Women's L. J. at 528 n.133 (cited in note 330). Similarly, the "breeder" is
usually associated with the Black/Hispanic mother of four with another on the way, despite the
fact that there are more white women on AFDC than either Black or Hispanic. See Backer, 30
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 397-98 (cited in note 60).
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sexual promiscuity deflects attention from the fact that the work re-
quirements and reduced benefit levels in both WARA and the PRA
will eventually make it more difficult for all poor, single mothers to
raise their own children effectively.
The images celebrating maternal power and matrifocal ex-
tended families discussed in Part III would reorganize the welfare
debate around very different proposals by shifting the major points of
reference. First, the narratives of maternal power and stability focus
attention on the fact that women, particularly lower-class, minority
women, are often compelled to compensate for paternal powerless-
ness. While male poverty is an image strikingly absent in the welfare
rhetoric that proposes to end poverty by promoting marriage and en-
forcing child support obligations, 32 female-headed households are
often one of the coping mechanisms through which women respond to
male poverty and abuse.333
More importantly, these images of maternal power provide
resources for dismissing the assumption that female-headed
households are inherently pathological. Re-valuing single mother-
hood is certainly a matter of acknowledging the empowering and in-
spiring ways in which poor women often experience their own moth-
erhood. 334 But it is also a matter of seeing the ways in which matrifo-
cal extended families are not simply coping mechanisms. They are, on
the contrary, alternative child-rearing arrangements that are poten-
tially psychologically and economically superior to the male-domi-
nated nuclear family so favored by white, American patriarchy. 35
From this perspective, the problem plaguing the welfare poor is not
fatherlessness, particularly not when fathers are themselves poor or
332. According to Backer, "[WARA] concentrates on the need to force fathers to support
their children ... only because, for WARA drafters, that obligation represents a substantial
source of cash. To further the collection of this mother lode of funds, WARA even establishes
procedures for automatically reviewing and updating child support awards. The problem is that
these men often do not have sufficient resources to support their children." Backer, 30 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 394 (cited in note 60) (emphasis added). See Roger J.R. Levesque, Targeting
"Deadbeat" Dads: The Problem with the Direction of Welfare Reform, 15 Hamline J. Pub. L. &
Pol. 1, 32-33 (1994). These child support proposals "fail to address poor fathers' lack of
resources and their inability to lift children out of poverty." Id. at 34 (quoted in Backer, 30
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 394 n.278 (cited in note 60)).
333. "As an economic cushion, AFDC does offer poor women some choice which, however
limited, increases their bargaining power at home and on the job .... For women in particular,
the social wage offers additional protection against entering into or remaining in marriages re-
gardless of their safety or security." Mimi Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women: Social
Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present 314 (South End, 1988) (quoted in Backer, 30
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 389 (cited in note 60)).
334. See, for example, Roberts, 5 Colum. J. Gender & L. at 149-51 (cited in note 60).
335. See notes 150-60 and accompanying text (discussing the cultural logic and psy-
choanalytical impact of child rearing practices in matrifocal extended family arrangements).
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abusive. The problem is poverty itself. Policies that deny single
mothers necessary resources in the hopes that this will pressure
women into marriage may increase women's sexual vulnerability to
any man who offers to help out, but they will not end poverty. On the
contrary, such policies only deflect our attention from the need for
systemic reforms, which the scapegoating of welfare mothers seems
determined to displace.
B. Images of Women and Men in Child Custody Battles
Welfare reform debates constitute only one social space in
which dominant cultural images of maternal power(lessness) and fe-
male sexual morality are used to rationalize public policies that in-
crease women's vulnerability to men. The welfare debates show how
these images reinforce policies that leverage women's poverty into
enforced relations of dependence on dominant male partners.
Similarly, child custody controversies illustrate how these images
rationalize legal doctrines that leverage women's desire to raise our
children into enforced compliance with judicial expectations of
maternal deference to paternal prerogatives and judicial norms of
female sexual "morality."
Subsection 1 of this Section draws on Professor Karen
Czapanskiy's impressive analysis of the ways in which child custody
laws construct a gendered structure of parental rights and
obligations.336 Through this gendered structure, state power operates
to undermine women's potential for autonomy, both as mothers and
as sexual subjects. Significant restrictions are imposed on women's
maternal authority and sexual autonomy in order to preserve for men
the opportunity, but not the obligation, to be "fathers" to their
biological children.337 Through these restrictions, motherhood is
336. See generally Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental
Equality, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1415 (1991).
337. See id. at 1420-21, 1436-38. Although current legal discourse pretends to regulate
custodial arrangements in non-gendered terms by referring to the parties regulated as the
custodial/non-custodial parent or, in joint-custody cases, as the residential/non-residential
parent, these gender-neutral formulations obscure the sexism embedded in the social relations
maintained through custody laws: the custodial/residential parents who appear in the court
documents are almost always mothers, while non-custodial/non-residential parents are almost
always fathers. Ignoring the gendered structure of this social reality simply deflects attention
from the fact that custody laws are important instruments through which state power
participates in the subordination of motherhood. Fineman, The Neutered Mother at 88-89 (cited
in note 60). Moreover, as Martha Fineman has persuasively argued, gender-neutral
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constructed as a position of vulnerability and ever-present exposure to
coercive intervention.
Subsection 2 is a critical contribution to the feminist debate
over alternative solutions. Starting from a common understanding
that the structure of parental rights and obligations constructs
motherhood as a position of gendered responsibilities and
vulnerability, feminist legal scholars have offered two alternative
reform trajectories. The first trajectory, represented in Czapanskiy's
analysis and the work of Professor Barbara Stark, would alleviate
these hardships by using images of the "egalitarian family" and
"gender-neutral parenthood" to shift some of the burdens of mothering
to fathers. 338 The second trajectory, most powerfully articulated in the
work of Professor Martha Fineman, would pursue legal reforms that
empower women to fulfill their maternal responsibilities by securing
mothers' access to the economic resources and decision-making
autonomy with which mothers could quite happily and effectively
raise their children on their own.339 My intervention draws on the
images of maternal authority in Black and Latin cultures to explain
why feminists advocating these competing alternatives can view each
others' proposals as decidedly anti-feminist. In order to understand
the stakes in this debate, we need to understand the different cultural
logics in which the alternative images of motherhood that rationalize
these competing proposals are nested.
1. Locating Women's Vulnerability in the Gendered Structure of
Parental Rights and Obligations
Professor Czapanskiy's analysis of the legal doctrines applied
in resolving disputes over the care and custody of children provides
compelling evidence that the structure of parental rights and
obligations is both gendered and hierarchical. Her analysis shows
how women's maternal autonomy and authority are legally restricted
to preserve the prerogatives of what she calls "volunteer fatherhood."
Volunteer fatherhood refers to the legal doctrines that enable men to
terminology hides the extent to which the debate over custody reform trajectories is precisely a
debate about the future of "motherhood." Id. at 76-89.
338. Czapanskiy, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1416 n.4 (cited in note 336) (proposing to use the
gender-neutral image of parenthood to reconceptualize legal doctrines and practical
arrangements through which parental rights and responsibilities are enforced in a variety of
child custody contexts). According to Czapanskiy, "[a] central goal of the reconceptualization is
to eliminate the notion that mothers and fathers, as a matter of nature, are different in relation
to their children." Id.
339. Fineman, The Neutered Mother at 177-81, 233 (cited in note 60).
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assert paternal rights over and against maternal preferences, without
establishing effective mechanisms for mothers to enforce paternal
responsibilities on reluctant fathers. The correlative of voluntary
fatherhood is what Czapanskiy terms "draftee motherhood." Draftee
motherhood imposes on mothers the obligation to defer to fathers'
discretionary assertions of paternal prerogatives and enables men to
enforce this maternal obligation in court.3 40
According to Czapanskiy, the volunteer fatherhood/draftee
motherhood dichotomy organizes a legal structure in which men enjoy
rights without responsibilities, while women are required to assume
responsibilities without corresponding rights. This structure is evi-
denced by cases in which mothers have been denied the authority to
make significant life-choices for themselves and their children in or-
der to preserve the opportunity (but not the obligation) for fathers to
maintain even minimal relationships with their children.
One example of constricted parental self-determination is found where a cus-
todial parent can be denied the right to move the child to another location if
the move will interfere with the visitation rights of the noncustodial
parent.... The self-determination issues may be quite substantial for the
parent, however: she may want to relocate with a new spouse or partner, she
may want to return to the support of her family of origin, or she may be unable
to find employment or educational opportunities without relocating.341
Another example is found in the use of state power to police
the sexual relations of custodial parents, both before 342 and after di-
340. For example, Czapanskiy's analysis of the rights of unwed parents illustrates the way
the correlatives of "volunteer fatherhood" and "draftee motherhood," are constructed in and
through the procedural and evidentiary standards that distinguish paternity actions from le-
gitimation proceedings. While paternity actions are usually brought by mothers to impose fi-
nancial obligations upon reluctant fathers, legitimation proceedings are usually brought by fa-
thers to assert paternal rights over and against the will of mothers and/or their current hus-
bands. According to Czapanskiy, "[t]he mother-initiated paternity action.., is accompanied by
strict procedural and evidentiary burdens. Their purpose is to protect the man from having
fatherhood wrongly thrust upon him. The father-initiated legitimation proceeding... usually is
accompanied by more lenient procedural and evidentiary burdens." Czapanskiy, 38 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. at 1430-31 (cited in note 336). As a consequence, unwed mothers have less power than
unwed fathers to impose upon the other parent of their child the obligation to share parenting
responsibilities. Id.
341. Id. at 1436-37.
342. For example, Professor Fineman cites a number of recent cases indicating the extent
to which marital infidelity can impact the determinations made on issues relating to divorce,
alimony, and child custody. See Fineman, The Neutered Mother at 168 n.7 (citing Silver v.
Silver, 1992 WL 157489 (Conn. 1992) (holding that the wife must answer questions on
deposition relating to adultery because, although no longer a crime, it is relevant to the issue of
divorce, alimony, and child custody); Farris v. Farris, 532 So. 2d 1041, 1043 (Ala. 1988) (holding
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vorce. 343 Although some courts have refused to modify custody awards
based on a custodial parent's sexual relations with third parties, oth-
ers have agreed to such modifications.3" The custodial parent's vul-
nerability is further exacerbated by the fact that custody determina-
tion and modification proceedings turn upon fact-sensitive assess-
ments of "the best interests of the child," a standard that is both inde-
terminate and subjective. 345 Custody decrees can also be repeatedly
reopened and modified at the court's discretion or upon a showing of
"changed circumstances."346  The cumulative effect of these legal
doctrines is that custody laws become the vehicle through which state
that the wife's adultery justified the denial of alimony and custody to the wife); Adams v.
Adams, 374 S.E.2d 450, 452-53 (N.C. 1988) (holding that the husband's adultery was grounds
for requiring him to pay alimony).
343. See generally Annotation, Custodial Parent's Sexual Relations with Third Person as
Justifying Modification of Child Custody Order, 100 A.L.R.3d 625 (1995); Nancy B. Shernow,
Comment, Recognizing Constitutional Rights of Custodial Parents: The Primacy of the Post.
Divorce Family in Child Custody Modification Proceedings, 35 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 677 (1988).
344. The legal standard for determining whether a custodial parent's sexual relations with
third parties warrants modification of custody varies across jurisdictions. See 100 A.L.R.3d at
629-88 (cited in note 343); Shernow, 35 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 699-700 (cited in note 343). For
example, some states use "the best interests of the child" standard, while others apply a
rebuttable presumption of unfitness. This presumption can be overcome if the custodial parent
marries her lover or ends the relationship. But see Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill.2d 337, 400 N.E.2d
421 (1979), in which the state supreme court held that the mere fact of non-marital cohabitation
by the custodial parent established a conclusive presumption of unfitness, warranting
modification of custody.
345. Sylvia A. Law and Patricia Hennessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of Family Law, 69
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 345, 348 & n.15 (1993) (noting that an overwhelming majority of states apply
some version of the "best interests of the child test"). The "best interests" test involves the
assessment of numerous complex factors, such as the "moral fitness of the parties," their
financial status, the quality of the home environment, and the need for stability in the child's
life, and often "requires a prediction about the future" Id. at 348-50. According to the authors,
"[c]ases tried under a 'best interese standard usually require expert testimony because the
underlying facts are not easily observed .... The 'best interese standard favors the party with
the greatest resources to mount an expert-based claim. In most cases that is the man." Id. at
350.
346. Traditional custody modification analysis operates on the principle that a custody de-
cree is never final or permanent because the overriding concern is "the best interests of the
child." Courts retain jurisdication over child custody issues and have the discretion to order
modifications that they consider to be in the child's best interests at any time until the child
becomes an adult, subject only to review for abuse of discretion. See Joan G. Wexler,
Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 Yale L. J. 757 (1985) (criticizing the
opportunities for abuse and harassment created by legal standards that permit repeated
motions for custody modification); Shernow, 35 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 694 (cited in note 343)
(same). Some jurisdictions now follow section 409 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.
Section 409 has two provisions. Provision (a) prohibits motions to modify a custody decree
within two years after its date, absent evidence that "the child's present environment may
endanger seriously his physical, moral or emotional health." Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
§ 409 (1987). Provision (b) permits modification upon a finding of "changed circumstances" only
if (1) the custodian agrees, (2) the child has been integrated into the petitioner's family with the
consent of the custodian, or (3) the child's present environment seriously endangers his
physical, mental, moral, or emotional health. Id.
980
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intervention is available to enforce maternal deference to paternal
prerogatives and compliance with judicial norms of female sexual
morality. On pain of losing custody of their children, women are
subjected to judicial orders regulating their sexual activities, 347 as well
as constant surveillance by their children's fathers.3 48
The justification for the denial of maternal autonomy is always
"the best interests of the child." The idea is that having both parents
involved in the child's life is in the child's best interests. 3 49
Czapanskiy's analysis demonstrates, however, that "the best interests
of the child" really translates into "the discretionary preferences of
the father." While the custodial parent's (almost always the mother's)
obligation to facilitate visitation is enforced through a variety of legal
procedures, ranging from modification of custody to contempt
proceedings, the noncustodial parent's (almost always the father's)
failure to visit his children and the burdens this imposes on mothers
and children go completely unremedied.350 Indeed, paternal immunity
from any legal obligation to exercise visitation rights for the benefit of
children or to provide personal services to their children is so well-
established that it has almost never been litigated. One exception
Czapanskiy discusses is the case of Louden v. Olpin.351 This case is
347. See, for example, McKimn v. McKim, 440 So. 2d 562, 563-64 (Ala. App. 1983) (deciding
that the trial court's decision to transfer legal custody of a teenage girl from her divorced
mother to the state social services agency was properly based on the fact that the mother had
violated an order directing her to refrain from permitting men to visit her).
348. See, for example, Huhn v. Hulm, 484 N.W.2d 303, 305 (S.D. 1992) (upholding the trial
court's "novel approach" denying the father's custody modification petition based on the
mother's agreement to reform the behavior that triggered the father's petition: allowing a male
friend to spend nights in her bedroom when the daughter was in her apartment, and her lack of
cooperation in raising the child Catholic. According to the court, the father would simply have
to revive the issue if the mother continued or resumed inappropriate behavior).
349. See generally Annotation, Propriety of Awarding Joint Custody of Children, 17
A.L.R.4th 1013 (1982).
350. Czapanskiy, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1472-80 (cited in note 336) (criticizing the lack of
remedies and proposing practical reforms). Other commentators have noted similar and related
problems. Amy Hirsch notes: "Joint legal custody rarely imposes additional responsibilities on
the nonresidential parent while at the same time enabling him to exercise effective veto power
over decisions of the caretaker. It also forces battered women to have continued contact with
abusive spouses, providing opportunities for continued violence. There is also evidence that
support orders are substantially lower in joint custody cases, even where the actual child care
arrangements are no different from sole custody with visitation." Amy E. Hirsch, Income
Deeming in the AFDC Programi Using Dual Track Family Law to Make Poor Women Poorer, 16
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 713, 738-39 (1987-88).
351. 118 Cal.App.3d 565, 568, 173 Cal.Rptr. 447, 449 (1981). Thus, Czapanskiy quotes the
California Appeals Court:
Under the Uniform Parentage Act, the father has a privilege of visitation. Appellant
wishes us to extend that holding to include a reciprocal right on the part of the child in
that she may compel the noncustodial parent to visit. This we decline to do. There is
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notable only because it expressly acknowledges that however much
paternal visitation rights may be enforced against mothers for the
sake of "the child's best interests," visitation rights are a paternal
privilege, not a child's legal right.
The restrictions imposed through the best interests of the child
doctrine on maternal autonomy appear all the more hypocritical given
evidence that post-divorce ruptures in the father/child relationship
are better explained by fathers' weak attachments to their children
than by mothers' efforts to obstruct this relationship.352 Indeed,
mothers frequently wish their former husbands would play larger
roles in raising the children. On the other hand, fathers tend to be-
come increasingly disinterested in maintaining these relationships.
They tend to assert denial of visitation complaints only in response to
support enforcement proceedings. 353 As Czapanskiy persuasively ar-
gues, the fact that mothers and children have limited avenues for en-
forcing the nonfinancial responsibilities of parenthood on reluctant
fathers shows the extent to which fatherhood is legally constructed as
a voluntary enterprise. The law is more concerned with protecting
the father's interest in his children (or in dominating and harassing
his former wife), than in the children's right to their father's care and
involvement in their lives.354
Through this legal structure, motherhood is constructed as a
position of vulnerability that cuts across the class and racial stratifi-
cation between women. Significant decisions mothers make can be
unmade through state intervention at the father's request. Women's
freedom and maternal decision-making power are legally restricted
neither statutory nor case law to support such a contention.... The court cannot
compel a noncustodial parent... to care for and love and visit with the child. The court
can only compel the parent to provide monetary support.... Respondent has been
designated as the father and he has duties and obligations to fulfill, but the fact remains
that the court cannot order him to act as a father. While it is true that the state has a
public policy interest in wanting parents and children to be together, it still remains
that the court cannot order the family to stay together. Appellant argues that
compelling the father to visit now will make him love the child and in time his visits will
become voluntary. This may or may not occur, but in any event it is not up to the courts
to make such a decision.
Czapanskiy, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1436 n.72 (cited in note 336).
352. Czapanskiy notes a number of studies evidencing both points. Czapanskiy, 38
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1449-50 & nn.116-23 (cited in note 336).
353. Czapanskiy reports of her review of nearly four hundred cases: "In almost every case,
the denial of visitation had not been raised until the noncustodial parent had already been sued
for child support. That is, in almost no case did the noncustodial parent seek enforcement of a
right to visitation before there was a monetary claim." Id. at 1450-51 n.123.
354. Id. at 1442-46.
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for the benefit of men who cannot be legally compelled to assume the
day-to-day responsibilities of caring for their children.
2. Contested Solutions: From Gender-Neutral Parenting to
Matrifocal Families
Most feminists would agree that the gendered structure of pa-
rental rights and responsibilities imposes debilitating restrictions on
women's autonomy, both as mothers and as sexual subjects.
Nevertheless, the different images of motherhood reviewed in Part III
of this Article suggest radically different solutions. For example,
Czapanskiy locates the solution to women's maternal subordination in
the image of gender-neutral parenting, which she develops by in-
voking the ethical framework articulated in the political philosophy of
John Rawls. Professor Barbara Stark advocates a similar solution,
grounding her proposals in the white feminist psychoanalytic theories
of motherhood also reviewed in Part II. 355 In both proposals, the im-
age of gender-neutral parenting is used to promote policies aimed at
liberating women by requiring fathers to undertake the parenting re-
sponsibilities ordinarily assumed by or imposed upon mothers.
In a path-breaking re-visioning of Anglo-American family law,
Professor Martha Fineman advocates a very different reform trajec-
tory.356 Fineman proposes to deregulate and privatize the sexual rela-
tionship that currently constitutes heterosexual marriage as the legal
foundation of the family. Fineman suggests reorganizing the legal
family around the Mother/Child, rather than the HusbandWife, rela-
tion.357 Fineman's proposal offers a provocative vision of the kinds of
legal doctrines and public policies that could simultaneously promote
the family and reduce women's sexual vulnerability to men. These
reforms would locate the solution to women's subordination in policies
that reinforce maternal autonomy by ensuring mothers access to the
resources necessary to raise their children and by eliminating the le-
gal avenues through which voluntary fathers are able to trigger state
interventions that undermine women's freedom.
355. See notes 85-108 and accompanying text.
356. See generally Fineman, The Neutered Mother (cited in note 60).
357. Id. Fineman successfully defends her decision to invoke the culturally loaded image of
Mother in order to identify the primary familial relation. As she explains, however, Mother is
for most practical legal purposes a metaphoric image, which organizes the legal incidents of
family around any caretaker-dependent relation and acknowledges that some men can be
Mother. Id at 233-36.
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The vehement opposition the "maternal empowerment" trajec-
tory tends to trigger depends upon the conjured images of individual
women locked into predetermined social roles and gendered identities
and upon the image of paternal rights subjected to maternal discre-
tion. Indeed, one of the many strengths in Fineman's analysis is that
it proposes radical reforms in which the ideological points of conten-
tion are more fundamental than any debate over operational specif-
ics. 358 Approaching this debate in terms of its relevance to the femi-
nist struggle against rape, the task is to assess which trajectory is
more likely to secure women's rights to sexual autonomy and the
expression of sexual desire, without fear of rape, harassment, or other
forms of coercion. While we may now see how that question relates to
the issue of which reform trajectory is more likely to liberate
motherhood from the cultural expectations and legal doctrines that
promote the male-dominated nuclear family, my purpose in this
Subsection is to suggest how the images of maternal authority and
the practices of matrifocal extended families described in Part III.B
might be deployed in this debate.
Viewed through a cultural logic of matrifocality, the images
deployed in support of gender-neutral parenting warrant resistance
because they are highly destructive of identity positions and norma-
tive commitments through which interpersonal relations are consti-
tuted as familial relationships rather than contractual arrangements.
Czapanskiy's work is particularly valuable because, by expressly in-
voking the Rawlsian original position,3 59 it helps illuminate the ways
358. For example, Czapanskiy suggests a number of practical reforms that could be used as
much to reinforce maternal authority as to effectuate the new substantive legal obligations of
gender-neutral parenting. These practical suggestions include proposals to make visitation and
care-taking responsibilities a right enforceable against nonresidential parents for the benefit of
their children; to off-set financial support obligations against care-taking work and vice-versa; to
require parenting plans that specifically delineate the allocation of care-taking work as between
residential and non-residential parents; to establish progressively coercive remedies for the non-
performance of care-taking responsibilities, for example, by requiring nonresidential parents to
pay residential parents for babysitting services or by increasing support awards to compensate
the residential parent for doing the parenting work that should have been done by the non-
performing parent. Czapanskiy, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1474-76 (cited in note 336). The appeal
of these practical solutions suggests that the difference, at least initially, between feminist
reform trajectories is not so much in the operational specifics, but in how the law conceptualizes
parents. As Czapanskiy, herself observes: "A question about how the law conceptualizes parents
...addresses a large problem, not a specific detail, and thus is capable of carrying a large
burden of expressiveness about law and society." Id. at 1463.
359. According to Czapanskiy, parental rights and obligations should be gender-neutral
because that is the arrangement most likely to emerge as the negotiated outcome if one imag-
ined that all individuals were asked to design the rules governing family relationships without
knowing what position they, themselves, would eventually occupy in the family. See id. at 1463-
65 ("According to [Rawlsian] methodology, a fair method for designing a good society would be to
deny the designers knowledge of what position they would find themselves in once the society
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in which the image of gender-neutral parenting displaces "separate
spheres ideologies." 360 Professor Czapanskiy, however, replaces these
ideologies with the equally contingent and highly problematic ideology
of "abstract individualism." In this ideology, a person's identity as an
individual purportedly displaces the gendered specificities,
socioeconomic positioning, and historical contexts that are partly im-
posed upon and partly negotiated by particular men and women. As
individuals defined primarily by the faculties of reason and will, men
and women are expected to renegotiate inherited traditions and social
patterns, replacing them with the freedom and fluidity of contractual
arrangements.
It is certainly true, and much of my Article is an attempt to
explore the transformative potential embedded in the fact, that an
individual's identity is constructed through the negotiation of cultur-
ally contested images and identity-enforcing narratives and practices.
Moreover, an important task for feminists is to identify those images
that can further the ultimate objectives of securing women's auton-
omy and reducing our sexual vulnerability to men. The question,
however, is whether these objectives will be better achieved by pro-
moting the image of gender-neutral parenting or by reconfiguring the
substantive content of gendered identity positions.
The answer depends initially on recognizing that these alter-
native approaches look very different, depending on the ideological
position through which they are viewed. From inside the ideology of
abstract individualism, gender-neutral parenting looks like the tri-
umph of reason over custom, the fluidity of individual freedom tem-
pered by self-legislated commitments. From the outside in, however,
gender-neutral parenting looks like another victory for the commodity
form in which all interpersonal relations are increasingly divorced
from the normative imperatives of self-sacrifice and interdependence
and reconceptualized as negotiable contractual arrangements.
Conversely, from inside the cultural logic of matrifocality, legal re-
forms aimed at promoting maternal autonomy look like a victory over
the patriarchal devaluation of female power, opening up possibilities
for the cultural production of new images of women and narratives of
were created"). The problem with this approach is that it presupposes an ideological disposition
towards conceptualizing inter-familial commitments and obligations as fluid and negotiable.
360. The common element in proposals promoting gender-neutral parenting is an attack on
the dispositions, expectations, and self-representations inscribed in what is called "a separate




empowered femininity; from the outside in, this reform trajectory ap-
pears to reimpose the gendered scripts that feminists have struggled
to escape.
The important point is not that these ideological positions may
be fundamentally incommensurable, but rather that "abstract indi-
vidualism" is an identity position that is much more feasible for some
women than for others. Inhabiting this position depends on access to
resources and exposure to ideas and practices that are differentially
constituted across class and culture-including access to the liberal
colleges that purport to critique all inherited social relations (except
the commodity form). Rather than exploring the impact of different
cultural values, personal experiences, and socioeconomic resources on
women's inclination to negotiate and our ability to enforce gender-
neutral interpersonal arrangements with men, proponents of this
reform trajectory simply assume that "the ideology of separate
spheres" is in cultural decline and that its ultimate demise would be
universally beneficial. 361 Even its proponents acknowledge that this
assumption is still unsubstantiated by the lived experiences of most
women.
362
This assumption can be directly contested by recognizing the
feminist possibilities embedded in a "maternal empowerment"
trajectory. Fineman argues in favor of designing public policies that
ensure single mothers access to the socioeconomic resources and
autonomy they need to raise their children by themselves because this
trajectory could eliminate many of the socially constructed vulner-
abilities to which motherhood currently exposes individual women.
The effort to develop an appreciation of the cultural logic of matrifo-
cality would further progress in this direction by increasing our expo-
sure to the counter-narratives of maternal power and authority. This
would be a significant development because the ideology of freedom
through abstract individualism is only one of the imperatives driving
feminist proponents of gender-neutral parenthood. The other impera-
361. See Czapanskiy, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1460 (cited in note 336). See also Stark, 38
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1504-08 (cited in note 61).
362. On the one hand, Czapanskiy claims this ideology is in decline. See Czapanskiy, 38
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1460 (cited in note 336). On the other hand, she is clearly aware that this
ideology still organizes much of what she calls "modern America," citing evidence and discussing
the impact of the "second shift' responsibilities still shouldered by large numbers of "modern"
women. Id. at 1452-57. Czapanskiy, however, acknowledges the gendered structure of
individual habits and preferences only to dismiss them through the ideology of abstract indi-
vidualism. See id. at 1464-65 ("[O]ne must ask whether gender socialization and patriarchal
privilege animate such [gendered] preferences more than human impulses untainted by power
relations").
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tive is what Professor Stark has called "the hostility of both sexes
toward the 'all-powerful mother.' "363
Like Czapanskiy, Professor Stark advocates gender neutrality
in the allocation of parental rights and obligations, focusing
specifically on post-divorce custody determinations.364 According to
Stark, women's socioeconomic subordination is not produced by
divorce,365 but by a system in which the gendered division of labor
forces women to assume the primary responsibilities of caring for
children at their own expense.36 6 Thus, she concludes that divorce
would have a less devastating impact on women and children if the
division of labor in the workplace and the family were gender-neutral.
Joint custody arrangements and other legal reforms promoting
gender-neutral parenthood are a means toward that end.
Stark's analysis is particularly valuable (and disturbing) be-
cause it is grounded in the feminist psychoanalytic theories of moth-
erhood examined in Part III.A.367 Her approach precludes "maternal
empowerment" reform proposals like Fineman's because the psycho-
analytic theories that drive her arguments preclude the possibility
that the gendered division of labor might have a less devastating im-
pact after divorce if women's mothering were socially valued and sup-
ported independently from the male-dominated nuclear family. In
Stark's formulation, gender-neutral parenting is a feminist impera-
tive, not simply because it would help to alleviate women's socioeco-
nomic subordination (by shifting the socioeconomic burdens of moth-
erhood onto men), but more significantly because it would liberate us
from the psycho-sexual dysfunctions purportedly engendered by ex-
clusive female parenting. Thus Stark argues that:
363. Stark, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1521 (cited in note 61).
364. See id. at 1483 (criticizing the gendered structure of post-divorce custody
arrangements using feminist psychoanalytical theory).
365. According to Stark, "the most egregious consequence of divorce is that it perpetuates
and exacerbates the effects of patriarchy, or, to use Gayle Rubin's apt phrase, the sex/gender
system. What is most deplorable about the legal process ofdivorce is that it masks this. It is the
sex/gender system, rather than divorce, that is responsible for women's impoverishment." Id. at
1493 (emphasis added).
366. Stark notes that, "[u]pon divorce, women usually get physical custody of the children,
and the attendant expenses and impediments to their own career advancement and financial
autonomy. Men are charged with some continuing financial responsibility, although their pay-
ments usually taper off, and they are rarely expected to assume a significant care-giving role."
Id. at 1493-94 (footnotes omitted).
367. According to Stark, "divorce law not only incorporates, but is structured by, subcon-
scious notions of gender. If we are to constructively recast rights and responsibilities under di-
vorce law, we have to understand the 'dreams'--the subconscious reality-in which they begin."
Id. at 1487 (footnotes omitted).
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Although joint custody raises troubling questions for most of us, it becomes
increasingly appealing, individually and collectively, as gender roles become
more fluid. We recognize the problems associated with exclusive female par-
enting. It not only puts women in a precarious financial situation, but impedes
the development of an autonomous "subjective" self. For children, sole female
custody after divorce not only reinforces gender stereotypes and misogyny, but
results in often severe material deprivation, since they share in the "feminiza-
tion of poverty."
368
By proposing to read child custody practices through "psycho-
feminist" theory, Stark's work provides an excellent point of depar-
ture for re-reading both current custody laws and feminist reform
proposals through Stanley Kurtz's psychoanalytic account of matrifo-
cal extended family arrangements. 369 These two alternative readings
support very different law reform trajectories because they project
very different visions of the kinds of family structures and child care
arrangements most likely to promote female autonomy and reduce
heterosexual misogyny. Indeed, read against Kurtz's cross-cultural
psychoanalytic analysis, Stark's work makes it easier to see how the
image of gender-neutral parenting is a fundamentally misguided and
decidedly misogynistic "solution" to the same misogyny it seeks to
combat.
First, while Stark is careful to object to compulsory joint cus-
tody,3 70 her arguments provide substantial ammunition for those
forces that have made it a policy preference-even over maternal op-
position.3 71 According to Stark, "[t]he focus here is on the reasons
parents reject such [joint custody] arrangements."72 But if, as she
argues, the intrapsychic structures produced by female mothering
drive individual women and men into making destructive life choices
that reproduce women's subordinate position in the sex-gender sys-
tem, then laws and policies that promote male mediation of the
mother/child relationship, including compulsory joint custody and the
recent welfare attacks on single motherhood, may certainly be coer-
cive in the short run. Nonetheless, these reforms are ultimately justi-
fiable because they will, in the long run, prevent the formation of in-
368. Id. at 1525.
369. See Part III.B.
370. Stark, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1521 n.189 (cited in note 61) ('The movement to
encourage joint physical custody is wise but the movement to permit courts to impose joint
custody is not' (quoting David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody
Disputes in Divorce, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477, 479 (1984))).
371. See generally Annotation, 17 A.L.R.4th at 1013-28 (cited in note 349) (collecting cases).
372. Stark, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 1521 n.189 (cited in note 61).
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trapsychic structures that originate in our experiences of psycho-sex-
ual individuation from the all-powerful mother.
Second, while Stark acknowledges that her analysis focuses on
"the typical pattern in middle-class families in the West of babies
attended by one lone mother, '" 373 the important task is to show how
her arguments would be affected by a more informed appreciation of
the impact of exclusive female mothering in the non-nuclear, extended
family networks her analysis tends to marginalize. As I argued in
Parts III.B, IV.A, and V.A, this analysis suggests that heterosexual
dis-ease, the psycho-sexual dynamics of male dominance and female
submission, and the fear of female power are better explained by the
narratives of pornographic masculinity. They are driven by the
socioeconomic structures that organize the competition for power and
status between men.
From this perspective, the impact of exclusive female parent-
ing depends entirely on the social relations in which it is practiced.
Located in the context of the male-dominated nuclear family, exclu-
sive female parenting may be the vehicle through which women are
subordinated to men. Located in the context of matrifocal extended
family arrangements, however, exclusive female parenting is one of
the vehicles through which children are raised into a deep apprecia-
tion and respect for maternal authority and commitment to familial
interdependence. This is because separation from the mother means
integration into a broader network of social relations in which female
power is present and pervasive, rather than individuation into the
delusion of individual independence, achieved through a devaluation
of the feminine and the increasing commodification of all social rela-
tions.
Indeed, a fuller understanding of the cultural logic of matrifo-
cality suggests that women's subordination is not so much a product
of exclusive female parenting as a product of the social context in
which motherhood is practiced. In the cultural logic of matrifocality,
exclusive female parenting is the vehicle through which women ac-
quire and exercise power, construct and enjoy relations of female soli-
darity, and promote respect for and allegiance to maternal authority.
From this perspective, women's autonomy, both as mothers and as
sexual subjects, is much more likely to emerge from the "maternal
empowerment" trajectory, which advocates reforms designed to
373. Id. at 1496 n.68 (quoting Benjamin, The Bonds of Love at 75 (cited in note 10)).
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ensure women access to the socioeconomic resources they need to
raise their children independently of men, if they so choose, than from
policies designed to promote gender-neutral parenthood.
Equally important, a clearer understanding of the cultural
logic and psychoanalytic impact of matrifocal extended families also
suggests that the maternal empowerment reform trajectory may help
reconstruct the terms upon which men and women interact as
heterosexual desiring subjects. This cross-cultural analysis suggests
a very different account of the origin of male supremacist narratives
of pornographic masculinity. In this account, fear and resentment
toward women and the urge to dominate women is not so much a
function of the mother's power as of her powerlessness, both as a
mother and as a wife, in the male-dominated nuclear family. When
women command real power in the family, maternal authority is
respected and cherished. Indeed, from this perspective, rather than
being the origin of male supremacist ideologies and practices,
maternal empowerment is a potential solution because the
pornographic attack on feminine sexual beauty, maternal authority,
and the devaluation of femininity are means men use to maintain the
socioeconomic and coercive relations through which they continue to
subordinate and dominate each other.
In short, in the cultural logic of matrifocality, proposals
promoting gender-neutral parenthood are most problematic precisely
because they are grounded in arguments that embrace abstract
individualism as a universally authentic identity (Czapanskiy's
approach) and indulge mainstream culture's psycho-sexual fear of
female power (Stark's approach). Neither abstract individualism, nor
the repudiation of female power are likely to reconstruct motherhood
in ways that secure women's freedom from sexual coercion and
appropriation because these ideologies are the foundations upon
which the practices of commodified femininity and pornographic
masculinity are culturally constructed.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article explores various problems that the feminist strug-
gle against women's sexual oppression presents for some straight
women of color. Starting from a common interest in eliminating the
subordination of women because of our sex and sexuality, I suggest a
number of ways the feminist struggle for women's sexual autonomy
can be more sensitive to the differences that class, race, and sexual
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orientation make in the way women experience this struggle and en-
vision the objective of sexual autonomy. A genuinely inclusive femi-
nism must seriously consider the ways women's heterosexual desire
and their intraracial solidarity with men influence how they
experience the feminist legal interventions designed to liberate them.
Initially, I make this point by examining how empirical pat-
terns in the processing of rape cases can simultaneously reflect and
reinscribe the logics of male supremacy and white supremacy through
the exercise of discretionary power. Feminist legal reforms that at-
tempt to alter the substantive criminal elements of rape are unlikely
to change these processing patterns because much of the discretion
exercised is inherent in applying any formal legal standards to com-
plex factual events. Legal reforms that target the case processing
system, particularly the points at which culturally dominant narra-
tives of race and sexuality penetrate discretionary decision making
are more effective legal strategies for altering racist and sexist rape
enforcement patterns.
A further problem is that even the most unbiased rape process-
ing system will not eliminate rape so long as women are easy and ac-
ceptable targets for male sexual aggression. Consequently, the legal
struggle for women's freedom from rape must be conceptualized as a
struggle that extends beyond reforming the criminal justice appara-
tus. Feminists should also target the production of popular culture as
well as the economic conditions, public policies, and legal doctrines
that construct women's sexual vulnerability.
Along the way, I provide a critical account of the ways in which
culturally dominant narratives of race and sexual identity, as well as
psychoanalytic theories of mothering and motherhood, are deployed in
various discourses to understand the interpersonal practices of sexual
dominance and the legal arrangements that support these practices. I
call these the narratives of commodified femininity and pornographic
masculinity. My discussion exposes their cultural contingency by
comparing various images of sexual identity in Black and Latin cul-
tures and argues that their cultural dominance should be combatted
by circulating alternative narratives. I draw these narratives from
the work of various Jungian psychoanalysts.
These counter-narratives offer alternative resources through
which individual men and women may begin to construct the terms of
a nonmisogynistic heterosexuality, that is, a heterosexuality in which
male power does not depend upon female powerlessness and subordi-
nation. Wider circulation of these alternative narratives could help
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alter the enforcement patterns in rape cases. These counter-nar-
ratives could also help reconstruct the public policies that make many
women experience their sexuality as a vulnerability. There are no
easy answers in the feminist struggle for women's sexual autonomy,
only more or less redemptive trajectories.
